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Cooperative services—a term which includes any system that relies on the
resources and participation of its clients to function—have proven to be a
popular, naturally scalable means to disseminate content, distribute compu-
tational workloads, or provide network connectivity. However, because these
services critically depend on participants that are not controlled by a single
administrative domain, these services must be designed to function in environ-
ments where no participant—because of failure or selfishness—will necessarily
follow the specified protocol.
This thesis addresses the challenge of establishing and maintaining co-
operation in cooperative services by (1) advancing our understanding of the
limits to what our services can guarantee in the presence of failure, (2) demon-
strating the critical role that correct participants can play in the incentives
provided by the service, and (3) proposing a new notion of equilibrium that,
unlike traditional notions, provides both rigorous yet practical guarantees in
the presence of collusion. Furthermore, we demonstrate that our ideas can be
applied to practice by designing and implementing Seer, a system that pro-
vides a scalable, reliable, and robust method for disseminating content even if
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How does one reason about and build systems with provable proper-
ties in an environment where no participant is guaranteed to follow
the specified protocol?
While such an environment may seem implausible in reality, this is pre-
cisely the environment in which services that span multiple administrative
domains must function. In such services—which include applications such as
content dissemination (e.g., [4]), file backup (e.g., [16]), volunteer computing
(e.g., [15]), multihop wireless networking (e.g., [12]), and Internet routing—
resources are not under the control of a single administrative domain, so the
necessary cooperation cannot simply be achieved by fiat. Instead, it is imper-
ative that the service be structured so that nodes—which are administered
by different, potentially selfish entities—have an incentive to help sustain it.
Such issues are not simply the concern of researchers secluded in an ivory
tower: much evidence suggests that a large number of peers will free-ride or
deviate from the assigned protocol if it is in their interest to do so (e.g.,
[10, 22, 65, 96]). Yet, ensuring cooperation is critical to the dependability, if
not the survival, of these aptly-named cooperative services, which rely on their
participants’ resources to provide their offerings. It is this challenge that this
thesis addresses: establishing and maintaining cooperation in cooperative ser-
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vices between participants that may arbitrarily fail or selfishly deviate when
doing so is in their best interest.
There has been much previous work that has attempted to address this
challenge. Traditional game theory has been heavily leveraged to provide a
rigorous basis for designing a cooperative service (e.g., [4, 18, 43, 51, 70])
where nodes do not want to deviate (an equilibrium). This approach—while
rigorous when all participants are rational—has shortcomings that stem from
game theory’s general assumption that all participants act rationally, whereas
failures—which may cause participants to act “irrationally”1—are a reality in
any distributed system. This is particularly the case in cooperative services,
where the nodes themselves are often unreliable personal machines riddled
with malware and other exploits [1, 26]. Meanwhile, traditional fault tolerance
techniques can handle rational deviations by modeling them as failures, but
the limitations of this approach are obvious: since basic distributed computing
primitives such as consensus and reliable broadcast cannot be implemented if
more than one third of the nodes are Byzantine [75], fault tolerance techniques
alone are unlikely to be able to handle the potentially large number of selfish
participants who may find it advantageous to deviate.
Previous work has combined principles from both game theory and
fault-tolerant distributed computing to provide a model that overcomes the
limitations of the individual approaches. One approach is to draw inspiration
from traditional Byzantine fault tolerance techniques and require that rational
nodes prefer the specified equilibrium regardless of how up to t failures occur
[19, 21, 49]. In this thesis, we refer to this general approach as (k, t)-robustness
(from [19]). Another general model, formalized by Aiyer et al. [24], is known
as BAR for the Byzantine (faulty), acquiescent (correct),2 and rational (or
selfish) participants that are explicitly modeled.
Both approaches leave much to be desired. (k, t)-robustness, while theo-
1One can model arbitrarily faulty peers as rational peers who follow an unknown utility
function. Unfortunately, doing so does not simplify the problem.
2These nodes were originally known as “altruistic”, but we have renamed them to better
capture the idea that these peers are obedient rather than irrationally generous [20].
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retically elegant, has overly strict requirements in what guarantees an equilib-
rium provides with respect to Byzantine failures and coalitions. As we show in
§3.2 and §5.2, these requirements make (k, t)-robustness unachievable in many
real-world scenarios. On the other hand, the BAR model has been applied to
real systems [24, 78, 79], but these systems, as well as other work that has
used similar models [86], have:
• Generally required that rational participants believe the worst regarding
Byzantine failure,
• Assumed acquiescent nodes do not exist or models them as rational, and
• Do not explicitly handle collusion, a phenomenon that has been observed
in practice [80].
So what should be the basis for a rigorous treatment of cooperative
services? How do we model the participants, and what types of guarantees
should we aim for? Most importantly, can we apply our model and guarantees
in practice in a real system? As the aforementioned shortcomings with (k, t)-
robustness and BAR illustrate, there is a tension between theory and practice:
theoretically robust and elegant notions may prove impossible to realize in real
systems, but sprinkling a system with incentives whose rationale is rooted in
intuition and common sense provides only a modicum of protection that is
often defeated when exposed to more than casual strategic behavior [10, 68,
76, 81, 93, 99].
This thesis raises the bar in both the theory and practice of cooperative
systems by first describing three theoretical contributions that address the
aforementioned shortcomings in the BAR model while advancing the modeling
and understanding of all three types of nodes: Byzantine, acquiescent, and
rational(ly colluding). Importantly, we show how these contributions, while
interesting theoretically, are applicable to a real system.
In summary, this thesis shows that:
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• Notions of equilibrium inspired by traditional Byzantine fault-tolerant
techniques, such as (k, t)-robustness, do not admit any useful equilibria
even under a very general model of cooperative services. As a result,
any practical equilibria must take into account a rational node’s beliefs
regarding how Byzantine failure will occur (§3).
• Acquiescent nodes—the nodes that enable selfish nodes to free-ride to
begin with—can actually be a boon for the system. As we will show,
acquiescent nodes are not only sufficient, they are often necessary to
provide incentives for rational nodes to cooperate in cooperative services
when nodes know when the service will come to an end (§4).
• Traditional methods for analyzing protocols in the presence of collusion
are likely to bear little fruit in real systems. We propose new notions of
equilibria that provide rigorous guarantees of stability even when nodes
may collude (§5).
• The aforementioned theoretical contributions are useful in practice. We
design and implement a new hybrid content distribution system, Seer,
that applies our theoretical insights towards building a scalable, robust,
and dependable method for distributing content, thus demonstrating
that we can have our (theoretical) cake and eat it (in practice) too (§6).
In the remainder of this chapter, we delve into the contributions we
make to each type of node as well as the details of the system.
1.1 Byzantine
In traditional Byzantine fault tolerance, as long as the number of Byzantine
nodes does not exceed some threshold t, the system is guaranteed to provide
its safety properties independent of who the t Byzantine nodes are and how
they behave. It is appealing to aim for a notion of equilibrium based on the
same principles, in which rational nodes—either unilaterally or as a part of
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a coalition—cannot improve their utility by deviating independent of who the
t Byzantine nodes are and of how they behave. This approach, formalized as
a part of (k, t)-robustness [19, 21] and other notions such as fault-tolerant
Nash equilibrium [49], is in principle very attractive: at equilibrium, peers will
always be free of regret, as their chosen strategy is guaranteed to prove a best
response regardless of who and how t nodes fail.
We show that, despite its appeal, any notion of equilibrium that guar-
antees regret freedom is fundamentally unable to yield non-trivial equilibria
in any game that captures three key characteristics of achieving some desired
functionality in many fault-tolerant distributed systems:
• Some nodes need to communicate.
• Bandwidth is not free.
• The desired functionality can be achieved despite t Byzantine failures.
Furthermore, we argue that requiring regret freedom in any manner is
simply too much to ask. In particular, we find that even if we weaken (k, t)-
robustness by requiring regret freedom in only one dimension—namely, that
rational nodes do not regret their decision even if they knew (1) who would
fail but not how they fail, or (2) how nodes fail but not who would fail—still
only achieves regret-free equilibria under very limited circumstances.
To overcome this impasse, we argue instead that nodes must brave
through the possibility of regret. This approach, which we call regret brav-
ing, is motivated by the observation that rational agents that operate under
uncertainty about the strategy of other players (as is the case when players
are Byzantine) are often willing to cooperate without requiring absolute re-
gret freedom, as long as cooperation is expected to yield the highest payoff. For
instance, when stock traders buy or sell shares, they are well aware of the possi-
bility of regretting their actions. Nonetheless, they follow a particular strategy
as long as they cannot improve their utility with respect to their expectation
about their environment—the worth of the traded asset, their comfort with
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risk, and what they believe will be the trends in the market—by deviating.
Similarly, we consider notions of equilibrium in which rational nodes aim to
best respond to their expectations regarding Byzantine failures: the chosen
strategy guarantees no regret only to the extent that such expectations prove
correct.
We will describe two notions of equilibria: in the first, rational nodes
play a maximin strategy that guarantees the best worst-case outcome despite
any possible Byzantine failure; in the other, rational nodes assign probabili-
ties to various possible faulty behaviors and aim for a Bayesian equilibrium.
We then show that regret-braving equilibria admit simple and intuitive equi-
libria for communication games where even the weakened versions of (k, t)-
robustness could not.
1.2 Acquiescent
There exists a sizable fraction of acquiescent peers in many environments [22].
Yet, despite their ubiquity, it is not obvious what impact these participants
can have on cooperative services and their incentives. On one hand, services
often rely on the existence of acquiescent peers—and the unselfishness codi-
fied in the protocol they obediently follow—to continue providing service. In
particular, these acquiescent peers enable selfish participants to leech off the
service without contributing their fair share. On the other, heavily relying on
such peers to maintain the service by making up for free-riders is a risky propo-
sition: even well-meaning peers, if blatantly taken advantage of, may give in to
the temptation of joining the ranks of the selfish, leading in turn to more defec-
tions and to the service’s collapse. Because of the difficulty in finding a way to
rely on acquiescent peers without having rational peers simply freeload off of
them, acquiescent nodes have been largely ignored in the design of cooperative
service protocols.3
3Acquiescent nodes can be modeled as Byzantine [19] or as rational nodes by assigning
them the rational strategy. Neither classification is particularly satisfying.
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In this thesis, we show that not only are acquiescent nodes not an-
tithetical to rational cooperation, but that, in a fundamental way, rational
cooperation can only be achieved in the presence of acquiescent nodes. We
demonstrate how acquiescent nodes can induce cooperation by distilling the
issue of whether cooperation can be maintained in a cooperative service to
one critical exchange: the last exchange, the only exchange that, by definition,
cannot rely on the promise of future benefit, and the exchange which provides
incentives that form the cornerstone of cooperation in prior interactions.
We show that, without requiring oft-used assumptions on never-ending
services or ignorance on a node’s part regarding when the service ends—
assumptions that are often simply not true in practice and, worse, may still
be insufficient to incentivize cooperation given a lossy network and Byzantine
failure—the presence of acquiescent peers is sufficient and, in many ways, nec-
essary to motivate rational peers to contribute. In particular, in the context
of a model of the last exchange where one node wants to acquire content from
its peer and has the capability to pester its peer (which induces cost on both
the node and its peer), we prove that:
• There exists no equilibrium strategy where rational peers contribute if
all peers are either rational or Byzantine. This result essentially holds
even if we allow for an infinite number of pestering rounds.4
• The presence of acquiescent peers is sufficient to transform pestering
into a credible threat. Intuitively, if rational peers have sufficiently high
beliefs that they may be interacting with an acquiescent peer, they are
motivated to pester, making it in turn preferable for rational peers to
contribute.
The fraction of acquiescent nodes sufficient to sustain rational contri-
bution depends on several system parameters, including the probability of
4In §4.6, we precisely define the conditions under which our result holds given an infinite
number of rounds; intuitively, we assume players do not want to be punished and randomize
at most a finite number of times.
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network loss, the fraction of Byzantine peers in the system, and the behavior
that rational peers expect from acquiescent and Byzantine peers. Exploring
this space through a simulator, we find that:
• Acquiescent peers make rational cooperation easy to achieve under real-
istic conditions. In particular, we find that even if less than 10% of the
population is acquiescent, rational peers are incentivized to cooperate in
a system where the network drops 5% of all packets and Byzantine peers
make up over 50% of the remainder of the population.
• Confirming our prior intuition, overly acquiescent peers—those that con-
tribute every time they are pestered—make it more difficult to achieve ra-
tional cooperation: we cannot always achieve rational cooperation; when
we do, it requires an implausibly high fraction of acquiescent peers. This
is good news: the less foolishly generous is the acquiescent behavior suffi-
cient to incentivize rational contribution, the more feasible it is to design
systems with a sustainable population of acquiescent peers.
• The uncertainty introduced by network loss is both a bane and a boon.
On the one hand, it significantly complicates the analysis of a peer’s
optimal strategy because each peer does not know what the other has
observed. On the other, it lowers the threshold for rational cooperation
by leaving open some possibility that the other peer may be acquiescent,
even when the observed behavior suggests otherwise.
1.3 Rationally Colluding
The social nature of cooperative services suggests that nodes will develop,
or may have already established, a rich web of relationships (e.g., based on
friendship or on belonging to the same organization), which may cause coali-
tions of nodes to collude and deviate together [80]. The literature offers two
approaches to guarantee that deviations resulting from collusion do not affect
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the incentives provided to rational nodes. The first approach is to model col-
lusion as a fault and colluding nodes as Byzantine. While possible—after all,
Byzantine failure includes any arbitrary failure—this approach suffers the same
limitations that modeling rational deviations as Byzantine does: it introduces
an artificially low cap on the number of colluders. The second approach—
taken by strong Nash [31], k-resilient equilibria [19, 21], and coalition-proof
Nash equilibria [33], to name a few—is to deny any benefit to colluders: if the
equilibrium is a best response not just to every individual, but also to every
possible coalition, then collusion poses no harm to the equilibrium’s stability,
since nodes gain no benefit by colluding.
Our work is motivated by what we believe to be a critical flaw of the
second approach: its requirement that every node prefer the same course of
action, despite whom it may be colluding with. After all, nodes that collude
are likely to trust each other more and, more generally, be able to hold stronger
assumptions about one another. Since stronger assumptions typically lead to
more efficient protocols, identifying a single strategy that is a best response
both inside and outside of every possible coalition is very difficult and is un-
likely to yield a useful, practical foundation for building dependable services.
To overcome this challenge, this dissertation introduces a fundamen-
tally different approach to dealing with coalitions. The key observation is that
the fundamental property an equilibrium provides is stability (in that nodes
do not want to deviate), and that while finding a single best response between
all nodes is sufficient, it is not necessary to achieve stability. Leveraging this
observation, we introduce two new notions of equilibrium that achieve sta-
bility through a simple observation: coalitions (including the trivial singleton
coalition of one non-colluding node) will not deviate from an equilibrium as
long as the equilibrium specifies a best-response strategy for every coalition.
Thus, the strategy a node follows may depend on whom the node is colluding
with, thereby enabling the equilibrium to explicitly model the advantages that
coalition members have while providing assurances that nodes do not deviate
from the specified equilibrium.
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The first notion of equilibrium, k-indistinguishability, provides an at-
tractively simple guarantee: the strategy a node plays may depend on whom
it is colluding with, but its participation in any coalition has no effect on its ac-
tions towards peers the node is not colluding with. Thus, in a k-indistinguishable
equilibrium, nodes cannot tell whether another node, with whom they are not
colluding, is itself part of some other coalition (of at most k nodes).
k-indistinguishable equilibrium, while simple, provides stronger than
necessary guarantees. The second notion, k-stability, instead adheres to the
conditions necessary for stability: like k-indistinguishability, k-stable equilibria
specify a strategy per coalition that is a best response to the strategies played
by all other possible coalitions; unlike k-indistinguishability, the actions that
a node takes as a part of a k-stable equilibrium may be informative about
whether it is colluding and with whom. Finally, we introduce strategy functions,
a new construct that enables us to express the strategies a node may play as
a function of whom a node is colluding with.
In summary, we make the following contributions to how coalitions are
dealt with in cooperative services:
• We illustrate the limits of generalizing Nash equilibria to coalitions,
which requires that a single strategy be a best response for every node
regardless of whether it is colluding, and show that is too strong a re-
quirement to admit equilibria in several common cooperative service sce-
narios.
• We distill the fundamental stability property that defines an equilibrium
and introduce (a) two new notions of equilibria—k-indistinguishability
and k-stability—that continue to guarantee stability while allowing nodes
to benefit from their coalitions, and (b) a new construct, strategy func-
tions, for expressing a node’s strategy as a function of its coalitions.
• We demonstrate the applicability of our equilibria by showing their use
in scenarios for which previous equilibria did not exist.
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1.4 System
Putting it all together, we demonstrate the utility of our ideas and insights
by applying them to the design and implementation of Seer, a hybrid P2P
content distribution system.
Currently, content is predominantly delivered via servers in large data
centers, which provide a trusted, reliable source of content. The increasing
popularity of these services and richness of the content has resulted in the
rapid deployment of new data centers to offset the load (e.g., [38, 39]). The
cost of connecting and running these data centers can quickly add up: for
instance, Netflix, who streamed roughly 4 billion hours worth of content in Q1
2013 [91], pays over $400 million a year for bandwidth alone (assuming it costs
Netflix roughly $0.05 per 2 hours of content [36]).
Cooperative services, such as those that use peer-to-peer (P2P) tech-
nology, provide a cheaper alternative: because participants are responsible for
distributing content, the number of content distributors inherently scales with
the number of clients. However, such scalability does not come for free: in
addition to the aforementioned challenges in designing incentives and dealing
with failures, P2P systems provide no guarantee that clients will acquire the
content they desire.
In this thesis, we describe Seer, a hybrid P2P-client/server that pro-
vides a reliable, scalable, and robust content distribution service with strong
incentives for cooperation. Like previous hybrid P2P systems—deployed by
companies such as Spotify [17], Blizzard [5], and PPTV [14, 64] and studied
and used in much prior work (e.g., [89, 92, 100])—Seer leverages the strengths
of both approaches on which it is based: the scalability and low cost of P2P
services combined with the reliability of a server or CDN. Unlike other hybrid
P2P systems—which have largely assumed that clients will not free-ride off the
server (e.g., by changing the settings in the client’s software preferences, using
a firewall to block P2P traffic, or modifying the client itself) or used infor-
mal arguments about their incentives (which could lead to potential exploits
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[68, 10, 76, 81, 93, 99])—Seer leverages both our theoretical contributions and
the trusted server to provide robust guarantees that peers will be incentivized
to disseminate content despite the presence of Byzantine, acquiescent, and
rational participants. Thus, Seer ensures that it will not simply devolve to
a client/server architecture where the server provides all the content to the
clients.
Seer is proof that one can design a provably dependable cooperative ser-
vice under assumptions significantly more realistic than previously achieved:
more than ever before, Seer is not only rigorous, but rigorous in practice. In
particular, Seer does not assume that clients are (1) exceedingly risk-averse
with respect to Byzantine failure, (2) blissfully unaware of when the last ex-
change is and that they may receive no future benefit from the service, and
(3) unable to collude; furthermore, rational nodes in Seer account for network
loss and latency. Despite these weaker assumptions, we are able to rigorously
prove that clients want to help disseminate content in Seer. We accomplish
this in part by basing design decisions on what we are able to prove about the
system, thereby ensuring that Seer’s policies and mechanisms are backed by
strong theoretical guarantees. Yet, as we show, rigor does not have to come at
the price of performance: Seer neither sacrifices the scalability of P2P services
nor the reliability of client/server services. Evaluating our implementation of
Seer, we find that Seer can support significantly more clients than a traditional
client/server service and can outperform BitTorrent, a popular traditional P2P
service, by over 20%.
1.5 Organization of thesis
We introduce some background and common terminology and concepts that
we will use in the rest of the thesis in §2. We delve into our theoretical con-
tributions in §3 (Byzantine), §4 (acquiescent), and §5 (rational). We describe
Seer in §6. Finally, we describe related work in §7, and conclude in §8.
The theoretical contributions in this thesis have appeared in previous
12





Before describing our contributions in detail, we provide some general back-
ground, define some useful notions and terminology, and give a high-level in-
troduction on how we model and reason about cooperative services. We define
relevant notions and terminology as needed in subsequent chapters.
We model cooperative services as a game played by a set of n players
N = {1, . . . , n}. These players represent participants in the cooperative service
(which we also refer to as “nodes” or “peers”). In our game,
• Nodes communicate by sending and receiving messages.
• A node does not benefit directly from the act of sending a message. Thus,
a node does not receive benefit from sending a message if the outcome
of the node (e.g., the messages or credits it receives) or system (e.g., the
outcome of consensus) does not change.
• Doing more (e.g., sending or receiving more or larger messages) incurs
more cost.
• A node’s payoff solely depends on what benefits it earns and what costs
it incurs.
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• The actions a node can choose to take do not decrease as a result of
receiving a message. In particular, a node can always act as if it had not
received the message.1
We will define concrete instantiations of this model in subsequent chapters.
A strategy σx is a complete description of the actions some node x takes
at any point in the game; in the context of this thesis, a strategy is effectively
the protocol a node uses. We will mostly focus on pure strategies, which specify
exactly one action at every point where x must make a decision, but we will
also discuss mixed strategies, which may randomly select an action among some
set of actions at some point in the game.
We refer to the service-assigned protocol as the assigned strategy. A
strategy profile σ = (σx)x∈N assigns a strategy σx to each node x. We refer to
the actions that a node x has performed or observed in the past as the node’s
history and denote x’s history at some time r as hrx.
A utility function U defines the preferences of all nodes. If there is
no randomness in the system or environment (e.g., packets are not randomly
dropped because of network loss), then given a strategy profile σ, every node x
earns payoff or utility Ux(σ). Rational nodes prefer and select strategies that
increase their payoffs as specified by the utility function. We refer to the payoff
a node earns from the middle of the game (e.g., from some history hrx) on as
a node’s continuation payoff. We denote the amount of payoff some node x
earns from some strategy profile starting from some history hrx as Ux(σ|hrx).
We denote “everyone but x” as −x; indicate the combination of multiple
strategies into a strategy profile using parentheses, e.g., σ = (σx, σ−x); and
drop parentheses when the meaning is clear. For example, Ux(σ
′
x, σ−x) denotes
the payoff that x earns from playing σ′x while everyone else plays σ−x. We use
the same notation for sets of nodes as well, e.g., for some set of nodes K, −K
represents “everyone but nodes in K.”
1This assumption may seem obvious in the context of computer science, but we state
this explicitly to make clear that we are not considering any “unusual” games where this
property may not hold.
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Generally, we strive to prove that a particular protocol is an equilibrium.
When there is no randomness in the system and environment, an equilibrium
is a set of strategies (typically a strategy profile) in which every node prefers
to play its assigned strategy. For example, the celebrated Nash equilibrium
achieves this stability by ensuring that the strategy σ∗x of any given node x is
a best response (i.e., it maximizes x’s payoff) to everyone else following σ∗−x.
Thus, no node has any incentive to unilaterally deviate, making the strategy
profile stable.
Definition 2.1. A strategy profile σ∗ is a Nash equilibrium if for all







Definition 2.1 is an example of a notion of equilibrium, or a solution
concept, in that it defines a set of conditions that describe when a set of
strategies is considered an equilibrium. We will define other solution concepts
in subsequent chapters.
We focus on environments in which neither trusted hardware nor trusted
third-parties are used to monitor all communication between peers.2 Although
such a monitor is useful, it is often impractical or even infeasible to provide
one, and in practice few cooperative systems leverage trusted hardware to
prove communication. We express this reality in the following assumption:
Assumption 2.2. A node that sent a message m cannot unilaterally prove
that it sent m.
BAR. In this thesis, we consider three different types of nodes:
2Note that this does not preclude the existence of a trusted third-party such as the server
in Seer (§6), which does not observe every message between every pair of nodes.
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• Byzantine: these nodes play an arbitrary strategy.
• Acquiescent : these nodes follow the assigned strategy.
• Rational : these nodes follow a strategy if and only if deviating does not
increase their payoff.
Each node x has a type θx that distinguishes it as being Byzantine, ac-
quiescent, or rational. For simplicity, we will generally assume that all rational
nodes are of the same type (denoted R); we assume the same of acquiescent
nodes (denoted A), who would anyway follow any strategy assigned to them.
On the other hand, a Byzantine node may potentially play one of many differ-
ent strategies. When we need to distinguish the different strategies a Byzantine
node may play, we will denote a Byzantine node x’s type by its strategy τx.
When we do not (and we simply need to know the expected Byzantine strat-
egy), we will denote the Byzantine type as B.
We assume that a player’s type is only known a priori to the player
itself and any peers it may be colluding with (if collusion is possible). Thus,
players must choose their strategies given incomplete information about the
environment. The remainder of the thesis describes how we deal with and, at
times, leverage this uncertainty.
Summary of symbols used. This thesis makes heavy use of a variety of
symbols. For the reader’s convenience and reference, Table 2.1 lists many of
the symbols that we repeatedly use and how we generally use them in this





hrx Player x’s history at some time r
i, j Generic index variable
k Size of coalition
n Number of players
r Variable related to time or the round
t Maximum number of failures handled
u, v Function or variable related to payoff
x, y, z Index variable for players
K A coalition of size k
N Set of players {1, . . . , n}
R Number of rounds (for finitely-repeated games)
T Set of failed nodes
Ux Utility function for player x
V Function or variable related to payoff
γ Cost of communication
δ Discount factor (for infinitely-repeated games)
θx Type of player x
µ / µx Set of beliefs / player x’s belief
σ / σx Strategy (protocol) profile / player x’s strategy
τx Strategy for (and type of) Byzantine player x
B, A, R Byzantine, acquiescent, and rational types




We start off by describing the type that is most familiar to those in distributed
computing and systems. Because real distributed systems often fail in unex-
pected ways, there has been considerable work in developing techniques to
tolerate Byzantine, i.e., arbitrary, failure [75].
In cooperative services, simply being able to tolerate failure is insuffi-
cient: non-faulty participants that are selfish may deviate for their own self-
interest. Moreover, failure complicates any incentives that a service provides
for cooperation, as these incentives must be robust to the possibility that some
participants fail and act “irrationally.” It is useful, then, to provide a rigorous
basis for analyzing such services and incentives by devising a solution concept
that admits, as equilibrium, strategies (protocols) that rational nodes con-
tinue to follow despite the possibility of failure. But how does one devise such
a solution concept?
A natural approach is to draw inspiration from traditional Byzantine
fault-tolerant computing. In traditional Byzantine fault-tolerant systems, as
long as the number of Byzantine nodes does not exceed a threshold t, the
system is guaranteed to provide its safety properties independent of who the t
Byzantine nodes are and how they behave. Similarly, it is appealing to aim for a
notion of equilibrium in which rational nodes—either unilaterally or as a part
of a coalition—cannot improve their utility by deviating independent of who
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the t Byzantine nodes are and of how they behave. This approach, elegantly
formalized in the notion of (k, t)-robustness [19, 21] (as well as in fault-tolerant
Nash equilibrium [49]), is in principle very attractive: at equilibrium, peers will
never have reason to regret their chosen strategy, which is guaranteed to prove
a best response to any Byzantine strategy, independent of the identities of
Byzantine nodes.
In this chapter, we show that, despite its appeal, a solution concept
that guarantees regret freedom is fundamentally unable to yield non-trivial
equilibria in games (which we name communication games) that capture three
key characteristics of many practical fault-tolerant distributed systems:
• To achieve some desired functionality, some nodes need to communicate.
• Bandwidth is not free.
• The desired functionality can be achieved despite t Byzantine failures.
Moreover, we find that weakening (k, t)-robustness, even considerably,
does not help. For example, suppose that, magically, all rational nodes in a
communication game knew precisely the identity of all Byzantine nodes (but
not their strategy); or, alternatively, that they knew their strategy (but not
their identities). We find that in both cases a regret-free equilibrium can be
achieved only under very limited circumstances.
These results are not interesting because of their proofs, which are
straightforward, but because they show that in fault-tolerant distributed sys-
tems, conditioning rational cooperation on the expectation of regret freedom
may be fundamentally too much to ask. Furthermore, the limitations of this
approach appear hard to fix, since they are rooted in the universal quantifiers
(e.g., “for all strategies” or “for all sets of t Byzantine nodes”) that are at the
very essence of regret freedom.
The second part of this chapter describes how we overcome this im-
passe, using an approach we call regret braving. Regret braving is motivated
by the observation that rational agents that operate under uncertainty about
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the strategy of other players (as is the case when players are Byzantine) are
often willing to cooperate without requiring absolute regret freedom, as long
as cooperation is expected to yield the highest payoff. For instance, when
stock traders buy or sell shares, they are well aware of the possibility of re-
gretting their actions. Nonetheless, they follow a particular strategy as long
as they cannot improve their utility with respect to their expectation about
their environment—the worth of the traded asset, their comfort with risk, and
what they believe will be the trends in the market—by deviating. Similarly, we
consider solution concepts in which rational nodes aim to best respond to their
expectations regarding Byzantine failures: the chosen strategy guarantees no
regret only to the extent that such expectations prove correct.
We find that regret-braving solution concepts admit simple and intuitive
equilibria for communication games where even the weakened versions of (k, t)-
robustness could not. We will describe two solution concepts: in the first,
rational nodes play a maximin strategy that guarantees the best worst-case
outcome despite any possible Byzantine failure; in the other, rational nodes
assign probabilities to various possible faulty behaviors and aim for a Bayesian
equilibrium. We do not suggest that these solution concepts are the “right”
ones or that they can be directly applied to every BAR-tolerant system. What
these preliminary results do show, however, is that regret-braving solution
concepts are not subject to the fundamental limitations inherent to regret
freedom.
Organization of chapter. §3.1 formalizes how we model players and in-
troduces the communication game that we use to compare solution concepts.
§3.2 explores the land of the (regret) free, showing why equilibria that base
rational cooperation on regret freedom are fundamentally hard to achieve.
§3.3 describes instead the home of the (regret) brave: we discuss two mod-




In this chapter, we model a fault-tolerant system in which communication is
not free and at least some nodes must communicate to achieve the desired func-
tionality using the following game. This game mirrors many of characteristics
described in §2.
Definition 3.1. A communication game consists of some set of nodes
N = {1, . . . , n} in which
• Communication incurs some cost and does not generate direct benefit
to the sender.
• Communication incurs some cost to the receiver.
• The actions a node can choose to take does not decrease as a result
of receiving a message.
• Benefit is obtained from functionality that (a) can be achieved in
the presence of up to t < n Byzantine failures and (b) requires
communication between some pair of nodes.
For simplicity, in this chapter, we use the same communication cost
γ > 0 for both sending and receiving, we assume that messages are never lost,
and we assume that there are no acquiescent nodes. We focus on non-trivial
strategy profiles, in which some positive utility is expected for at least one
node; this implies that some communication must occur.
3.2 Regret freedom
In Byzantine fault-tolerant systems, safety properties hold regardless of how
Byzantine failures occur. Ideally, one would like rational cooperation to be
achieved under similarly strong guarantees. (k, t)-robustness [19, 21] is an el-
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egant solution concept that captures this attractive intuition. A (k, t)-robust
equilibrium is completely impervious to the actions of Byzantine nodes: ratio-
nal nodes will never have to second-guess their decision even if the identities
and strategies of the Byzantine nodes become known.
(k, t)-robustness offers three key properties. We define all three proper-
ties here for completeness, but our focus will be on the best-response condition,
which is the condition that provides regret freedom.
The first property, t-immunity [19], captures the intuition that nodes
following a strategy profile should not be adversely affected by Byzantine fail-
ures, as long as there are at most t.
Definition 3.2. A strategy profile σ is t-immune if, for all T ⊆ N such
that |T | ≤ t, all strategy profiles τ , and x /∈ T ,
Ux(σ−T , τT ) ≥ Ux(σ)
Note that t-immunity is not equivalent to Byzantine fault tolerance, as
t-immunity does not specify that a strategy profile σ must provide any sort
of desirable safety or liveness properties despite t faults. In fact, any σ, fault-
tolerant or not, is t-immune if it specifies actions so terrible that Byzantine
nodes, playing anything other than σ, cannot hurt a player’s utility.
The second, k-resilience [19], addresses the possibility of collusion and
is effectively a generalization of the Nash equilibrium for coalitions of up to
size k: a k-resilient equilibrium guarantees that a coalition of size at most k
cannot deviate in a way that benefits every member.1
1Abraham et al. also define a strong version of collusion resilience in which there must
not exist a deviation in which even one coalition member can do better [19, 21]. While
we explore the issue of collusion in §5, the impossibility results we derive in this chapter
are orthogonal to how we handle collusion. Consequently, we will use the weak version as
Abraham et al. do in [21]; since any strongly k-resilient equilibrium is (weakly) k-resilient,
our impossibility results hold in both versions.
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Definition 3.3. A strategy profile σ∗ is a k-resilient equilibrium if, for
all K ⊆ N such that |K| ≤ k, there does not exist an alternate strategy







The (k, t)-robustness solution concept is the combination of t-immunity, k-
resilience, and regret freedom with respect to Byzantine failure: regardless of
how Byzantine failures occurs, (k, t)-robustness guarantees that no coalition of
at most k nodes can ever do better than following the equilibrium strategy. It is
this last condition—the best-response condition—that provides regret freedom
and which we focus on in this chapter.
Definition 3.4. A strategy profile σ∗ is a (k, t)-robust equilibrium if σ∗
is t-immune and, for all (a) K,T ⊆ N such that K ∩ T = ∅, |K| ≤ k,
and |T | ≤ t, and (b) strategy profiles τ , there does not exist an alternate
strategy σ′K such that for all x ∈ K,
Ux(σ
′




−T , τT )
Note that there is no notion of expectation here, because rational nodes,
whoever they may be, must be willing to follow the protocol no matter who
the Byzantine nodes are.
3.2.1 (k, t)-robustness in communication games
We show that the very property that makes (k, t)-robustness so appealing—
regret freedom regardless of how Byzantine failures occur—makes it infeasible
in many real-world systems. The reason, fundamentally, is that communication
always incurs cost but could potentially yield no benefit if one is communicating
with a Byzantine node. In other words, a rational node may realize in hindsight
that it could have reduced its costs without affecting its benefits by avoiding all
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communication with Byzantine nodes, thus improving its utility. As any node
can be Byzantine, this implies that the only possible (k, t)-robust equilibrium
is one in which no node communicates.
Theorem 3.5. There exists no non-trivial (k, t)-robust equilibrium in any
communication game.
Proof. Consider some non-trivial (k, t)-robust strategy σ∗. There must exist
some node x which, with positive probability α under σ∗, sends a message
to some other node z before receiving any other messages. Suppose that z is
Byzantine. Since σ∗ is (k, t)-robust, x must not be able to do better with some
alternate strategy, regardless of who has failed and what a failed node will do.
In particular, for all alternate strategies σ′x for x and Byzantine strategies τz
for z, it must be that
Ux(σ
∗
−z, τz) ≥ Ux(σ′x, τz, σ∗−{x,z}) (3.1)
Suppose τz is the strategy in which z crashes immediately, i.e., z never
sends any messages. Let σ′x be the strategy in which x plays the same actions
with the same probability as in σ∗x, except x sends nothing to z. By Assump-
tion 2.2, x cannot prove that it communicated with z; it thus follows that
(σ′x, τz, σ
∗
−{x,z}) has the same functionality as (σ
∗
−z, τz) and is indistinguishable
to any node in N \{x, z}. Clearly, if z follows τz, x can do better by never com-
municating with z: x’s outcome will not change (since z never communicates







−z, τz) + αγ > Ux(σ
∗
−z, τz)
which contradicts inequality (3.1).
More broadly, Theorem 3.5 suggests that it may be hard to build non-
trivial (k, t)-robust equilibria for any game where a player’s actions incur cost.
25
Indeed, in all the games for which Abraham et al. derive (k, t)-robust equilib-
ria [19, 21], a node’s utility depends only on the game’s outcome (e.g., in a
secret-sharing game based on Shamir’s scheme, utility depends on whether a
node can learn the secret) and is independent of how much communication is
required to reach that outcome.
It follows from Theorem 3.5 that (k, t)-robustness—which requires re-
gret freedom along two axes: who the Byzantine nodes are and how they
behave—may be too strong to require in practice. However, one may won-
der whether regret freedom can still be applied along one axis. In particular,
can we achieve regret freedom in communication games if we know exactly
who the Byzantine nodes are, but not how they behave? What if we do not
know who is Byzantine, but we know how they behave?
3.2.2 What if we know who is Byzantine?
Let us assume that we know exactly who all the Byzantine players are before
the game begins. This may already appear a strong assumption, but it is
necessary, since if the identity of even one Byzantine node were unknown,
Theorem 3.5 would still apply. We show that, even with this strong assumption,
a solution concept that is regret-free with respect to the strategies of Byzantine
nodes is possible only to the extent that it defines away the problem: the
only possible equilibria are those in which rational nodes communicate only
among themselves, completely excluding Byzantine nodes from the system.
Furthermore, we show that many interesting communication games do not
yield a regret-free equilibrium even if one takes the drastic step of excluding
Byzantine nodes. In communication games where Byzantine nodes may take
actions that can affect a rational node’s utility by more than the cost of sending
a single message, there exists no regret-free equilibrium, even if the identity of
all Byzantine nodes are known a priori.
We first define the equivalent of t-immunity (Definition 3.2) and (k, t)-
robustness (Definition 3.4) for a fixed set T of Byzantine nodes.
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Definition 3.6. A strategy profile σ is T -strategy-immune if for all strat-
egy profiles τ and x /∈ T ,
Ux(σ−T , τT ) ≥ Ux(σ)
Definition 3.7. A strategy profile σ∗ is (k, T )-strategy-robust with re-
spect to T ⊆ N iff σ∗ is T -strategy-immune and for all K ⊆ N \ T such
that |K| ≤ k and all strategy profiles τ , there does not exist some σ′ such
that for all x ∈ K,
Ux(σ
′
K , τT , σ
∗
−(K∪T )) > Ux(σ
∗
−T , τT )
A (k, T )-strategy-robust equilibrium need only be a best response to
the specified set T of Byzantine nodes. The following theorem shows that no
(k, T )-strategy-robust equilibrium is possible unless rational nodes “blacklist”
all nodes in T .
Theorem 3.8. In a communication game, there does not exist any (k, T )-
strategy-robust equilibrium σ∗ where any x /∈ T communicates with any
z ∈ T .
Proof. This is similar to the proof of Theorem 3.5. Assume there exists such
an equilibrium σ∗ and, in σ∗, some node x, with positive probability α, sends
a message to some other node z ∈ T . Suppose the strategy τz that some
Byzantine node z employs is the crash strategy: it never communicates.
Consider an alternate strategy strategy σ′x in which some rational node
x plays the same actions with the same probability as in σ∗x, except x does
not communicate with z. Since σ∗ is a (k, T )-strategy-robust equilibrium,
Ux(σ
∗
−z, τz) ≥ Ux(σ′x, τz, σ∗−{x,z}). Yet, by Assumption 2.2, x cannot prove it
communicated with z. It follows that (σ∗−{x,z}, σ
′
x, τz) has the same functional-
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x, τz) ≥ Ux(σ∗−z, τz) + αγ > Ux(σ∗−z, τz)
Contradiction.
Although Theorem 3.8 does not rule out all (k, T )-strategy-robust equi-
libria, Theorem 3.9 proves that these equilibria, which must be regret-free for
any Byzantine strategy, only exist in limited circumstances. Intuitively, if dif-
ferent Byzantine failures can affect a rational node’s payoff by even just the
cost of communication and these failures can be triggered by whether a rational
node communicates or not, a rational node may find that ignoring Byzantine
nodes may not be optimal in hindsight (as required by regret freedom).
Theorem 3.9. No communication game can yield a (k, T )-strategy-robust
equilibrium for any set T ⊆ N of Byzantine nodes if for some x /∈ T ,
• x has at least one opportunity to send a message to some z ∈ T ,
• Members of T can freely coordinate their strategies,a and
• For any strategy profile σ in which x does not send any message to
any member of T , there exist two Byzantine strategies τhT and τ
`
T
such that τhT and τ
`
T are the same until one of x’s opportunities to
send a message to some z ∈ T and
Ux(σ−T , τhT )− Ux(σ−T , τ `T ) > γ
aNote that this trivially holds if |T | = 1.
Proof. By contradiction. Fix σ∗ to be some (k, T )-strategy-robust equilibrium.
We know by Theorem 3.8 that if σ∗ is (k, T )-strategy-robust, then any rational
node x following σ∗ never chooses to send to any member of T .
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By assumption, we know that, given σ∗, there exists two Byzantine
strategies τhT and τ
`
T such that they affect x’s utility by more than γ during
some opportunity that x has to communicate with some z ∈ T . We compose
a strategy τT where:
• If x sends a message at this time to z, T plays actions from τhT as if x
had not sent a message.
• T otherwise plays actions from τ `T .
It is obvious then that x prefers to send a message to z. More formally,
consider some alternate strategy profile σ′ that is the same as σ∗ except x
chooses to communicate in its first interaction with any member of T ; x then
plays the same actions as if it had not communicated in σ∗x. It follows that
Ux(σ
′
x, τT , σ
∗












−T , τT )
This contradicts the assumption that σ∗ is a (k, T )-strategy-robust equilib-
rium.
Theorem 3.9—unlike Theorem 3.5—provides conditions under which
no (k, t)-strategy-robust equilibria exist, whether trivial or not. Since (k, t)-
strategy-robust equilibria are a superset of (k, t)-robust equilibria, it naturally
follows from Theorem 3.9 that no (k, t)-robust equilibria exist under the same
conditions.
3.2.3 What if we know how Byzantine nodes behave?
Let us now consider a solution concept that assumes that the strategy played
by every Byzantine node is known a priori and yields equilibria that are regret-
free with respect to who the Byzantine nodes are.
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Definition 3.10. The strategy profile σ∗ is a (k, t, τ)-type-robust equi-
librium iff σ∗ is t-immunea and for all K,T ⊆ N such that K ∩ T = ∅,
|K| ≤ k, and |T | ≤ t, there does not exist some σ′ such that for all x ∈ K,
Ux(σ
′
K , τT , σ
∗
−(K∪T )) > Ux(σ
∗
−T , τT )
aWhile we could have defined a weaker notion of immunity with respect to τ , since
our focus is on regret freedom and not t-immunity, we use t-immunity for simplicity in
order to avoid introducing another notion of immunity.
Despite the strong assumption on which they rely, (k, t, τ)-type-robust
equilibria are impossible to achieve for many Byzantine behaviors. In partic-
ular, it follows immediately from Theorem 3.5 that no such equilibrium is
possible if the known Byzantine strategy calls for any Byzantine node to crash
at the very beginning of the game.
Theorem 3.11. There exist no non-trivial (k, t, τ)-type-robust equilibria
in the communication game in which a Byzantine node z, following τz,
crashes at the beginning of the game.
Proof. Same as proof of Theorem 3.5.
In general, we can show that, if time is discrete (and thus can be divided
into periods2) and there exists some period after which a Byzantine node
becomes “unresponsive,” i.e., the node’s behavior becomes independent of how
the game has been played so far (e.g., the node crashes or starts flooding all
other nodes with messages), there do not exist any non-trivial (k, t, τ)-type-
robust equilibria that guarantees that nodes choose the best response at every
given point in the game.3
2As the game is not necessarily repeated, we use the word “period” rather than “round”
to try to avoid any confusion.
3In game theory parlance, there do not exist any (k, t, τ)-type-robust equilibrium that
rely on credible threats, are subgame-perfect equilibrium, or are perfect Bayes equilibrium.
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Theorem 3.12. There exists no non-trivial (k, t, τ)-type-robust equilibria
in the communication game in which
• Any node z, following τz, (a) plays as if it were playing σ∗z before
some period r, and (b) is unresponsive after period r; and
• Every node is always best-responding to every other node.
Proof. By contradiction. Assume that σ∗ is a non-trivial (k, t, τ)-type-robust
equilibrium as described in the theorem statement. Consider some period r,
and suppose, for now, there exists some communication between some nodes
after period r. Consider the first period in which, under σ∗, a node x sends a
message to another node z with positive probability (if there are multiple such
nodes, arbitrarily choose one).
Suppose now that z is Byzantine and is playing τz. As the equilibrium
strategy cannot depend on who the Byzantine nodes are, x’s choice to send a
message must not depend on whether z is Byzantine. However, if z turns out
to be unresponsive, x is clearly better off not sending to z (using the same
argument as in the proof of Theorem 3.5).
Suppose then that σ∗ does not have any nodes communicating after
period r. We can then prove that in any equilibrium, communication never
occurs with positive probability at any period in the game. We prove this
using backwards induction on the period; we use i as the induction variable.
Base case: i = r + 1 (or any period after r). As proven above, no node
communicates in the equilibrium with positive probability after time r.
Inductive step. Assume true for all i > r0; we now prove it to be true for period
r0. If no communication occurs in period r0, then we are already done; thus,
assume that some rational node y, following σ∗y, sends a message at period
r0 with probability α > 0 (again, if there are multiple such nodes, choose
one arbitrarily). Let hr0y be some history that leads to this point in the game
and let σ′y be some alternate strategy in which y does not send anything at
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or after period r0. By the induction hypothesis, we know that there is no
communication that occurs after period r0.





−y)|hr0y ) = Uy(σ∗|hr0y ) + αγ > Uy(σ∗|hr0y )
contradicting that communicating at period r0 was in y’s best interest.
Note that the second-half of the proof above can be applied to any
equilibrium that requires a best-response at any point in the game, not just
(k, t, τ)- or (k, t)-robust equilibrium.
3.3 Regret bravery
Finding a single strategy that is a best response against all possible Byzantine
strategies or all possible t-sized subsets of Byzantine nodes (or both) appears
fundamentally hard: regret-free solution concepts, for which rational cooper-
ation depends on finding such a strategy, seem unlikely to provide a viable
theoretical framework for many BAR-tolerant systems.
Regret bravery, the alternative we explore in this section, explicitly for-
goes seeking a“universal” best response. Instead, it makes rational cooperation
dependent on identifying a strategy that is a best response to the Byzantine
behavior that rational nodes expect to be exposed to. Before we proceed to look
at examples of regret-braving equilibria, we answer some natural questions.
Is aiming for a best response towards only a subset of all possible Byzan-
tine behaviors in effect abdicating the general claims (and benefits) of Byzantine
fault tolerance? No. Any BAR-tolerant protocol, independent of the underlying
solution concept, must be a strategy that guarantees Byzantine fault tolerance.
The choice of a solution concept is not about fault tolerance; rather, it specifies
under which conditions rational nodes will be willing to follow a given strategy,
fault-tolerant or not. Regret-braving solution concepts are motivated by the
observation that rational nodes may be willing to cooperate even without the
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guarantee that the considered strategy will, in all circumstances, prove to be
a best response.
Do regret-braving solution concepts limit how Byzantine node can be-
have? No more than a threshold t on the number of Byzantine faults limits
a system to experience, in reality, more than t faults. Regret braving asks ra-
tional nodes to build a model of expected Byzantine behavior, but of course
Byzantine failures are in no way bound to follow that model. If Byzantine be-
havior does not match the expectation of rational nodes, then a regret-braving
equilibrium strategy may not, in hindsight, prove to be a best response.
What is the right set of expectations when it comes to Byzantine be-
havior? It all depends on the application being considered. We discuss below
two concrete examples inspired by approaches (maximin and Bayes equilib-
ria) that have been extensively studied in the economics literature, but we do
not claim that these solution concepts model “realistic” expectations for all
distributed systems. For example, the maximin approach produces a best re-
sponse to the expectation that the system always includes exactly t Byzantine
nodes, when it may instead often be reasonable to expect that the actual num-
ber of Byzantine faults will be lower.4 Indeed, we believe that the challenge
of finding equilibrium strategies under more flexible solution concepts is an
extremely exciting research opportunity.
The threshold communication game. To show the viability of regret-
brave solution concepts in a communication game, we consider a concrete
communication game: a threshold game, which models protocols, such as secret-
sharing [98], replicated state machines [74], and terminating reliable broadcast
[58] in which functionality is achieved if and only if some sufficiently large
subset of peers cooperate with a node.
4A worst-case attitude is actually not uncommon when designing fault-tolerant systems,
even for benign failures. For instance, non-early stopping protocols for synchronous termi-
nating reliable broadcast always run for t+ 1 rounds, even in executions that experience no
failures.
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Definition 3.13. A (synchronous) threshold game is an infinitely-
repeated communication game where
• There are at least 3 nodes (n ≥ 3).
• The game repeats indefinitely. In every round, for every pair of nodes
x, y ∈ N such that x 6= y, x decides whether to send a message
(“contribute”) or not (“snub”) to y.
• At the end of the round, every x ∈ N simultaneously (1) observes
who contributed to it and (2) receives its payoff.a x incurs a cost of
γ for each node x contributes to and for each node that contributes
to x; x incurs no cost for snubbing or being snubbed. x realizes a
positive benefit of b > 2nγ in any round where q > 0 other nodes
contribute to x, where q is the threshold.
• The total payoff is the δ-discounted sum of each individual round’s
payoff, where 0 < δ < 1.b
aIn game theory parlance, the game is a simultaneous game; in distributed systems,
synchronous.
bδ-discounting is a commonly-accepted way of handling utility in infinite-horizon
games (see any game theory text, e.g., [54, 87]). This models the reality that earning
benefit (incurring cost) now is better (worse) than doing so later. For example, it is
often preferable to have a dollar now rather than later, since money can be invested
and can earn interest in the meantime.
When up to t failures can occur, we will generally focus our attention
only on threshold games where q < n − t, i.e., where even t failures cannot
prevent a node from achieving benefit.
In the subsequent sections, we consider two concrete regret-braving so-
lution concepts for the threshold game. We do not claim that these solution
concepts are new; instead, our goal is to illustrate that taking a node’s expec-
tations into account (for which we provide two examples) allow us to bypass
the difficulties with dealing with Byzantine failures that regret freedom faced.
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In a paper we previously published [107], we show how these solution concepts
could be extended to explicitly consider collusion via k-resilience. Because the
choice of how Byzantine failures are modeled is orthogonal to how coalitions
are modeled and because of recent advances in how coalitions should be dealt
with (§5), we omit these details here.
3.3.1 t-maximin equilibrium
In the first, rational nodes best-respond to fearing the worst, i.e., they follow
a maximin strategy with respect to Byzantine failures. This is the notion of
equilibrium used in previous BAR systems (e.g., [24, 79]).
Definition 3.14. The strategy profile σ∗ is a t-maximin equilibrium iff
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To demonstrate that t-maximin yields equilibria in communication games,
we show the following simple t-maximin equilibrium in the threshold game.
Theorem 3.15. Let the strategy profile σ∗ be defined as follows: any
x ∈ N following σ∗x contributes to some y 6= x iff x and y have always
contributed to each other in the past and x has been snubbed by at most t
different nodes. Then σ∗ is a t-maximin equilibrium in the threshold game
if q < n− t and
b
γ




Proof. Consider some rational node x. If all rational nodes follow σ∗, then each
node will receive a threshold number of contributions regardless of Byzantine
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behavior and the worst a rational node can do is incur the cost of contributing
and being contributed to by every node in the system. Thus, a rational node,
following σ∗, will earn at least
V ∗ =
1
1− δ (b− 2(n− 1)γ) (3.3)
Suppose instead that in round r, x snubs some node y that x was sup-
posed to contribute to after history hrx. If h
r
x is not “expected” to occur—i.e.,
given σ∗ and the T and τ that minimize σ∗, hrx occurs with zero probability
5—
then the expected change in utility as a result of snubbing is 0, and the proof is
trivially complete. Otherwise, suppose hrx is expected to occur. If y is rational
and t Byzantine nodes, in addition to x, snub y by round r, y will snub all
nodes from round r + 1 at latest. If y and all t Byzantine nodes snub every
node by round r + 1, then all other nodes snub every node from, at latest,
round r + 2 on. Therefore, x earns at most b− (q + t)γ in rounds r and r + 1
and 0 in subsequent rounds for a total payoff of
V ′ = (1 + δ)(b− (q + t)γ)
Given inequality (3.2), V ∗ ≥ V ′ and thus deviating is not worthwhile.
Now consider if x contributes to some node y that x, under σ∗, was
supposed to snub after some history hrx. As we just showed, rational nodes
never snub unless they were snubbed first. Because q < n− t, a rational node
will be guaranteed to get a threshold number of contributions regardless of how
Byzantine nodes play. Thus, the worst damage a Byzantine node can inflict on
a rational node x is to have x contribute in every round to it and to contribute
in every round back. As a result, hrx must occur with zero probability, implying
that deciding to contribute after such a history changes the expected utility
by 0 and is thus not a profitable deviation.
5This is similar to being “off the equilibrium path” in traditional game theory.
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3.3.2 Bayes equilibrium
One advantage of using the t-maximin solution concept is its simplicity: be-
cause we need only consider the worst possible case, t-maximin equilibria are
simple to analyze. Unfortunately, although a rational node playing a t-maximin
equilibrium may receive a safe, steady amount of utility, Byzantine failures are
unlikely to always occur in the worst possible way, and a rational node willing
to take a risk and deviate from the prescribed strategy may be able to do
better in expectation.
In this section, we show how a standard solution concept, Bayes equilib-
rium, can be used to take a node’s expectation regarding failure into account
by having rational nodes maintain beliefs that represent the probability of var-
ious failure scenarios occurring. More specifically, each node x has some beliefs
µx((R−T , τT )|Rx) that represents its belief that all nodes z ∈ T are Byzantine
and of type (i.e., playing strategy) τz and all nodes y /∈ T are rational (i.e.,
of type R), given that x is rational. For notational simplicity, we denote it as
µx(τT ).
Definition 3.16. The strategy profile/belief tuple (σ∗, µ∗) is a Bayes
equilibrium iff for all x ∈ N, there does not exist an alternate strategy















µx(τT )Ux(σ−T , τT )
In the remainder of this section, we demonstrate that the Bayesian
approach provides flexibility in how Byzantine nodes are modeled by rational
nodes by showing equilibria given two different sets of beliefs. Our goal in
these examples is to simply illustrate the existence of Bayesian equilibria, not
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to derive tight bounds for when these equilibria exist. Thus, for simplicity
of exposition, we will be extremely optimistic about the utility earned by
deviating and pessimistic about the utility earned by cooperating.
We first show a Bayes equilibrium in a simple scenario that roughly
models the one used in the proof of Theorem 3.9: Byzantine nodes are expected
to either crash or threaten to inflict communication costs unless rational nodes
contribute.
Theorem 3.17. For any x ∈ N , let T ix be the set of nodes who have
snubbed x in round i and let t be the expected number of Byzantine
failures. Define strategy profile σ∗ as follows. x, playing σ∗x, (a) in round 0,
contributes to all nodes, and (b) in round r > 0, if |T 0x | > t or there exists
some round i < r with T ix * T 0x , then snub all nodes; otherwise, contribute
to all nodes in N \ T 0x .
Let µ∗ be some set of beliefs which place positive probability only on
the following Byzantine strategies: (a) snub everyone (the crash strategy);
and (b) snub everyone in the first round, and, in any subsequent round r,
snub a node y iff y previously contributed to it.
Let ψ be the joint probability (based on µ∗) that the environment
has exactly t Byzantine nodes and that a node, picking a peer at random,
selects a rational one. Then (σ∗, µ∗) is a Bayes equilibrium in the threshold





(2(n− 1)− q(1− δ2ψ)) (3.4)
Proof. Consider some rational node x. As shown in the proof of Theorem 3.15,
if x follows σ∗, the worst x can do is receive a threshold number of contributions
in every round and incur communication costs with everyone, resulting in a
payoff of V ∗, where V ∗ is defined as in equation (3.3).
Consider the ways that x may deviate.
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Case 1: x snubs some set of nodes L ⊂ N in round 0. We optimistically assume
that (a) x is only hurt if there exists some rational node y ∈ L that x snubbed
and there are exactly t Byzantine nodes, which occurs with probability at least
ψ, and (b) x earns the maximum round payoff that it can (i.e., b − qγ if it
receives a threshold number of contributions and 0 if not) when deviating.
Thus, if L contains only Byzantine nodes, then x earns b − qγ in all rounds.
Otherwise, x earns at most b − qγ in rounds 0 and 1 and 0 in all subsequent
rounds. x’s total expected payoff from deviating is then
V ′ = ψ(1 + δ)(b− qγ) + (1− ψ) 1
1− δ (b− qγ)
Inequality (3.4) ensures that V ∗ ≥ V ′, and thus x does not deviate in this
fashion.
Case 2: x snubs a node that x is supposed to contribute to in round r > 0. In
any subsequent round r > 0, x knows exactly who the Byzantine nodes are.
Thus, the second case, in which a rational node that deviates by snubbing
some (rational) node y that has never snubbed it before, results in y snubbing
everyone in round r+1, causing all nodes to snub x by round r+2. In this case,
x earns at most (1 + δ)(b− qγ) in rounds r and r + 1 and 0 in all subsequent
rounds. The same argument used in the previous case implies that x does not
deviate in this way either.
Case 3: x contributes to a node that x is supposed to snub in round r >
0. Suppose x contributes to a node z that x is supposed to snub in round r.
Regardless of the reason, contributing to z incurs cost on x yet does not affect
z’s strategy in any way. It is obvious then that this deviation is never in x’s
best interest.
We now demonstrate a Bayes equilibrium in a crash-failure scenario
that is similar to that used in many of the theorems in this chapter.
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Theorem 3.18. Let t be the expected number of Byzantine failures. De-
fine the strategy profile σ∗ such that any x ∈ N , following σ∗x, contributes
to any y 6= x iff x and y have always contributed to each other in the past
and x has been snubbed by at most t peers.
Let τ be defined as the random t-crash strategy: in any given round,
a node z playing τz has some positive probability ρ of crashing. Define the
set of beliefs µ∗ such that for all x ∈ N,
• µ∗x(τT ) = 0 for any T such that |T | 6= t, and
• µ∗x(τT1) = µ∗x(τT2) > 0 for any T1, T2 ⊆ N \ {x} such that |T1| =
|T2| = t.
Then (σ∗, µ∗) is a Bayes equilibrium if q < n− t and
b
γ
≥ 2n− q − 2
δ2ρt
n− 1
n− t− 1 + q (3.5)
Proof. Consider the perspective of some rational node x. We optimistically
assume that if x deviates in round r, it only loses utility if t nodes crash on or
before round r, which occurs with probability at least ρt.
As shown in the proof of Theorem 3.15, if x follows σ∗, the worst x can
do is receive a threshold number of contributions in every round and incur
communication costs with everyone, resulting in a payoff of V ∗, where V ∗ is
defined as in equation (3.3).
Suppose that x snubs some node y. Since the probability that a node
is rational is uniform across all nodes, y is rational with probability at least
1 − t/(n − 1), and with probability at least ρt, y will observe t other nodes
snub it by round r. y then snubs everyone starting in round r + 1, all nodes
snub everyone starting in round r + 2, and x earns at most 0 in every round
starting from round r+ 2. Otherwise, we assume x earns the maximum round
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payoff b− qγ. Thus, deviating results in a payoff of
V ′ = ψ(1 + δ)(b− qγ) + (1− ψ) 1
1− δ (b− qγ)
where ψ = ρt(1− t/(n− 1)). Given inequality (3.5), V ∗ ≥ V ′; thus, deviating
is not in x’s best interest.
3.4 Summary
To formally reason about cooperative services, we need a solution concept that
provides rigorous guarantees for rational cooperation without sacrificing real-
world applicability. This chapter argues that solution concepts based on regret
freedom, despite their intuitive correspondence to the traditional guarantees
of fault-tolerant distributed computing, are unlikely to provide the basis for a
viable theoretical framework for real-world systems. In particular, we believe
that any practical solution concept should be able to admit equilibria in games
where a rational node’s payoff is not based simply on the outcome but also on
the cost of the actions required to achieve said outcome. While our discussion
here has focused on communication costs, other costs should be included, such
as computational costs [61]. We believe that regret-brave solution concepts





In §3, we discussed how incentives in cooperative services must be resilient to
faulty peers. However, incentives must also be robust against a more subtle
threat: an overabundance of good will from the unselfish peers who simply
follow the protocol run by the service. It is, after all, the unselfishness of
correct peers—as codified in the protocol they obediently follow—that allows
selfish peers to continue receiving service without contributing their fair share.
Yet, the efforts of well-meaning peers alone may be insufficient to sustain the
service. Further, asking these peers to increase their contribution to make
up for free-riders may backfire: even well-meaning peers, if blatantly taken
advantage of, may give in to the temptation of joining the ranks of the selfish,
leading in turn to more defections and to the service’s collapse.
Although real cooperative services include a sizable fraction of correct
and unselfish peers [22], their impact on the incentive structure of coopera-
tive services is not well understood. Existing BAR-tolerant systems have side-
stepped the challenge of dealing with acquiescent nodes by designing protocols
that neither depend on nor leverage the presence of acquiescent peers.1
In this chapter, we ask the following question: can we leverage the good
1Gossip-based BAR-tolerant streaming protocols [78, 79] do rely on a trusted source to
seed the stream; however, the nodes we are focusing on are those nodes that participate in
the gossip protocol, which are modeled as either rational or Byzantine.
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will of acquiescent nodes and still motivate rational participants to cooperate?
We find that not only is acquiescence not antithetical to rational cooperation,
but that, in a fundamental way, rational cooperation can only be achieved in
the presence of acquiescent nodes. To do so, we distill the issue to a rational
peer’s last opportunity to cooperate.
The last exchange. Rational peers are induced to cooperate with another
peer (or, more generally, with a service) by the expectation that, if they co-
operate, they will receive future benefit. However, in most cases, interaction
with a particular peer or with the service itself eventually comes to an end. In
this last exchange, rational peers do not have incentive to contribute, as doing
so incurs cost without any future benefit. Unfortunately, rational cooperation
throughout the protocol often hinges on this critical last exchange: the lack
of incentive to cooperate at the end may, in a sort of reverse domino effect,
demotivate rational peers from cooperating in any prior exchange.
Most current systems address this problem in one of three ways (or
some combination of them). Some systems [24, 79] assume that rational peers
interact with the service forever, and thus future incentives always exist; oth-
ers [76, 77, 78] assume rational peers deviate only if their increase in utility is
above a certain threshold; others, finally, try to threaten rational peers with
the possibility of losing utility if they deviate. For instance, in BAR Gos-
sip [79], peers that do not receive the data they expect pester the guilty peer
by repeatedly requesting the missing contribution.
Unfortunately, each of these approaches relies on somewhat unrealistic
assumptions. Few relationships in life are infinite in length; worse, as we will
show later in this paper, with a lossy network and the possibility of Byzantine
peers it may be impossible to incentivize cooperation even in an infinite-length
protocol. The real possibility of penny-pinching peers can undermine any sys-
tem that assumes no deviation unless their expected gain is “large enough.”
Finally, threats such as pestering are effective only when they are credible:
to feel threatened, a peer must believe that it will be rational for the other
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peer to pester. Since pestering incurs cost for the initiator as well as for the
receiver, it is surprisingly hard to motivate rational peers to pester in the first
place. For example, pestering in BAR Gossip is credible only under the rather
implausible assumption that a peer, even when faced with enduring silence,
will never give up on an unresponsive peer and forever continue to attribute a
peer’s lack of contribution to the unreliability of the network [79].
We model the last-exchange problem as a finite-round game between two
players 1 and 2; neither player expects to interact with the other beyond this
exchange. We assume player 1 holds a contribution (e.g., some information)
that is of value to player 2; however, contributing yields no expectation of
further benefit for player 1. We are interested in studying whether player 2
can nonetheless induce a selfish player 1 to contribute by threatening to pester
it if player 1 fails to do so. Pestering is an attractive threat because it is
simple and does not require the involvement of a third party. We want to
determine whether it can be made a credible threat under realistic system
assumptions, unlike in BAR Gossip [79]. In each round, player 1 is given a
choice whether to contribute or not; in response, player 2 may pester player 1.
Players communicate through a lossy channel and therefore do not necessarily
share the same view of the ongoing game. For instance, player 1 may have
contributed, but player 2 may not have received the contribution.
Our contributions. We show that, without requiring implausible network
assumptions or the specter of never-ending pestering, the presence of acquies-
cent peers is both necessary and sufficient to make pestering a credible threat
and motivate rational peers to contribute. In particular:
• We prove that there exists no equilibrium strategy where rational peers
contribute if all peers are either rational or Byzantine—even if we allow
for an infinite number of pestering rounds.
• We show that the presence of acquiescent peers is sufficient to trans-
form pestering into a credible threat. Intuitively, if rational peers have
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sufficiently high beliefs that they may be interacting with an acquies-
cent peer, they are motivated to pester, making it in turn preferable for
rational peers to contribute.
The fraction of acquiescent peers sufficient to sustain rational contribution
depends on several system parameters, including the probability of network
loss, the fraction of Byzantine peers in the system, and the behavior that
rational peers expect from acquiescent and Byzantine peers. Exploring this
space through a simulator we find that:
• Acquiescent peers make rational cooperation easy to achieve under real-
istic conditions. In particular, we find that even if less than 10% of the
population is acquiescent, rational peers are incentivized to cooperate in
a system where the network drops 5% of all packets and Byzantine peers
make up over 50% of the remainder of the population.
• Prodigal acquiescent peers do harm rational cooperation: if acquiescent
peers contribute every time they are pestered, then we cannot always
achieve rational cooperation; when we do, it requires an implausibly high
fraction of acquiescent peers. This is good news: the less foolishly gen-
erous is the acquiescent behavior sufficient to incentivize rational con-
tribution, the more feasible it is to design systems with a sustainable
population of acquiescent peers.
• The uncertainty introduced by network loss is both a bane and a boon.
On the one hand, it significantly complicates the analysis of a peer’s
optimal strategy because each peer does not know what the other has
observed. On the other, it lowers the threshold for rational cooperation
by leaving open some possibility that the other peer may be acquiescent,
even when the observed behavior suggests otherwise.
Organization of chapter. After presenting in §4.1 the game theoretic frame-
work used to analyze the last exchange problem, we show in §4.2 that rational
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cooperation is impossible in the absence of acquiescent peers. We proceed to
derive, in §4.3, conditions under which acquiescence is sufficient to elicit ra-
tional cooperation in the last exchange and, in §4.4, use simulations to study
the implications of these conditions on the design of cooperative services.
4.1 Setup
In this chapter, we consider cooperative services that can be modeled as a col-
lection of peer-to-peer pairwise exchanges, in which two players communicate
over unreliable channels. In particular, we focus solely on the last exchange
between these two players and are interested in studying the conditions under
which one player can induce another to contribute with the threat of pestering
and without any exogenous incentives or entities such as a server.
We model this last exchange as a two-player, (R + 1)-round stochastic
sequential game, which is similar to a repeated game except that it allows
players’ payoffs to change as the game progresses. This flexibility is critical to
model the intuition that player 2 benefits from player 1’s contribution only the
first time player 2 receives it. In each round, player 1 moves first by choosing
between two actions: contribute (denoted by c) or do nothing (o). Player 2
follows by choosing between two actions: pester (p) or do nothing (o). Since
our analysis of the game often relies on the number of rounds remaining rather
than on the round number, we label the first round as round R and the last
round as round 0.
Doing nothing has neither cost nor benefit. Player 1 incurs a cost γ↑c in
every round in which it contributes and a cost γ↓p in every round in which it is
pestered; player 2 incurs a cost γ↓c in every round it receives a contribution and
a cost γ↑p in every round it pesters player 1.2 A non-Byzantine player 2 starts
off being destitute, i.e., player 2 does not have the contribution that player 1
can provide. A destitute player 2 receives a one-time benefit b γ↓c + γ↑p the
2One easy way to remember which symbol corresponds to what is to remember that ↑
corresponds to uploading (or sending) and ↓ corresponds to downloading (or receiving).
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first time it receives player 1’s contribution; now no longer destitute, player 2
gains no further benefit from receiving further copies of the contribution.
Network loss, signals, and utilities. To model the unreliable channel
through which players 1 and 2 communicate, we adopt from game theory the
concept of private signals : for every action a played by some player, both play-
ers privately observe some (possibly different) resulting signal. Specifically, let
ρ, 0 < ρ < 1, be the rate of network loss, which we assume to be common
knowledge. When player x plays a, player x observes a, and player −x ob-
serves a with probability 1 − ρ and o otherwise. Thus, players do not always
observe their peer’s actions accurately and cannot rely on their peer accurately
observing their own actions.
As mentioned in §2, a node’s history describes what a player has per-
formed or observed in the past. In this chapter, we denote the history that
results from the sequence of signals observed by player x until player y’s turn
in round r as hr,yx . At the beginning of the game, h
R,1
x is the empty sequence.
During player 1’s turn in round r < R, player x’s history hr,1x is obtained by ap-
pending player x’s previous history hr+1,2x with some signal ω
r+1,2
x observed by





Similarly, during player 2’s turn in round r ≤ R, player x’s history hr,2x is
obtained by appending hr,1x with some signal ω
r,1
x observed by player x corre-




x ). For simplicity, we
drop the second superscript (e.g., the y in hr,yx and ω
r,y
x ) when it is obvious
whose turn it is. We use the subscript to denote different histories (e.g., hr1′ ,
hr1,c) and the superscript to denote the prefix of a history (e.g., for i ≥ r, hi,x1
is the first i rounds of hr1, including player 1’s signal in round i if x = 2).
We define u to be a mapping from the signals that a player observes to
47
Symbol Meaning
γ↑p Cost of sending a pester
γ↓p Cost of receiving a pester
γ↑c Cost of contributing
γ↓c Cost of receiving a contribution
b Benefit of receiving a contribution
Table 4.1: Summary of symbols that define the payoffs of various actions.
the payoff they receive:
u1(C, Pˆ ) = −
(
|Pˆ |γ↓p + |C|γ↑c
)
u2(P, Cˆ) = H[|Cˆ| − 1]b−
(
|P |γ↑p + |Cˆ|γ↓c
)
where C and Pˆ are the sets of rounds in which player 1 respectively contributed
and observed player 2 pester; P and Cˆ are the sets of rounds in which player
2 respectively pestered and observed player 1 contribute; and H[n] is the unit
step function.3 We can define the utility function U as a function of the players’
strategies, but we stick to u in this chapter for simplicity.
Strategies, types, beliefs, and equilibrium. As noted earlier, our game
is stochastic: the payoffs of a non-Byzantine player 2 change depending on
whether it is destitute (and wants player 1 to contribute) or not (and wants
player 1 to do nothing). In this chapter, for convenience, in addition to A
and R denoting acquiescent and rational types (§4.1), we abuse notation and
introduce two additional types, D and ¬D, to characterize the state of a non-
Byzantine player 2, depending on whether or not it is destitute. If player 1
contributes, then with probability (1− ρ), a player 2 of type D observes c and
hence change to type ¬D.
In this chapter, we model rational players as entities that maximize
their payoffs ex-ante. As described in §2, every player x starts with some
3H[i] = 0 if i < 0; else H[i] = 1.
48
initial beliefs µx(θ) representing the probabilities that player x assigns to the
statement that player −x is of type θ.4 We assume that, for all x ∈ {1, 2},
µx(θ) equals an initial value µ(θ), which is common knowledge, and that the
beliefs of a rational player x’s evolve based on the history hrx it has observed;
we use µx(θ|hrx) to denote player x’s conditional beliefs.
For a given set of beliefs, a rational player’s strategy depends on the
specific strategy that it expects its peer to adopt—which, in turn, depends on
the peer’s type. A rational player expects an acquiescent player x’s strategy
σA,x to be identical to the initially assigned protocol and a rational player
to follow σR,x (assuming that it is a best response). A player’s strategy may
depend on its observed history hrx; we use σθ,x(a|hrx) to denote the conditional
probability that a is played by player x of type θ given hrx.
If player x is Byzantine, its strategy can in principle be arbitrary, sig-
nificantly complicating the task of identifying a rational player’s best response
ex-ante. In this chapter, we address this difficulty by limiting our attention
to a particular set of beliefs that a rational player can hold vis-a`-vis Byzan-
tine behaviors: we assume that a rational player does not expect to be able
to influence a Byzantine peer’s strategy through its actions, and the rational
beliefs we consider only put positive probability on Byzantine strategies of this
form. More formally, a rational player −x expects to observe a Byzantine peer
player x do nothing in round r with some probability τx(o|hr−x) ≥ ρ that at
most depends on player x’s signals in player −x’s current history hr−x. While
this restriction sacrifices the generality of our results—our results do not hold
if a rational player believes it can influence Byzantine failures5—we believe it
captures a large and realistic set of beliefs that models the reasonable distrust
that a rational player is likely to harbor towards a Byzantine peer’s threats
and promises.
As a player only cares about the expected Byzantine strategy, we denote
4Technically, a player’s belief is also a function of its own type, i.e., µx(θ−x|θx), but since
we are only considering the beliefs of a single-type rational player, we simplify our notation.
5Note that this restriction is on a rational player’s beliefs and expectations. A Byzantine
failure may still occur in ways that defy a rational player’s expectation (as in §3.3).
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the Byzantine type as B and, for notational consistency, denote τx as σB,x. This
allows us to use σx = {σB,x, σA,x, σR,x} to denote the strategies that a rational
player expects player x to adopt, depending on player x’s type; σ = (σ1, σ2) to
denote the strategy profile that describes the (expected) strategies for players
1 and 2; and µ = (µ1, µ2) to denote the belief profile that describes the beliefs
µ1 and µ2 held by rational players 1 and 2.
In this chapter, we are interested in perfect Bayes equilibrium: a strat-
egy profile and set of beliefs (σ∗, µ∗) such that for all x ∈ {1, 2}, µ∗x(θ|hrx) is
computed using Bayes rule whenever hrx is reached via a signal that may be




















[ux|hrx] is a rational player x’s expected utility from playing
σR,x with beliefs µ
∗
x, with both strategy and beliefs conditional on h
r
x, while
its peer player −x plays σ∗−x. To lighten the already substantial notation, we
drop µ∗ when it is obvious that we are referring to that particular set of beliefs
and almost always refer to σR,x as σx unless it is not obvious we are referring
to the rational strategy.6
Finally, we often refer to a player x’s expected utility given that its peer
−x is of a specific type θ. We denote this expected utility as Eσ[ux|θ] and the
expected continuation utility given some history hrx as E
σ[ux|θ, hrx].
We assume that all players are limited to actions in the strategy space.
This can be accomplished in practice if actions outside of the strategy space
generate a proof of misbehavior [24, 59] and if the associated punishments (e.g.,
financial penalties) are sufficient to deter rational players. Finally, we assume
that a rational player 1 does not try to avoid pestering by severing its network
connection: if losing a fraction of bandwidth from pestering is undesirable,
disconnecting and losing all of it is even less desirable.








4.2 The need for acquiescence
Acquiescence is not only sufficient to incentivize cooperation, it is necessary.
In this section, we assume that there are no acquiescent nodes, and we show
that, as a result, rational players never pester or contribute.
Lemma 4.1. There exists no equilibrium where a rational player 2 pesters
with any positive probability if a rational player 1 will not subsequently
contribute.
Intuition. Player 2 incurs cost by pestering—with no chance of future contri-
bution from player 1.
Proof. Suppose such an equilibrium (σ∗, µ∗) exists where after some history
hr2, player 2 pesters with probability ψ > 0 during some round r, but player 1
will never subsequently contribute. Consider an alternate strategy σ′2 in which
player 2 plays exactly as in σ∗2 until round r, after which player 2 never pesters




(−γ↑p + Eσ∗ [u2|(hr2, p)])+ (1− ψ) (Eσ∗ [u2|(hr2, o)])





Following σ′2 instead of σ
∗
2 improves player 2’s utility. Contradiction.
Lemma 4.2. There exists no equilibrium where a rational player 1 con-
tributes with any positive probability if a rational player 2 will not subse-
quently pester.
Intuition. Player 1 incurs cost by contributing, yet there is no threat of pes-
tering from player 2.
Proof. Suppose such an equilibrium (σ∗, µ∗) exists where, after some history
hr1, player 1 contributes with probability ψ > 0 during some round r, but
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player 2 will never subsequently pester. Consider an alternate strategy σ′1 in
which player 1 plays exactly as in σ∗1 until round r, after which player 1 never










Following σ′1 instead of σ
∗
1 improves player 1’s utility. Contradiction.
Theorem 4.3. There exists no equilibrium in which rational players 1
and 2 contribute and pester, respectively.
Proof. Suppose such an equilibrium (σ∗, µ∗) exists. Then there exists some
rounds rc and rp such that players 1 and 2 contribute and pester, respectively,
with some positive probability for the last time. By Lemma 4.2, a rational
player 1 never contributes after round rp and so rc ≥ rp.7 However, by Lemma
4.1, a rational player 2 only pesters until round rc+1; thus, rp > rc. Finally, it
is obvious that contributing or pestering to a Byzantine peer is never in either
player’s best interest, since a Byzantine peer will play a strategy independent
of what the player does. Contradiction.
Theorem 4.3 only holds when the game lasts for a finite number of
rounds. When there exists no bound on the number of rounds, a weaker, yet
in practice still crippling, result holds. We summarize a simplified version of
the main result here; the model of the infinitely-repeated game and details of
the results are in §4.6.
Theorem 4.4. In the infinitely-repeated game, suppose a non-destitute
player 2 always prefers to do nothing and rational players expect that
there exists some positive fraction of Byzantine peers that either (a) when
7Recall that, in this chapter, we count rounds in reverse.
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playing as player 1, never contributes; or (b) when playing as player 2,
plays the same strategy played by a destitute rational player 2. Then
there exists no finitely mixed equilibriuma in which rational players 1 and
2 contribute and pester, respectively.
aIn other words, an equilibrium in which only a finite number of histories can be
reached with positive probability
Proof. (Sketch) If some Byzantine player 2 pesters as if playing the destitute
rational strategy, despite player 1’s contributions, then player 1’s belief that
player 2 is Byzantine eventually grows arbitrarily close to 1. Similarly, if a
Byzantine player 1 never contributes despite player 2’s incessant pestering,
then player 2 becomes increasingly certain player 1 is Byzantine. It can be
shown that a player’s belief in its peer being Byzantine eventually grows suf-
ficiently high such that the expected utility of contributing (in the first case)
or pestering (in the second) is lower than that of doing nothing. By showing
a bound of the number of rounds in which a rational player 1 contributes or
player 2 pesters, it follows, using an argument similar to the finitely-repeated
game, that this bound must be 0.
4.3 Acquiescence to the rescue
We now show that acquiescence is sufficient to incentivize rational peers to, re-
spectively, pester and contribute by constructing a cooperative strategy profile
and proving that it is an equilibrium. We start by specifying the acquiescent
strategy.
Definition 4.5. The acquiescent strategy σ∗A is the following:
• σ∗A,1: Player 1 contributes during round R. During round r < R,
player 1 contributes, only if pestered in the previous round r + 1,
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with probability (1−α)/(1−ρ)2, where α is a known parameter such
that 0 < (1− α)/(1− ρ)2 ≤ 1.a
• σ∗A,2: For any round r > 0, player 2 pesters if and only if it is desti-
tute.
aHence, if player 2 pesters an acquiescent player 1 during round r, player 2 expects
to observe a contribution in round r − 1 with probability 1− α.
In practice, all players are initially given the acquiescent strategy. Al-
though we cannot guarantee that a rational player 1 will follow σ∗A,1, we prove
that, under the expectation that its peer player −x of type θ plays σ∗θ,−x, a
rational player x will play the following rational strategy.
Definition 4.6. The rational strategy σ∗R is the following:
• σ∗R,1: During round r, player 1 contributes if and only if being
pestered is sufficiently expensive to overcome the cost of contribut-









player 1 knows that player 2, if non-Byzantine, is destitute; and
player 1’s belief that player 2 is destitute exceeds some threshold µ¯r1.
• σ∗R,2: Same as σ∗A,2.
We prove that rational players follow σ∗R under the following set of
assumptions:
Assumption 4.7. A destitute rational player 2 always prefers pestering
a known acquiescent player 1:
α ≤ 1− γ↑p
b− γ↓c (4.2)
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Assumption 4.8. For all histories hr2 that a rational player 2 may observe
which do not contain a contribution, its belief µ∗2(A|hr2) that player 1 is
acquiescent satisfies the following condition:
µ∗2(A|hr2) >
γ↑p








For consistency, we denote the Byzantine strategy as σ∗B.
In a perfect Bayes equilibrium, whether a rational player deviates or
not depends on its beliefs for all histories, both those on and off the equilib-
rium path. In our desired equilibrium, almost every history has some positive
probability of being observed: a rational player 2 expects that an acquiescent
player 1 contributes with positive probability (if player 2 pestered); destitute
player 2 always pester; and, as a result of network loss, doing nothing is al-
ways observable with positive probability from either player. Thus, for most
histories, Bayes’ rule can be applied to calculate a rational player’s beliefs.
However, there are still signals that are never expected from a rational or
acquiescent player; whether they are observable from a Byzantine peer depends
on the expected Byzantine strategy. In this section, all sets of beliefs that
we consider use the following set of rules to specify beliefs on and off the
equilibrium path:
Definition 4.10. Our rules for updating beliefs are as follows:
• For any action that is expected as a result of σ∗, update using Bayes
rule.
• Player 2 observes contribution in round r < R from player 1 unex-
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pectedly. We assume at this point that player 2 believes player 1 to
be Byzantine with probability 1.
• Player 1 observes pestering in round 0. At this point, the game is
over.
Note that the second case has no effect on player 2’s strategies, since a
non-destitute player 2, following σ∗A,2 or σ
∗
R,2, does nothing for the remainder
of the game anyway.
It is possible for player x to reach off-equilibrium information sets as a
result of its own play. While player x’s signals themselves do not affect player
x’s belief about player −x, player −x’s response to said deviation does. We
simply update a player’s beliefs using the rules above.
Generally, there may exist multiple strategies that result in a coopera-
tive equilibrium. All our lemmas and theorems here apply only to our particu-
lar cooperative equilibrium (and thus, all our results should be prefaced by, “In
our cooperative equilibrium. . . ”). We believe that our rational strategy repre-
sents a sensible design point: incentivizing a rational player 1 to contribute in
every round would require player 1 to start with an unrealistically low belief
in player 2 being Byzantine. Fortunately, this is unnecessary: we show in §4.4
that the rational strategy results in player 1 often contributing multiple times.
We will proceed as follows. For clarity of exposition, we defer the de-
tailed formal results and proofs to §4.3.3. We instead provide a summary of
why it is in a rational player 2’s best interest to pester in §4.3.1 and why it is in
a rational player 1’s best interest to contribute in §4.3.2. This will subsequently
allow us to prove the following main result:
Theorem 4.11. The strategy profile and set of beliefs (σ∗, µ∗) make up a
perfect Bayes equilibrium.
Proof. See page 81.
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We also prove the following, which gives the rational player 1’s strategy
a flavor of the acquiescent player 1’s strategy. We find that player 1 effectively
only contributes in some round r when pestered in previous round r + 1. The
only exception is if player 1 “accidentally” did nothing in round r + 1 when
contributing was the best response.
Theorem 4.12. Let r < R be the current round, and suppose that player
1 played its best-response action in round r+ 1. Then, if player 1 observes
player 2 do nothing in round r+ 1, then player 1 does nothing in round r.
Intuition. The belief that player 2 is destitute is strictly non-decreasing when
player 1 observes player 2 do nothing, and the number of expected pesters also
drops as the number of remaining rounds decreases. Thus, if it was in player
1’s best interest to do nothing in the prior round, then player 1 is better served
by not contributing in the current round as well.
Proof. See page 81.
4.3.1 When does a rational player pester?
In this section, we consider the incentives of a rational player 2 and its choice
of actions.8 Intuitively, a rational player 2 pesters only if it is destitute and
believes that player 1 is sufficiently acquiescent (and thus willing to contribute,
even in the final rounds). Naturally, player 2’s strategy also depends on a
rational player 1’s strategy; in this section, we assume a rational player 1
plays σ∗R,1.
We start by making two simple observations that are easy to prove.
Lemma 4.13. If (a rational) player 2 is non-destitute, player 2 does noth-
ing.
8Thus, all our results in this section apply only to a rational player 2.
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Intuition. If player 2 already has the contribution, player 2 receives no further
benefit from receiving another contribution. In fact, pestering and receiving
another contribution only incurs cost.
Proof. See page 61.
We now show that player 2 is no less likely to get a contribution from
a rational player 1 if player 2 pesters more frequently.
Lemma 4.19. Player 2 is as likely to receive a contribution from a rational
player 1 if player 2 pesters instead of doing nothing.
Intuition. It is obvious that an acquiescent player 1 is more likely to contribute
if pestered, and a Byzantine player 1 will contribute independent of what
player 1 does. Finally, since a rational player 1 expects a destitute player 2 to
always pester whereas Byzantine player 2 may not, a rational player 1 is more
convinced that player 2 is destitute if pestering is observed.
Proof. See page 70.
From these lemmas (along with others; see §4.3.3), we can prove that
player 2 pesters in every round r > 0.
Theorem 4.20. A destitute player 2 pesters in all rounds r > 0.
Intuition. Since a Byzantine player 1 is expected to play independently, an
acquiescent player 1 will contribute only when pestered, and a rational player
1 is never discouraged from contributing by pestering (by Lemma 4.19), a
destitute player 2 is willing to incur the minor cost of pestering to get a
contribution.
Proof. See page 71.
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4.3.2 When does a rational player contribute?
We now consider the incentives of a rational player 1. In every round, player
1 must make a choice:
• Pay the cost of contributing now (γ↑c), hoping to stop a non-Byzantine
player 2 from pestering in the future. The savings are a function of the
remaining rounds and the beliefs about player 2.
• Delay contributing, at the risk of being pestered (with cost at most
(1− ρ)γ↓p), hoping to glean more about player 2’s type.
Procrastination has its lure. Since we are considering strategies where a
non-Byzantine player 2 always pesters (minus the last round) whereas a Byzan-
tine player 2 may not, every additional signal can drastically affect player 1’s
expected utility and possibly save player 1 the cost of contributing. Moreover,
doing nothing now does not preclude player 1 from contributing in the future.
In this section, we find that if player 1 has sufficiently strong belief that
player 2 is destitute, procrastination is something best put off until tomorrow:
for every round sufficiently removed from the end of the game, there exists a
belief threshold above which contributing yields a higher expected utility for
player 1. We prove this under the assumption that a rational player 2 will play
σ∗R,2.
We start off our proof that the rational strategy is in a rational player
1’s best interest by proving an obvious result: player 1 never contributes when
the threat of pestering does not offset the cost of contributing.
Lemma 4.21. Player 1 does nothing for rounds r ≤ r¯, where r¯ is defined
as in condition (4.1).
Proof. See page 73.
We can further show that player 1 is never better off trying to contribute
unless player 1 knows for certain that player 2, if non-Byzantine, is destitute.
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Lemma 4.14. Let r < R be the current round, hr1 = h
r,1
1 be the current
history during player 1’s turn in round r, and µ1 be player 1’s beliefs. If
µ1(¬D|hr1) > 0, i.e., player 1 has contributed in the past and has not been
pestered since, then player 1 does nothing in round r.
Intuition. Given a sufficiently low ρ, player 1 is better off not being overly
anxious: player 1’s contribution has a sufficiently high probability of reaching
player 2, so player 1 is thus better off waiting for a definitive signal that player
2 is still destitute (if non-Byzantine).
Proof. See page 61.
Given these lemmas (along with other lemmas in §4.3.3), we can show
that playing σR,1 is in player 1’s best interest.
Theorem 4.23. Let hr1 be the history of player 1 in some round r such
that r¯ < r ≤ R, where r¯ is defined by condition (4.1), and let µ1 be player
1’s beliefs such that µ1(¬D|hr1) = 0. Then there exists some threshold µ¯r1
such that if µ1(D|hr1) ≥ µ¯r1, player 1 contributes; otherwise, player 1 does
nothing.
Intuition. Player 1, who has sufficiently strong belief that its peer is destitute
to contribute, will contribute if its belief is even stronger.
Proof. See page 75.
4.3.3 Complete formal results
In this subsection, we provide full proofs of the results we have in §4.3.1 and
§4.3.2. As a reminder to the reader, as in any typical proof of equilibrium, we
will assume that, when considering a player x’s behavior, player x is rational
and believes player −x is following the specified strategy.
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Lemma 4.13. If (a rational) player 2 is non-destitute, player 2 does noth-
ing.
Proof. Consider some alternate strategy σ′2 in which player 2 pesters with some
probability ψ > 0 after observing some history hr2 which contains at least one
c. Since σ∗2 specifies player 2 to do nothing starting from history h
r
2, player 2’s
expected difference in utility between σ∗2 versus σ
′







1)[u2|hr2] ≥ ψγ↑p > 0
and thus player 2 does strictly better following σ∗2.
Lemma 4.14. Let r < R be the current round, hr1 = h
r,1
1 be the current
history during player 1’s turn in round r, and µ1 be player 1’s beliefs. If
µ1(¬D|hr1) > 0, i.e., player 1 has contributed in the past and has not been
pestered since, then player 1 does nothing in round r.
Proof. By induction on r, i.e., backwards induction on time.
Base case: r = 0. If player 1 does nothing, it earns 0 since player 2 never
pesters in the last round. If it contributes, it earns at most −γ↑c < 0.
Inductive step. Assume true for all rounds r ≤ r0; we prove the inductive
step (r = r0 + 1) by contradiction. Let mc and mp be the number of rounds
elapsed since player 1 has last contributed or observed pestering, respectively,
i.e., player 1 has done nothing in the past mc rounds and observed player 2 do




1 , c, o, o, o, . . . , o, o)
where hr+mc+11 is some history from round r +mc + 1.
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Let σ1,c be some strategy such that player 1 contributes after some
history hr1, i.e., a history in which player 1 was not pestered since its last
contribution. Given a type-θ player 2, let V (θ) be the continuation payoff
starting from player 2’s turn in round r, i.e., after player 1 contributes in
round r. Construct an alternate strategy σ1,o where player 1 does nothing in
round r but for the remaining rounds is identical to σ1,c (i.e., following σ1,c
as if player 1 had contributed in round r). Thus, the continuation payoff from
playing σ1,o after doing nothing in round r is also V (θ). Note that V (¬D) = 0
since a non-destitute player 2 never pesters, and, by the inductive hypothesis,
player 1 never contributes in later rounds unless player 1 has been pestered
since its last contribution.
Following σ1,c and contributing after h
r
1 results in an expected payoff of
− γ↑c + µ1(D|(hr1, c))V (D) + µ1(B|(hr1, c))V (B)
=− γ↑c + ρµ1(D|hr1)V (D) + µ1(B|(hr1, c))V (B)
whereas following σ1,o and doing nothing earns
µ1(D|(hr1, o))V (D) + µ1(B|(hr1, o))V (B)
= µ1(D|hr1)V (D) + µ1(B|(hr1, o))V (B)
Observe that µ1(B|(hr1, o)) = µ1(B|(hr1, c)). Thus, player 1 contributes
only if
γ↑c ≤ −(1− ρ)µ1(D|hr1)V (D) (4.5)
Note that in the above condition, both sides are positive (V (D) ≤ 0).










(1− (1− ρ)τ2(p|hr−i+mc+1,21 ))
Intuitively, the numerator represents the probability that non-Byzantine player
2, destitute after hr+mc+11 , remains destitute after one contribution (with prob-
ability ρ) and that player 1 does not observe any pesters from round r+mc+1
to round r + 1, inclusive of both endpoints (with probability ρmc+1).
We can further evaluate the above fraction, giving us
µ1(D|hr1) ≤
µ1(D|hr+mc+11 )ρmc+2
µ1(D|hr+mc+11 )(ρmc+2 + (1− ρ))
=
ρmc+2




The above fraction gives us an upper bound to µ1(D|hr1). We can also
derive a lower bound on V (D) ≤ 0 (and thus an upper bound on −V (D) ≥ 0)
by observing that, in any optimal strategy against a destitute player 2, player
1 can do no worse than being pestered for the entire game. It follows then that
V (D) ≥ −R(1 − ρ)γ↓p. Plugging these bounds into condition (4.5), it follows




but this contradicts condition (4.4).
Lemma 4.15. Let hr1 and h
r
1′ be two histories that player 1 could observe
and µ1 be player 1’s beliefs. Then µ1(D|hr1) ≥ µ1(D|hr1′) if
1. For every round, player 2’s signals in hr1 and h
r
1′ are the same;
2. The number of contributions in hr1 is greater than or equal to the
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number in hr1′ ; and
3. The last contribution in both hr1 and h
r
1′ are followed by a pester at
some point.
Proof. Since pestering has been observed after the last contribution and a non-
destitute player 2 never pesters, µ1(¬D|hr1) = µ1(¬D|hr1′) = 0. Letting mc and





and Oˆ be the rounds in which player 2 is observed to pester and do nothing,
µ1(D|hr1) =
µ1(D)(1− ρ)|Pˆ |ρ|Oˆ|+mc














(1− (1− ρ)τ2(p|hi,21 ))
Lemma 4.16. Suppose that player 1 follows a threshold strategy (i.e.,
contribute iff its belief that player 2 is destitute is above some threshold)
starting from some round r − 1 and history hr−11 . Let µ1 be player 1’s
beliefs and let hi1,p and h
i
1,o be two continuation histories from player 1’s



























In other words, hi1,p and h
i
1,o differ in player 1’s perception of player 2’s
round r signal and potentially every signal from player 1 after round r.
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Then either:
1. There has not been a pester since the last contribution in hi1,o and
hi1,p contains at least as many c’s as h
i
1,o: for i < j < r, |{ωj,11,p|ωj,11,p =
c}| = |{ωj,11,o|ωj,11,o = c}|;
2. µ1(D|hi1,p) ≥ µ1(D|hi1,o) and hi1,p contains at least as many c’s as
hi1,o; or
3. hi1,p contains more c’s than h
i
1,o: for i < j < r, |{ωj,11,p|ωj,11,p = c}| >
|{ωj,11,o|ωj,11,o = c}|.
Proof. By backwards induction on i.
Base case: i = r − 1. Let hr,21 = (hr1, ωr,11 ), hi1,p = (hr,21 , p) and hi1,o = (hr,21 , o).
Then since player 1 expects that a destitute player 2 always pesters, whereas
a Byzantine player 2 may not, then if player 1 observes pestering, then, by
Bayes rule, its belief that player 2 is destitute equals
µ1(D|hi1,p) =
(1− ρ)µ1(D|hr,21 )
(1− ρ)(µ1(D|hr,21 ) + τ2(p|hr,21 )µ1(B|hr,21 ))
=
µ1(D|hr,21 )
µ1(D|hr,21 ) + τ2(p|hr,21 )µ1(B|hr,21 )
The numerator in the above expression represents the probability of observ-
ing pester from a destitute player 2, whereas the bottom represents the total
probability of observing pester. The (1−ρ) term is the possibility of observing
the signal given network loss (which cancels out).
On the other hand, if player 1 observes nothing, then, by Bayes rule,




ρµ1(D|hr,21 ) + µ1(¬D|hr,21 ) + (1− (1− ρ)τ2(p|hr,21 ))µ1(B|hr,21 ))
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From these two expressions, it can be shown that
µ1(D|hi1,p) ≥ µ1(D|hi1,o)
and both hi1,p and h
i
1,o have the same number of c’s, thus satisfying case 2.
Inductive step. Assume true for all r0 ≤ i < r; we prove the lemma for i = r0−1
by starting from the inductive hypothesis for round i + 1 and showing that
one of the above cases must hold when extending the history into round i.
Case 1: There has not been a pester since the last contribution in hi+11,o and
hi+11,p contains at least as many c’s as h
i+1
1,o . By Lemma 4.14, we know that
player 1 will never contribute following hi+11,o . Therefore,
• If player 1 contributes after hi+11,p , then case 3 holds.
• If player 1 does nothing after hi+11,p and subsequently observes player 2
doing nothing, then case 1 holds.
• If player 1 does nothing after hi+11,p and subsequently observes player
2 pestering, then it follows from Lemma 4.15 that µ(D|(hi+11,p , o, p)) ≥
µ(D|(hi+11,p , o, p)), thus satisfying case 2.
Case 2: µ1(D|hi+11,p ) ≥ µ1(D|hi+11,o ) and hi+11,p contains at least as many c’s as
hi+11,o . If player 1 contributes after h
i+1
1,o because µ1(D|hi+11,o ) exceeds some thresh-
old, then µ1(D|hi+11,p ) must also exceed the threshold by assumption, so player
1 contributes after hi+11,p . It is obvious that the number of contributions in
(hi+11,p , c, ω
i+1,2
1 ) continues to be at least that in (h
i+1
1,o , c, ω
i+1,2
1 ). Furthermore,
• If player 1 observes player 2 pester in round i+ 1 (ωi+1,21 = p), then, by
Lemma 4.15, µ1(D|(hi+11,p , c, p)) ≥ µ1(D|(hi+11,o , c, p)), thus satisfying case
2.
• If player 1 observes player 2 do nothing in round i+ 1 (ωi+1,21 = o), then
case 1 holds.
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Case 3: hi+11,p contains more c’s than h
i+1
1,o . If player 1 contributes after h
i+1
1,p or
does nothing after hi+11,o , then case 3 holds. Otherwise, if player 1 contributes
after hi+11,o but not after h
i+1
1,p , then it is obvious that the number of contributions
in (hi+11,p , o, ω
i+1,2
1 ) continues to be at least that in (h
i+1
1,o , c, ω
i+1,2
1 ). Furthermore,
• If player 1 observes player 2 pester in round i+ 1 (ωi+1,21 = p), then, by
Lemma 4.15, µ1(D|(hi+11,p , o, p)) ≥ µ1(D|(hi+11,o , c, p)), thus satisfying case
2.
• If player 1 observes player 2 do nothing in round i+ 1 (ωi+1,21 = o), then
case 1 holds.
Lemma 4.17. Suppose that player 1 is playing a threshold strategy start-
ing from some round r − 1 and history hr−11 . Let hi1,c and hi1,o be two



























In other words, hi1,c and h
i
1,o differs in how player 1 plays in round r and
may also differ in how player 1 plays in subsequent rounds. Then either:
1. There has not been a pester since the last contribution in hi1,o and
hi1,c contains at least as many c’s as h
i
1,o: for i < j < r, |{ωj,11,c|ωj,11,c =
c}|+ 1 = |{ωj,11,o|ωj,11,o = c}|;
2. µ1(D|hi1,c) ≥ µ1(D|hi1,o) and hi1,c contains at least as many c’s as hi1,o;
or
3. hi1,c contains more c’s than h
i
1,o: for i < j < r, |{ωj,11,c|ωj,11,c = c}|+ 1 >
|{ωj,11,o|ωj,11,o = c}|.
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Proof. By backwards induction on i.
Base case: i = r − 1. Player 1 has one more contribution by construction.
Inductive step. Assume true for all r0 ≤ i < r; we prove the lemma for i = r0−1
by starting from the inductive hypothesis for round i + 1 and showing that
one of the above cases must hold when extending the history into round i.
Case 1: There has not been a pester since the last contribution in hi+11,o and
hi+11,c contains at least as many c’s as h
i+1
1,o . By Lemma 4.14, player 1 will never
contribute after hi+11,o . Therefore,
• If player 1 contributes after hi+11,c , then case 3 holds.
• If player 1 does nothing after hi+11,c and subsequently observes player 2
doing nothing, then case 1 holds.
• If player 1 does nothing after hi+11,c and subsequently observes player 2
pester in round i+1, it follows from Lemma 4.15 that µ(D|(hi+11,c , o, p)) ≥
µ(D|(hi+11,o , o, p)), thus satisfying case 2.
Case 2: µ1(D|hi+11,c ) ≥ µ1(D|hi+11,o ) and hi+11,c contains at least as many c’s as
hi+11,c . If player 1 contributes after h
i+1
1,o because µ1(D|hi+11,o ) exceeds some thresh-
old, then µ1(D|hi+11,c ) must also exceed the threshold, so player 1 contributes
after hi+11,c . It is obvious that the number of contributions in (h
i+1
1,c , c, ω
i+1,2
1 )
continues to be at least that in (hi+11,o , c, ω
i+1,2
1 ). Furthermore,
• If player 1 observes player 2 pester in round i+ 1 (ωi+1,21 = p), then, by
Lemma 4.15, µ1(D|(hi+11,c , c, p)) ≥ µ1(D|(hi+11,o , c, p)), thus satisfying case
2.
• If player 1 observes player 2 do nothing in round i+ 1 (ωi+1,21 = o), then
case 1 holds.
Case 3: hi+11,c contains more c’s than h
i+1
1,o . If player 1 contributes after h
i+1
1,c or
does nothing after hi+11,o , then case 3 holds. Otherwise, if player 1 contributes
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after hi+11,o but not after h
i+1
1,c , then it is obvious that the number of contributions
in (hi+11,c , o, ω
i+1,2
1 ) continues to be at least that in (h
i+1
1,o , c, ω
i+1,2
1 ). Furthermore,
• If player 1 observes player 2 pester in round i+ 1 (ωi+1,21 = p), then, by
Lemma 4.15, µ1(D|(hi+11,c , o, p)) ≥ µ1(D|(hi+11,o , c, p)), thus satisfying case
2.
• If player 2 observes player 2 do nothing in round i+ 1 (ωi+1,21 = o), then
case 1 holds.
The following lemma states that, given that a non-Byzantine player 2 is
known to be destitute (and thus player 1 is willing to consider contributing),
there exist (infinitely-many) prior beliefs which, after the same sequence of
signals, map to arbitrarily-close posterior beliefs.
Lemma 4.18. Let hr1 be the current history and µ1 be player 1’s beliefs
such that µ1(D|hr1) > 0 and µ1(¬D|hr1) = 0. For all  > 0, there exists
some δ > 0 such that:
1. For all histories hr1′ and associated beliefs µ
′
1(θ|hr1′) where
µ′1(¬D|hr1′) = 0 and 0 ≤ µ′1(D|hr1′)− µ1(D|hr1) < δ; and
2. For any history hi1 and h
i




1′ , respectively, as
a prefix such that:



























µ1(¬D|hi1) = µ′1(¬D|hi1′) = 0
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Then the following holds: 0 ≤ µ′1(D|hi1′)− µ1(D|hi1) < .
Proof. Let Pˆ and Oˆ be the rounds in which pestering and doing nothing,
respectively, are observed in ωr,11 , ω
r,2




1 ; similarly, let mc be
the number of rounds in which contribution occurs in this sequence. Letting












(µ′1(D|hr1′)ζ + µ′1(B|hr1′)β)(µ1(D|hr1)ζ + µ1(B|hr1)β)
=
(µ′1(D|hr1′)− µ1(D|hr1))ζβ
(µ′1(D|hr1′)ζ + µ′1(B|hr1′)β)(µ1(D|hr1)ζ + µ1(B|hr1)β)
It is obvious that the above expression is non-negative if µ′1(D|hr1′)−µ1(D|hr1) ≥
0. Moreover, since the denominator in the above expression is positive and less
than 1 and 0 ≤ βζ < 1, it can be verified that the above expression is strictly
less than  if µ′1(D|hr1′)− µ1(D|hr1) <  = δ.
Full results for player 2
Lemma 4.19. Player 2 is as likely to receive a contribution from a rational
player 1 if player 2 pesters instead of doing nothing.
Proof. Let r be the current round and let hr1 and h
r
2 be the histories that
player 1 and 2 have observed. If player 2 pesters and player 1 does not observe
it, then regardless of whether player 2 pesters or not, player 1 starts from
history (hr1, o) and plays exactly the same. As a result, the likelihood of player
1 contributing and player 2 receiving said contribution is exactly the same.
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Thus, suppose that player 1 observes the history (hr1, p) if player 2
pesters and (hr1, o) otherwise. Consider any two complete histories h1,p and























Let mp and mo be the number of rounds from round r − 1 until the end of
the game in which player 1 observes player 2 pestering and doing nothing.
By Lemma 4.16, h1,p must contain at least as many c’s as h1,o; let mc,p and





respectively, where mc,p ≥ mc,o.
Player 1 expects that a destitute player 2 will pester every round ex-
cept the last. Moreover, note that (a rational) player 1 never mixes: based on
the history it has observed, player 1 either contributes or does nothing with
probability 1. Thus, given that player 2 never receives the contribution, the
probability that h1,p and h1,o result from (h
r
1, p) and (h
r
1, o), respectively, is
the same: (1 − ρ)mpρmo−1 (note the mo − 1 is due to the fact that player 2
always does nothing in the last round). The probability that player 2 never
receives a contribution given h1,p is ρ
mc,p . Since the probability that player 2
never receives a contribution given h1,o is ρ
mc,o ≥ ρmc,p , player 1 is as likely to
receive a contribution in history h1,p as in h1,o.
The probability of player 2 not getting the contribution starting from
(hr1, p) and (h
r
1, o) is simply the sum of the probabilities of all possible complete
histories h1,p and h1,o that start with (h
r
1, p) and (h
r
1, o), respectively. It then
follows that player 2 is no less likely to get the contribution starting from
(hr1, p) instead of (h
r
1, o).
Theorem 4.20. A destitute player 2 pesters in all rounds r > 0.
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Proof. By contradiction. Assume player 2 prefers to do nothing despite condi-
tion (4.3), i.e., there exists some strategy σ2,o in which player 2 does nothing
in round r despite having beliefs which satisfy condition (4.3). Construct an
alternate strategy σ2,p in which:
1. Player 2 pesters after hr2.
2. If player 2 receives a contribution in round r − 1, player 2 does nothing
for the remainder of the game.
3. Otherwise, player 2 plays σ2,o as if it did nothing in round r, i.e., σ2,o
and σ2,p are identical from round r − 1 on if player 2 does not receive a
contribution in round r.
Consider player 2’s difference in expected utility between playing σ2,o
and σ2,p. If player 1 is Byzantine, the expected difference in utility between
σ2,o and σ2,p is γ↑p. If player 1 is rational, by Lemma 4.19, player 2 is as likely
to receive a contribution if player 2 pesters in round r (versus doing nothing);
hence, the expected difference in utility between σ2,p and σ2,o is at most γ↑p.
Finally, if player 1 is acquiescent, then the expected utility, starting from player
2’s turn in round r−1, of playing σ2,o or σ2,p as a destitute player is the same;
let V (A, r − 1) represent this utility. Thus, the expected difference in utility





1)[u2|hr2,A] = γ↑p − (1− α)(b− γ↓c − V (A, r − 1))
Note that we subtract away V (A, r − 1) with probability 1 − α since, with
probability 1−α, player 2 observes the contribution and, for the remainder of
the game, will do nothing along with an (acquiescent) player 1.
By Assumption 4.7, pestering an acquiescent player 1 until player 2
gets the contribution or r = 0 is in player 2’s best interest, and thus for i < r,
V (A, i) ≤ −γ↑p + (1− α)(b− γ↓c) + αV (A, i− 1), where V (A, 0) = 0. Solving
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the recursion, we have
V (A, r − 1) ≤ 1− α
r−1
1− α (−γ↑p + (1− α)(b− γ↓c))






≤ γ↑p − µ∗2(A|hr2)(αr−1(1− α)(b− γ↓c) + (1− αr−1)γ↑p)
< 0
and thus player 2 prefers to pester. Contradiction.
Full proofs for player 1
Lemma 4.21. Player 1 does nothing for rounds r ≤ r¯, where r¯ is defined
as in condition (4.1).
Proof. By induction.
Base case: r = 0. If player 1 does nothing, it earns 0 since player 2 never
pesters in the last round. If it contributes, it earns at most −γ↑c < 0.
Inductive step. Assume true for all rounds r such that 0 ≤ r < r0 ≤ r¯. We now
prove it to be true for r = r0. Let h
r
1 be player 1’s current history. If player 1
does nothing for the remainder of the game, its expected utility is at least
−µ∗1(D|hr1)r(1− ρ)γ↓p + µ∗1(B|hr1) E[u1|hr1,B]
since, by the induction hypothesis, player 1 does nothing for the remaining
rounds.
If player 1 instead contributes, its expected utility is at most
−γ↑c − µ∗1(D|hr1)rρ(1− ρ)γ↓p + µ∗1(B|hr1) E[u1|hr1,B]
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for similar reasons.
Thus, doing nothing is strictly better if
−µ∗1(D|hr1)r(1− ρ)2γ↓p > −γ↑c
This is satisfied given condition (4.1).
Lemma 4.22. Let r < R be the current round and hr1 be the current
history, and suppose that player 1 follows a threshold strategy σ1 starting
from round r and history hr1. Then
−γ↑c + E(σ1,σ∗2)[u1|(hr1, c),B] ≤ E(σ1,σ
∗
2)[u1|(hr1, o),B]
Proof. Starting from history (hr1, o) and (h
r
1, c), consider any two complete



























such that ωj,11,c and ω
j,1





(for 0 ≤ j < r).
Given the fact that σ1 is a threshold strategy and that player 2 is
Byzantine and is thus expected to play actions independent of what it observes
from player 1, (1) h1,c and h1,o occur with equal probability, (2) by Lemma
4.17, h1,c contains at least as many c’s as h1,o, and (3) the cost incurred by
pestering in both histories is exactly the same.
It follows then that, starting from history (hr1, c) and history (h
r
1, o),
player 1 will contribute at most once more in continuation starting from (hr1, o)





[u1|(hr1, o),B] ≤ γ↑c
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as needed.
Theorem 4.23. Let hr1 be the history of player 1 in some round r such
that r¯ < r ≤ R, where r¯ is defined by condition (4.1), and let µ1 be player
1’s beliefs such that µ1(¬D|hr1) = 0. Then there exists some threshold µ¯r1
such that if µ1(D|hr1) ≥ µ¯r1, player 1 contributes; otherwise, player 1 does
nothing.
Proof. By induction on r, i.e., backwards induction on time.
Base case: r = r¯ + 1. player 1 contributes iff
−γ↑c + E(σR,1,σ∗2)[u1|(hr1, c)] ≥ E(σR,1,σ
∗
2)[u1|(hr1, o)]
Since, by Lemma 4.21, player 1 does nothing in subsequent rounds regardless
of player 2’s actions, we have
−γ↑c ≥ E(σR,1,σ∗2)[u1|(hr1, o)]− E(σR,1,σ
∗
2)[u1|(hr1, c)] = −(1− ρ)2µ1(D|hr1)r¯γ↓p







Inductive step. Assume true for all r, r¯ < r ≤ r0; we prove r = r0 + 1 by
contradiction, i.e., there exists some alternate strategy σ′1 such that, in round
r, there are beliefs (in player 2 being destitute) in which player 1 is (weakly)
better off contributing and higher beliefs in which player 1 is better off doing
nothing; in subsequent rounds, by the induction hypothesis, player 1 is best off
playing the threshold strategy. Formally, there must exist some ηr1 < 1, δ > 0,
and some belief µ1(θ|hr1) such that µ1(¬D|hr1) = 0 and either:
1. For µ1(D|hr1) = ηr1, player 1 contributes, and for µ1(D|hr1) such that
ηr1 < µ1(D|hr1) < ηr1 + δ, player 1 does nothing; or
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2. For µ1(D|hr1) such that ηr1 − δ < µ1(D|hr1) < ηr1, player 1 contributes,
and for µ1(D|hr1) = ηr1, player 1 does nothing.
We only consider the first case, as the proof of the other case is very
similar. Suppose that µ1(¬D|hr1) = 0 and µ1(D|hr1) = ηr1 for some history hr1.
By the inductive hypothesis, there exists a threshold µ¯i1 for all rounds i < r.
For any i ≤ r, let H i1 represent the set of all possible histories that start with
hr1 in which player 1 knows a non-Byzantine player 2 is destitute:
H i1 =
{






µ¯i1 − µ1(D|hi1) | µ¯i1 > µ1(D|hi1)
}
If µ1(D|hi1) ≥ µ¯i1 for all hi1, then we set  = 1.  represents the minimum
difference, if one exists, between player 1’s belief and the threshold at any
future round when player 1’s belief in player 2 being destitute is less than that
round’s threshold.
By Lemma 4.18, we know that we can find some history hr1′ and as-
sociated belief µ′1(θ|hr1′) such that µ′1(¬D|hr1′) = 0 and for 0 ≤ µ′1(D|hr1′) −
µ1(D|hr1) < δ and 0 ≤ i < r,
0 ≤ µ′1(D|hi1′)− µ1(D|hi1) < 
for all hi1′ ∈ H i1′ (where H i1′ is defined similarly to H i1) and hi1 ∈ H i1.
Thus, for any round i < r where µ1(¬D|hr1) = µ′1(¬D|hr1′) = 0, µ1(D|hi1) <
µ¯i1 iff µ
′
1(D|hi1′) < µ¯i1. By Lemma 4.14, player 1 is better off doing nothing if its
belief that player 2 is non-destitute is positive. It follows that player 1 playing
σ′1 with belief µ1(θ|hr1), upon observing some non-empty sequence of signals
after hr1, plays the same action as if player 1 held the belief µ
′
1(θ|hr1′) and ob-
served the same non-empty sequence of signals after hr1′ . Given that player 2
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is of type θ, player 1’s expected utility of playing action ar1 followed by the
threshold strategy with either belief µ1(θ|hr1) or µ′1(θ|hr1′) must be equal; let
V (ar1, θ) be this expected continuation utility.
By assumption, µ1(¬D|hr1) = µ′1(¬D|hr1) = 0 and so µ1(B|hr1) = 1 −
µ1(D|hr1) and µ′1(B|hr1) = 1 − µ1(D|hr1). However, since µ1(D|hr1) = ηr1 <
µ′1(D|hr1′) < ηr1 + δ, then given belief µ′1(θ|hr1′), player 1 prefers to do nothing
during round r + 1:

























[u1|(hr1′ , ωr,11 )]
= µ′1(B|hr1′)V (ωr,11 ,B) + µ′1(D|hr1′)V (ωr,11 ,D) + µ′1(¬D|hr1′)V (ωr,11 ,¬D)
Since a non-Byzantine player 2 stops pestering upon receiving a contribution,
then by Lemma 4.14, player 1 never contributes unless pestered: V (ar1,¬D) =
0. Combining the last two groups of expressions and moving terms around, we
get
µ1(B|hr1)(V (o,B)− V (c,B) + γ↑c) ≤ µ1(D|hr1)(−γ↑c + ρV (c,D)− V (o,D))
µ′1(B|hr1′)(V (o,B)− V (c,B) + γ↑c) > µ′1(D|hr1′)(−γ↑c + ρV (c,D)− V (o,D))
In rounds r + 1 on, we know by the inductive hypothesis that player
1 is better off playing a threshold strategy. By Lemma 4.22, we know that
V (o,B) − V (c,B) + γ↑c ≥ 0. If V (o,B) − V (c,B) + γ↑c = 0, an immediate
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contradiction arises:
µ′1(D|hr1′)(−γ↑c+ρV (c,D)−V (o,D)) < 0 ≤ µ1(D|hr1)(−γ↑c+ρV (c,D)−V (o,D))
Thus, assuming that V (o,B)− V (c,B) + γ↑c > 0, we have
µ1(B|hr1)
µ1(D|hr1)
≤ −γ↑c + ρV (c,D)− V (o,D)




However, by assumption, µ′1(D|hr1′) > µ1(D|hr1), so
µ1(B|hr1) = 1− µ1(D|hr1) > 1− µ′1(D|hr1′) = µ′1(B|hr1′)
thus contradicting condition (4.6).
Lemma 4.24. Suppose there exists a threshold strategy σ1 which specifies
a best response for player 1 at every point in the game. Let r be the current
round such that 0 < r < R and R satisfies condition (4.4), and let hr1 be
the current history. If player 1, following σ1, does nothing in round r after
history hr1 and observes player 2 doing nothing, then player 1, following
σ1, also does nothing in round r − 1 following history (hr1, o, o).
Proof. Since player 1 never contributes starting from round r¯ (as defined by
condition (4.1)), we prove the lemma for r = r0 + 1 > r¯.
For the sake of contradiction, suppose that there exists a threshold
strategy σ1,o that specifies a best response for player 1 at every point in the
game and in which player 1, following σ1,o, does nothing after history h
r
1 but
contributes after history hr−11 = (h
r
1, o, o). By Lemma 4.16,
µ1(D|hr−11 ) = µ1(D|(hr1, o, o)) ≤ µ1(D|(hr1, o, p))
It follows that, since player 1 is playing a threshold strategy, player 1 will also
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contribute following (hr1, o, p).
Consider, instead, an alternate strategy σ1,c, which is exactly the same
as σ1,o except player 1 contributes after history h
r
1 but does nothing after
history hr−11 = (h
r
1, c, o). The subsequent actions that player 1 plays, following
σ1,c, are the same as if player 1 had faithfully followed σ1,o the entire time (i.e.,
as if player 1 contributed in round r−1 and not the prior round r). Intuitively,
σ1,c differs from σ1,o in that player 1 contributes one round early in σ1,c.






Consider what player 1’s expected continuation utility is given these
two different strategies. First, consider if player 2 is non-destitute. By Lemma
4.14, player 1 only contributes if it has been subsequently pestered. Since a
non-destitute player 2 never pesters, the continuation utility against a non-
destitute player 2 is the same (−γ↑c) regardless of whether player 1 is playing
σ1,c or σ1,o.
Next, consider if player 2 is destitute. Then, starting from hr1 and given
that player 2 is destitute, player 1 expects to earn
E(σ1,o,σ
∗
2)[u1|hr1,D] = −γ↑c + (1− ρ)(−γ↓p + ρE(σ1,o,σ
∗
2)[u1|(hr1, o, p, c),D])+
ρ(ρE(σ1,o,σ
∗
2)[u1|(hr1, o, o, c),D])
following σ1,o. The (1−ρ)(·) term (the ρ(·) term) represents the expected pay-
off if player 1 observes pestering (nothing) from player 2 in round r. The ρ
multiplying the E[·] expression in both of the aforementioned terms represents
the likelihood that the contribution in round r is missed by player 2, who re-
mains destitute as a result. Again, since a non-destitute player 2 never pesters,
by Lemma 4.14, player 1’s expected continuation utility from round r0 on for
any destitute player that receives a contribution is 0.
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On the other hand, player 1 expects to earn
E(σ1,c,σ
∗
2)[u1|hr1,D] = −γ↑c + ρ((1− ρ)(−γ↓p + E(σ1,c,σ
∗
2)[u1|(hr1, c, p, o),D])+
ρE(σ1,c,σ
∗
2)[u1|(hr1, c, o, o),D])
following σ1,c. The ρ(·) term represents the expected payoff if the contribu-
tion in round r is missed by player 2; the expression inside of the parenthesis
represents the expected payoff given that player 1 observes pestering with
probability 1 − ρ and nothing with probability ρ; and, again, player 1’s ex-
pected continuation utility from round r0 on is 0 from any destitute player




2)[u1|(hr1, o, p, c),D] = E(σ1,c,σ
∗
2)[u1|(hr1, c, p, o),D]
as σ1,o and σ1,c do not differ in rounds after r, and a destitute player 2 has
seen the same history from its perspective (i.e., no contributions) and will thus
play the same actions in continuation from either history.
By the same argument,
E(σ1,o,σ
∗
2)[u1|(hr1, o, o, c),D] = E(σ1,c,σ
∗
2)[u1|(hr1, c, o, o),D]









2)[u1|hr1,D] ≤ −(1− ρ)2γ↓p < 0
Finally, it can be easily verified through similar arguments that against











2)[u1|hr1] which implies that player 1 is
better off contributing in round r, thus completing the contradiction.
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Theorem 4.11. The strategy profile and set of beliefs (σ∗, µ∗) make up a
perfect Bayes equilibrium.
Proof. Lemmas 4.14, 4.13, and 4.21 and Theorems 4.20 and 4.23 show that
σ∗ specifies a best response given the set of beliefs µ∗. Furthermore, µ∗, by
construction, is the result of using Bayes rule in continuation whenever possi-
ble.
Theorem 4.12. Let r < R be the current round, and suppose that player
1 played its best-response action in round r+ 1. Then, if player 1 observes
player 2 do nothing in round r+ 1, then player 1 does nothing in round r.
Proof. By Theorem 4.23, we know that it is in player 1’s best interest to play
a threshold strategy. By assumption, player 1 observes player 2 do nothing
in round r + 1. If player 1’s best-response action was to contribute in round
r + 1 then by Lemma 4.14, player 1 does nothing in round r. If player 1’s
best-response action was to do nothing in round r + 1, then by Lemma 4.24,
player 1 does nothing in round r.
Auxiliary results
4.4 Characterizing the equilibrium
To understand the implications of §4.3 on the design of cooperative services,
we explore, through simulation, the parameter space for which our cooperative
equilibrium holds. We ask the following questions:
1. What fraction of acquiescent peers suffices to motivate a player
to pester? The shaded areas in Figures 4.1 and 4.2 show (for different rates
of network loss, different initial beliefs about the likelihood of player 1 being
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0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1
Figure 4.1: Sufficient initial beliefs for a rational player 2 in player 1 being
acquiescent to incentivize player 2 to pester (y-axis, shaded area) for varying
amounts of acquiescent generosity (x-axis); network loss or ρ (top/bottom
plots); and b−γ↓c (left/right plots). Simulation run with γ↑p = 1, R = 20, and
µ2(B) = 0.5.
Byzantine, and different worth of receiving a contribution) the fraction of
acquiescent peers that suffices to trigger player 2’s pestering, as a function of
the probability ((1− α)/(1− ρ)2) that an acquiescent player 1 will contribute
if pestered, which we refer to here as acquiescent generosity. We assume that
player 2 believes an acquiescent player 1 follows the acquiescent strategy; a
Byzantine player 1 never contributes; and a rational player 1 only contributes
in round R. This is a conservative estimate on the fraction of acquiescent peers
sufficient to motivate player 2; in practice, the actual amount is likely to be
lower than we report. As expected, for a given level of generosity, it is easier to
incentivize player 2 if the value of the contribution increases and the likelihood
of player 1 being Byzantine decreases. Given a highly lossy network, player 2
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0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1
Figure 4.2: Sufficient initial beliefs for a rational player 2 in player 1 being
acquiescent to incentivize player 2 to pester (y-axis, shaded area) for varying
amounts of acquiescent generosity (x-axis); network loss or ρ (top/bottom
plots); and µ2(B) (left/right plots). Simulation run with γ↑p = 1, R = 20, and
b− γ↓c = 105.
is also more willing to continue pestering, as it is more willing to attribute to
network loss its failure to receive a contribution.
2. How do player 1’s beliefs and the rate of network loss affect player
1’s willingness to contribute? Player 1 may contribute only if its belief
that player 2 is destitute is above a certain threshold. We show in Figure 4.3
how that threshold changes over the course of a game in which R = 20. For
six configurations, with two different rates of network loss and three different
probabilities that a Byzantine player 2 will pester, we plot the belief threshold
and report the number of times that player 1 contributes in Table 4.2. For a
given round, we assign player 1 some initial belief that player 2 is destitute and
construct the game tree to determine whether that initial belief is sufficient to
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Pr. Byz. pester = 0.1
Pr. Byz. pester = 0.5



















Figure 4.3: Player 1’s belief thresholds. Solid lines represent ρ = 0.05; dotted
lines represent ρ = 0.25. Simulation run with γ↑c/γ↓p = 2 and R = 20.




Table 4.2: The maximum number of times player 1 contributes for each of
the thresholds shown in Figure 4.3. Simulation run with γ↑c/γ↓p = 2, R = 20,
and µ1(B) = 0.1.
motivate player 1 to contribute in that round; we use binary search to approx-
imate the threshold value. As expected, when the game has only few rounds
left and the cost from being pestered is not enough to overcome the cost of
contributing, there is no threshold above which player 1 contributes. Note also
that increasing ρ increases the belief threshold required to convince player 1 to
contribute (as it reduces the expected threat from pestering) but also makes
player 1 more likely to contribute when pestered, since past contributions are
more likely to have been dropped. Also, the belief threshold increases as the
likelihood of a Byzantine player 2 pestering decreases, since it becomes more
in player 1’s interest to delay contribution, waiting to see whether player 2
will pester. However, when player 1 observes pestering, its belief that player 2
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is destitute increases, and player 1 becomes more more willing to contribute.
Finally, decreasing the relative cost of contributing (γ↑c/γ↓p) has an obvious
effect on player 1’s likelihood to contribute (not shown).
3. Too much generosity? An intriguing conclusion from Figure 4.1 and 4.2
is that acquiescent generosity can make it much harder to motivate player 2 to
pester. The reason is that the more generous acquiescent peers are, the easier it
is for a rational player 2 to determine, from observed signals, whether player 1
is acquiescent or not, which in turn affects whether player 2 continues to pester.
Figures 4.1 and 4.2 show the effects that an acquiescent peer’s generosity has on
cooperation. For higher levels of acquiescent generosity, we can only guarantee
cooperation if such generosity is offset by a high ρ or b − γ↓c. Acquiescent
generosity becomes a more obvious discriminant if a Byzantine player 1 never
contributes, but it becomes less conspicuous with higher rates of network loss,
which affects the observed generosity from player 2’s perspective. As expected,
player 2 is more willing to pester given a more valuable contribution.
4.5 Summary
Despite the presence of acquiescent peers in real-world cooperative systems,
little attention has been given to their role in establishing rational cooperation.
In this paper, we take the first step in understanding their function by showing
that altruism is necessary and sufficient to motivate rational cooperation in
the crucial last exchange between peers. Our results suggest that, while a small
fraction of acquiescent peers is sufficient to spur rational peers into action even
in systems with a large fraction of Byzantine peers, overly generous acquiescent
peers can irreparably harm rational cooperation.
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4.6 Appendix: Infinite-horizon games
4.6.1 The unbounded model
We focus on the differences between this model and the one presented in §4.1.
As in §4.2, we assume that there are only Byzantine and rational participants.
As we are dealing with an infinite-length game, we count the rounds in order,
i.e., the game starts at round 0 and increases from there. Another consequence
of an infinite-length game is that we must introduce discount factors on payoffs
in future rounds; otherwise, payoffs may diverge as it becomes possible to
achieve infinitely positive (or negative) payoffs. Thus, the utility functions for
players 1 and 2 are:


















where δ is the discount factor, assumed to be common knowledge, and 1X(r) =
1 if r ∈ X and is 0 otherwise. Note that these formulas are simply generaliza-
tions of the utility functions as defined in §4.2.
4.6.2 Equilibria of interest
The equilibria we focus on in this section have the following properties:
1. They are finitely mixed : they place positive probability only on a finite
number of histories. We leave (arbitrarily) mixed strategies as future
work.
2. A destitute player 2 believes it can earn positive payoff from the last
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exchange. More formally, a destitute player 2 expects that following any
equilibrium strategy σ∗ after some history hr2 with a rational player 1
results in non-negative utility:
Eσ
∗
[u2|hr2,R] ≥ 0 (4.7)
3. A non-destitute player 2 always prefers not to pester. In other words, we
do not consider “unusual” equilibria in which player 2 might pester to
dissuade player 1 from contributing.
4.6.3 What if a Byzantine player acts destitute?
In this section, we assume that if player 2 is Byzantine, it plays the following
strategy.
Definition 4.25. The destitute strategy is a strategy in which player 2
plays the rational strategy as though no contribution were ever observed.
Lemma 4.26. Suppose there exists some positive probability that player
2 is a Byzantine player. Furthermore, suppose that Byzantine players fol-
low the destitute strategy. Then for any round r and any history hr1, if
µ1(B|hr1) ≥ µ¯1, where
µ¯1 = 1− γ↑c
γ↑c + γ↓p
1− δ
1− ρ < 1 (4.8)
then player 1 is better off doing nothing.
Proof. Let σ∗1 denote a strategy in which player 1 contributes after h
r
1 given
beliefs µ1(B|hr1) ≥ µ¯r1 and maximizes player 1’s continuation payoff. Let σ′1 be
the same strategy as σ∗1 except player 1 does nothing after h
r
1 and then plays
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as if it had contributed from round r + 1 on.
Denoting V as the δ-discounted continuation utility of playing σ∗1 with
a (still) destitute player 2 after contributing, i.e.,
V = Eσ
∗




















2)[u1|hr1] and thus player 1 is better off doing nothing if V = 0 or
µ1(B|hr1) > µ¯1 ≥
V (1− ρ) + γ↑c
V (1− ρ)
Lemma 4.27. Suppose there exists some positive probability that player
2 is a Byzantine player. Furthermore, suppose that a Byzantine player 2
follows the destitute strategy. Then there exists no equilibrium (with the
properties specified in §4.6.2) where a rational player 1 contributes with
positive probability an unbounded number of times.
Proof. Suppose there exists some equilibrium (σ∗, µ∗) in which player 1 con-
tributes with positive probability an unbounded number of times. This implies







1 , . . .)
such that for any number of contributions mc ≥ 0, there exists a finite prefix
of this sequence hr1 that occurs with positive probability (given σ
∗) and that
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(a) contains at least mc contributions and (b) has a pester following the last
contribution.9
Note that, while destitute and non-destitute rational player 2 are distin-
guishable, destitute and Byzantine player 2 are not. Since pestering has been
observed in hr1, µ1(D|hr1) = 0. It follows that
µ1(B|hr1) =
µ1(B)
µ1(B) + ρmc(1− µ1(B))
It can be verified that for any finite continuation hi1 of h
r
1, µ1(B|hi1) ≥
µ1(B|hr1), as any signals that are observed by player 1 at most affect the second




µ1(B) + ρmc(1− µ1(B)) = 1
so by selecting a sufficiently large mc and corresponding finite prefix h
r¯c
1 that
has mc contributions and a pester following them, we have
µ1(B|hr¯c1 ) > µ¯1
after which player 1 never contributes again. Contradiction.
Theorem 4.28. Suppose there exists some positive probability that player
2 is a Byzantine player. Furthermore, suppose that a Byzantine player 2
follows the destitute strategy. Then there exists no equilibrium (with the
properties specified in §4.6.2) where a rational player 1 contributes or
rational player 2 pesters.
Proof. Suppose there exists an equilibrium (σ∗, µ∗) in which a rational player
9Case (a) holds by assumption; if case (b) did not hold, then this would imply that player
2, destitute or not, never pesters after mc contributions. It follows then that player 1 would
have been better off contributing only mc − 1 times.
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1 contributes and player 2 pesters. By Lemma 4.27, there exists no equilibrium
where a rational player 1 contributes with positive probability an unbounded
number of times. Because σ∗ is finitely mixed, we can consider all possible
histories that follow from σ∗ with positive probability and find the last round
in which player 1 contributes and after which player 1 never contributes again.
Denote this last round as r¯c. As in the proof of Theorem 4.3, it follows that a
rational player 2 never pesters with positive probability starting from round r¯c
in σ∗ and therefore a rational player 1 is better off not contributing in round
r¯c. Contradiction.
4.6.4 What if a Byzantine player never contributes?
In this section, we assume if player 1 is Byzantine, there is some probability
it has crashed.
Definition 4.29. The crash strategy is a strategy in which player 1 never
contributes.
We denote the subset of Byzantine nodes that have crashed using a new type:
S.
Lemma 4.30. Let (σ∗, µ∗) be some equilibrium and let φ(hr2) be the prob-
ability that player 2, following σ∗, will receive at least one contribution






then player 2 does nothing in round r.
Proof. Suppose that there exists some equilibrium σ∗ such that for some his-
tory hr2, condition (4.9) holds but player 2 pesters with positive probability.
Letting σ′2 be the strategy in which player 2 does nothing in round r but follows
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σ∗2 as if it had pestered for the remainder of the game, we know that





Since Byzantine players are expected to play independently of player
2’s actions, we know that
Eσ
∗





Let V (p) represent player 2’s expected utility given that a rational player
1 observed player 2 pester in round r; define V (o) similarly. Then we have
Eσ
∗





−2)[u2|(hr2, o),R] = V (o)
Plugging these into condition (4.10), we have
−γ↑p + δµ∗2(R|hr2) ((1− ρ)V (p) + ρV (o)) ≥ δµ∗2(R|hr2)V (o)
By condition (4.7), V (o) ≥ 0. In the best case, player 2 receives the contribu-
tion in the following round and incurs no additional costs, i.e., φ(hr2)(b−γ↓c) ≥
V (p):
−γ↑p + δµ∗2(R|hr2)(1− ρ)φ(hr2)(b− γ↓c) ≥ δ(1− ρ)µ∗2(R|hr2)V (o) ≥ 0














Lemma 4.31. Suppose there exists some positive probability that player
1 is a Byzantine player that has crashed and never contributes. Then
there exists no equilibrium (with the properties specified in §4.6.2) where
a destitute player 2 pesters with positive probability an unbounded number
of times.
Proof. Suppose there exists some equilibrium (σ∗, µ∗) in which a destitute
player 2 pesters with positive probability an unbounded number of times.







2 , . . .)
such that any finite prefix of this sequence is reached with positive probability
(given σ∗); ωi,11 = o for all i; and there does not exist some r¯p such that










2 |hr2) represent player 2’s expectation on the probability of
observing ωr,12 from a rational player 1 given that player 2 has observed h
r
2.





σ¯R,1(o|hr2) = 0 (4.11)
Suppose not; suppose instead that the limit converges to some L > 0. Since∏
r∈[0,R) σ¯R,1(o|hr2) is monotonically non-increasing with respect to R, this im-




b− γ↓c − γ↑pL
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Since player 2 pesters an unbounded number of times, there must exist
some round r2 ≥ r1 where player 2 pesters (ωr2,22 = p). As in Lemma 4.30, let
φ(hr22 ) be the probability that player 2 will receive at least one contribution
from a rational player 1 starting from some history (hr22 , p). By definition,





It follows, from this expression and condition (4.12), that











However, given this condition, Lemma 4.30 states that player 2 should not
have pestered after hr22 . This contradiction completes the proof of condition
(4.11).
Given condition (4.11), it follows that over time, if player 2 continues
to hear nothing from player 1, then the belief that player 2 has about player




















By the definition of the limit, there exists some round r¯p such that for
all rounds r ≥ r¯p,







b− γ↓c > 1 ≥ φ(h
r
2)
By Lemma 4.30, it follows that in every round after r¯p, player 2 does
nothing. Contradiction.
Theorem 4.32. Suppose there exists some positive probability that player
1 is a Byzantine player that has crashed and never contributes. There exists
no equilibrium (with the properties specified in §4.6.2) where a rational
player 1 contributes or player 2 pesters.
Proof. Suppose there exists an equilibrium (σ∗, µ∗) in which a rational player
1 contributes and player 2 pesters. By Lemma 4.31, there exists no equilib-
rium where a rational player 2 pesters with positive probability an unbounded
number of times. Because σ∗ is finitely mixed, we can consider all possible
histories that follow from σ∗ with positive probability and find the last round
in which player 2 pesters and after which player 2 never pesters again. Denote
this last round as r¯p. As in the proof of Theorem 4.3, it follows that a rational
player 1 never contributes with positive probability starting from round r¯p + 1





In the previous chapters, we described how to guarantee that rational individ-
uals will not deviate in the presence of Byzantine, acquiescent, and rational
nodes. Preventing individual deviations, however, is unlikely to be sufficient
to build robust cooperative services. The social nature of these services sug-
gests that nodes will develop, or may have already established, a rich web of
relationships (based, for instance, on friendship or on belonging to the same
organization), which may cause coalitions of nodes to collude and deviate to-
gether [80]. We submit that cooperative services that ignore the possibility of
collusion do so at their own peril. That most cooperative services still choose to
do so is a testament to how hard it is to address the threat posed by collusion
to the stability of an equilibrium.
The literature offers two approaches to address this threat. The first is
to model collusion as a fault and colluding nodes as Byzantine [24, 49, 86].
The limitations of this approach are obvious: since basic distributed computing
primitives such as consensus and reliable broadcast cannot be implemented if
more than one third of the nodes are Byzantine [75], modeling colluding nodes
as Byzantine imposes a cap on the number and size of coalitions that is both
artificial (since it lacks a game theoretic basis) and dangerously low.
The second approach is to deny any benefit to colluders. If the equilib-
rium is a best response not just to every individual, but also to every possible
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coalition, then collusion poses no harm to the equilibrium’s stability, since
nodes gain no benefit by colluding. This is the aim of solution concepts such
as strong Nash [31] and k-resilient equilibria [19, 21], which offer this guaran-
tee, respectively, for all conceivable coalitions and for arbitrary coalitions of
size at most k. Coalition-proof Nash equilibria [33] similarly ensure that nodes
cannot gain any benefit from colluding and deviating in a self-enforcing way
(such that there cannot be further profitable deviations from sub-coalitions).
Our work is motivated by what we believe to be a critical flaw of the
second approach: its inability to account for the role played by social factors
that are impossible to completely capture a priori (such as friendships or shared
participation in social groups) in determining whether a node will consider a
strategy to be a best response. Intuitively, nodes in coalitions formed on the
basis of social “side channels” are likely to know more about each other, trust
each other more, and in general be able to hold stronger assumptions about
one another than about non-coalition members. Since stronger assumptions
typically lead to more efficient protocols, techniques that aim to deny benefits
to coalitions face a fundamentally uphill battle: as we show in §5.1, identifying
a single strategy that is a best response both inside and outside every possible
coalition is very hard.
To overcome this impasse, this paper introduces and begins to explore
a fundamentally different approach to dealing with coalitions. The key obser-
vation is that the fundamental property provided by an equilibrium is stabil-
ity—in that nodes do not want to deviate—and that while finding a single
best response between all nodes is sufficient to achieve stability, it is not nec-
essary: insisting on this requirement as the means to providing stability puts
the cart (i.e., best responding) before the horse (i.e., stability). As a first con-
crete step in this new direction, we introduce two new solution concepts that
do not require fighting the strong headwinds of social relationships to guaran-
tee stable cooperative services; instead, they explicitly model the advantages
that coalition members have while ensuring that nodes do not want to de-
viate from the specified equilibrium. Both solution concepts achieve stability
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through a simple observation: coalitions (including the trivial singleton coali-
tion of one non-colluding node) will not deviate from an equilibrium as long as
the equilibrium specifies a best-response strategy for every coalition. Thus, the
strategy a node follows depends on whom the node is colluding with, allowing
the equilibrium to specify how nodes can benefit from their coalitions.
The first solution concept, k-indistinguishability, achieves stability through
a guarantee that, while stronger than necessary, is attractively simple. In a
k-indistinguishable equilibrium, the actions performed by a node within its
coalition may depend on who belongs to the coalition, but the actions towards
those with whom that participant is not colluding are unaffected. Thus, in a
k-indistinguishable equilibrium, nodes cannot tell whether another peer, with
whom they are not colluding, is itself part of some other coalition (of at most
k nodes). The second solution concept, k-stability, instead adheres to the con-
ditions necessary for stability: like k-indistinguishability, k-stable equilibria
specify a strategy per coalition that is a best response to the strategies played
by all other possible coalitions; unlike k-indistinguishability, the actions that
a node takes as a part of a k-stable equilibrium may be informative about
whether it is colluding and with whom. Finally, because k-stability and k-
indistinguishability allow nodes to change their strategies depending on whom
they are colluding with, strategy profiles—traditionally used by equilibria to
specify a single best-response strategy per node—cannot capture the range
of strategies that a node may play. Instead, we use strategy functions, a new
construct that lets us express a node’s strategy as a function of the coalition
the node belongs to.
Our contributions. In summary, our new contributions to the treatment
of collusion in cooperative services are as follows:
• We illustrate the limits of generalizing Nash equilibria that prevent col-
luding nodes from receiving any benefit. Specifically, we show that requir-
ing that a single strategy be a best response for every node, regardless of
whether it is colluding, does not admit an equilibrium in several scenarios
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that commonly arise in cooperative services.
• We decouple the fundamental property that defines an equilibrium—
stability—from the requirement that a single strategy be a best-response.
This requirement, while sufficient, is not necessary when nodes may col-
lude. We take a first step at leveraging this separation by introducing (a)
a new construct, strategy functions, that allows us to describe, for each
node and each possible coalition it may be part of, the strategies the
node will play, and (b) two new solution concepts, k-indistinguishability
and k-stability, that admit a strategy function as an equilibrium if no
coalition wants to deviate from its specified strategy.
• We demonstrate the applicability and utility of specifying a strategy per
coalition by showing how our solution concepts admit useful equilibria
in the same scenarios where traditional solution concepts could not.
Organization of chapter. §5.1 demonstrates the limits of generalizing tra-
ditional equilibria in the context of several common scenarios encountered
in many cooperative services. §5.2 defines our two new solution concepts—
k-indistinguishability and k-stability—and demonstrates how these solution
concepts overcome challenges faced by traditional approaches.
5.1 Disincentivizing coalitions
Solution concepts such as strong Nash equilibria and k-resilience specify, for
each node, a single best response in which a node’s actions towards a peer do
not depend on whether the two are colluding. However, if coalition members
trust each other more than other nodes, the practical applicability of these
solution concepts are fundamentally limited. To illustrate this point, we de-
scribe techniques and scenarios likely to occur in cooperative services where the
stronger assumptions that insiders can rely on when dealing with one another
hamper the ability to achieve k-resilience. These examples are by no means
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comprehensive; rather, our goal is to provide a taste of the larger challenges
faced by solution concepts that aim to discourage coalition formation.
As a reminder, before we proceed, we repeat the definition of k-resilience
here. Recall that k-resilience generalizes the Nash equilibrium (Definition 2.1)
by requiring that the strategy profile be a best response (i.e., admit no prof-
itable deviations) not only for every individual node (as required by a Nash
equilibrium) but also for any coalition of up to size k.
Definition 3.3. A strategy profile σ∗ is a k-resilient equilibrium if, for
all K ⊆ N such that |K| ≤ k, there does not exist an alternate strategy







As a Nash equilibrium is simply a 1-resilient equilibrium, we generally
focus on k-resilient equilibria where k ≥ 2. Note that a strong Nash equilibrium
is a n-resilient equilibrium.
As noted earlier in §3.2, we use the weak version of k-resilience to
prove our negative results; our results therefore apply to stronger notions of
k-resilience that guarantee stability even if coalitions are willing to deviate for
less [19, 21]. Our negative results also do not rely on coalition members being
able to “cheap talk”, i.e., communicate at no cost, during the game [44, 50].
We can analogously define a Bayesian notion of k-resilient and strong
Nash equilibrium similar to a Bayes (Nash) equilibrium.
Definition 5.1. A strategy profile and set of beliefs (σ∗, µ∗) is a k-
resilient Bayes equilibrium if for all K ⊆ N such that |K| ≤ k, there










where Eσ,µ[Ux] represents x’s expected payoff from the strategy profile σ
with belief µx, given that x ∈ K.
It is important to note that all the solution concepts and equilibria we
discuss in this paper are notions from non-cooperative game theory. There has
also been extensive work in cooperative game theory (see any game theory text,
e.g., [87], for a survey of related work) that explicitly studies the formation of
coalitions in games where players are trying to work together. Cooperative and
non-cooperative game theory significantly differ in focus: cooperative game
theory focuses on interactions within a coalition—how and which coalitions
form (players join a coalition based on the benefit the coalition offers) and
how payoffs are allocated among coalition members (based on each member’s
value to the coalition)—whereas non-cooperative game theory focuses instead
on the interactions between competing players (which, in our case, consist of
exogenously-determined coalitions and non-colluding nodes).
5.1.1 Can trusted third parties limit equilibria?
Cooperative services often rely on a trusted third party to incentivize cooper-
ation among nodes. This type of trust, which in some cases is indispensable
(e.g., to implement fair exchange [72, 90]), is unnecessary among coalition
members; indeed, perhaps surprisingly, it can actually render k-resilient equi-
libria impossible to achieve.
We illustrate this point through the following game, which models the
fundamental choice that each node makes in P2P cooperative services: should
I contribute my fair share?
For simplicity, we assume, in this example, that all nodes are rational.
Definition 5.2. The mediated pairwise-exchange game is a R-repeated
game where, in each round r ∈ {1, . . . , R}, each node x ∈ N :
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1. Decides (simultaneously) on some set of peers M rx ⊆ N \ {x} to use
a mediator with.
2. Observes which peers are using a mediator with x.
3. Decides on some set of peers Γrx ⊆ N \ {x} to contribute to; any
other peer is snubbed.
4. Receives a contribution from a peer y if y contributed to x and either
(a) y did not use a mediator with x, or (b) x contributed to y. Denote
the set of all such y as Crx, i.e., y ∈ Crx iff x ∈ Γry∧(x /∈M ry ∨y ∈ Γrx).
x pays γ per peer that x contributes to and  per peer that x uses a
mediator with. x earns b > 2γ +  per received contribution, for a round






While this game resembles a finitely-repeated prisoner’s dilemma, the
mediator, who can serve as a trusted third party and ensure a fair pairwise
exchange, enables the existence of Nash equilibria in which contribution occurs
(without the mediator, no such equilibrium exists).
Theorem 5.3. Let σ∗ be a strategy profile in the mediated pairwise-
exchange game in which a node x, following σ∗x:
• Contributes to a peer y, using a mediator only in round R, iff (a) x
and y have never snubbed each other in the past and (b) x and y
have not used a mediator in any round other than R.
• Snubs a peer y without a mediator otherwise.
Then σ∗ is a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Same as the backwards-induction half of the proof of Theorem 5.15.
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The Nash equilibrium in Theorem 5.3 uses the mediator to ensure co-
operation in the last round, which encourages cooperation in prior rounds
without the mediator. We now prove that this same mediator precludes the
existence of k-resilient equilibria. The reason, essentially, is that using the me-
diator, which incurs cost, is undesirable between colluding nodes (Lemma 5.5)
but necessary to ensure cooperation between two non-colluding nodes (Lemma
5.4). This tension makes it impossible for a single strategy to be a node’s best
response regardless of how it colludes (Theorem 5.6).
Lemma 5.4. In any k-resilient equilibrium of the mediated pairwise-
exchange game where some node contributes, the last time in the game
that any node contributes with positive probability to a peer must always
involve a mediator.
Proof. By contradiction. Fix some k-resilient equilibrium σ∗, where the last
time that any node contributes with positive probability does not involve a
mediator with positive probability (if there exist multiple such node/peer pair-
ings, choose one arbitrarily). During this “last contribution,” let x be the node
that contributes, y be the receiving peer, and α be the probability that x con-
tributes to y after deciding not to use a mediator with y. By assumption,
α > 0.
Since σ∗ must be a best response regardless of who is colluding, suppose
x and y are not colluding. Then it must be the case that, in σ∗, y snubs x
during the last contribution if x does not use a mediator: y expects to earn,
from x’s contribution, αb without incurring the cost of contributing; moreover,
since this is the last time a contribution occurs with positive probability, y’s
choice of whether to snub x does not negatively impact y’s continuation payoff.
It follows that x could profitably deviate from σ∗ by always snubbing y during
the last contribution if x does not use a mediator: doing so would save x
an expected cost of αγ with no negative effect on x’s continuation payoff.
Contradiction.
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Lemma 5.5. In any k-resilient equilibrium of the mediated pairwise ex-
change game where some node contributes, the last time in the game that
any node contributes with positive probability to a peer must never involve
a mediator.
Proof. By contradiction. Fix some k-resilient equilibrium σ∗ where the last
time that any node contributes with positive probability also involves a medi-
ator with positive probability (if there exist multiple such node/peer pairings,
choose one arbitrarily). During this “last contribution,” let x be the node that
contributes; y be the peer; α > 0 be the probability that x decides to use a
mediator with y; and ψx (ψy) be the probability that y (x) observes a contri-
bution from x (y) in expectation over all possible combinations of x and y’s
choices regarding using a mediator and contributing with one another.
Since σ∗ must be a best response regardless of who is colluding, suppose
x and y are colluding. Consider an alternate strategy profile σ′ in which all
nodes play the same actions with the same probabilities as in σ∗, except, during
the last contribution, x and y do not use a mediator with one another, x (y)
contributes to y (x) with probability ψx (ψy), and x and y subsequently play
actions as if x and y had instead followed σ∗. It follows that the payoffs for
x and y are exactly the same, with the exception of the payoffs that x and
y receive from one another during the last contribution, where (1) x and y’s
expected benefit remains the same, (2) x’s expected cost is strictly lower since
x contributes with the same probability in expectation without the cost of
a mediator (α > 0), and (3) y’s expected cost is no higher (and is lower if
y was using a mediator in σ∗). Thus, x is better off and y is no worse off.
Contradiction.
Theorem 5.6. There exists no k-resilient equilibrium in the mediated
pairwise-exchange game.
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Proof. Lemmas 5.4 and 5.5 imply that there exists no k-resilient equilibrium
where nodes contribute. Further, a strategy profile σ in which all nodes snub
and earn 0, while a Nash equilibrium, is not a k-resilient equilibrium. To see
why, consider an alternate strategy profile σ′ and some coalition K (such that
|K| ≥ 2) where no one uses mediators and only members of K contribute to
one another. σ′ earns K’s members payoffs of (|K| − 1)R(b − γ) > 0 each,
making it a profitable deviation from σ.
5.1.2 What if nodes may fail?
When nodes may fail, a node’s best response will generally depend on the
probability with which it expects other nodes may fail. Greater trust and
access to more information (e.g., concerning the frequency with which fellow
coalition nodes are patched) may allow nodes within a coalition to reasonably
believe that fellow coalition members have a lower probability of failing than
outsiders. Unfortunately, even a slightly lower failure probability can make
k-resilience practically unachievable.
We illustrate this point using a simple single-shot simultaneous game
that models a simplified version of secret-sharing [19, 98]. In this game, each
node wants to reconstruct a secret that requires the node to request shares
from its peers. These peers deliver the requested shares unless they fail (e.g., by
crashing). Each node must then decide how many shares to request: requesting
more shares incurs more cost, but requesting fewer shares may result in the
node being unable to reconstruct the secret because of peer failures. In this
example, we assume that nodes are either rational or may fail by failing to
send the requested share.
Definition 5.7. The simple secret-sharing game is a single-shot, simul-
taneous game in which every node x ∈ N :
1. Selects a set Γx ⊆ N \ {x} of nodes to request shares from.
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2. Pays |Γx|γ for this request.
3. Receives shares from some set Cx ⊆ Γx.
4. Earns benefit b > |N |γ iff |Cx| ≥ m, where m is the number of shares
that x must gather from its peers before being able to reconstruct
the secret.
The simple secret-sharing game is a decision theory problem: a node’s
choice does not affect its peers’ outcomes.1 This is intentional: our goal is to
show that, despite the game’s simplicity, it is often impossible to find k-resilient
equilibria. To account for a node’s beliefs regarding how likely its peers are
to fail, we use k-resilient Bayes equilibria (Definition 5.1). In this game, a
strategy profile Γ represents the peers that each node requests from. A set of
beliefs µ represents the view of each node, given the set of peers it is colluding
with, regarding the likelihood that any peer will successfully deliver its share
if requested. In other words, µ represents each node x’s view of the likelihood
that a peer in Γx will also be in Cx. An equilibrium in the simple secret-sharing
game is some (Γ∗, µ∗) where no node x, colluding with any (k−1) peers, could
do any better in expectation requesting shares from some set Γ′x 6= Γ∗x. More
formally, for all K ⊆ N such that |K| ≤ k, there is no Γ′x such that for all
x ∈ K,
H[|C ′x| −m]b− |Γ′x|γ > H[|C∗x| −m]b− |Γ∗x|γ
where H[i] is the discrete unit step function.2
Theorem 5.8. Let (Γ∗, µ∗) be a k-resilient Bayes equilibrium of the simple
secret-sharing game in which some node x ∈ N believes that a peer y will
fail with probability µ∗x if x and y are not colluding and µ
∗
x −  if x and y
1If the game were sequential, the choice of some node x to request a share from some peer
y could inform y of whether x has failed. However, finding k-resilient equilibria is no less
challenging, since (1) there is at least one node (the first node to move) that will never have
such a signal and (2) even if x successfully requests a share from y, x could subsequently
fail before y’s turn.
2As a reminder, H[i] = 1 if i ≥ 0; otherwise H[i] = 0.
105
are, where  > 0. Then either x requests secrets from no one or everyone,
i.e., Γ∗x ∈ {∅, N \ {x}}.
Proof. Suppose k = 2 and K = {x, y}, i.e., x and y are colluding. If x incurs
more cost requesting shares than it earns in expectation from reconstructing
the secret (e.g., because of high rates of failure), then Γ∗x = ∅. Otherwise, sup-
pose x requests shares from peers in Γ∗x 6= ∅. It is obvious that since x believes
that y will fail with probability µ∗x − , which is lower than the probability of
any other peer z 6= y failing (µ∗x), x should always request shares from y, so any
2-resilient Γ∗x must contain y. However, as y can be any peer, the only Γ
∗
x that
is guaranteed to contain all possible y is Γ∗x = {y | y ∈ N ∧ y 6= x} = N \ {x}.
Finally, as k-resilience implies 2-resilience, this result applies to k-resilience for
k ≥ 2.
A node that wants to reconstruct the secret rarely wants to request
shares from all of its peers, since the cost of these additional requests is not
worth the slight insurance that redundant shares provide. However, in such
cases, it follows from Theorem 5.8 that no k-resilient Bayes equilibrium exists.
Therefore, the only scenarios in which a node wants to reconstruct the secret
as a part of a k-resilient Bayes equilibrium are those in which the secret’s value
is sufficiently high to justify requesting shares from all peers to maximize the
likelihood of success.
Figure 5.1 quantifies what this value must be, using example numbers
based on a movie-streaming context: n = 100 nodes; each node expects that
coalition members never fail3 and that non-coalition members fail with inde-
pendent probability β; m is set such that, given an independent failure prob-
ability of β, there is at least a 0.99999 chance that at least m peers, out of
n − 1 possible peers, will not fail; and γ is set to (1500 Kbps) × (2 hours) ×
3While this may seem extreme, note that this is exactly what failure-aware k-resilient
solution concepts, such as (k, t)-robustness [19, 21], require: nodes do not deviate assuming
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Figure 5.1: In the simple secret-sharing game (Definition 5.7), the minimum
benefit needed for a k-resilient equilibrium where nodes attempt to reconstruct
the secret.
($1/GB)/(m+1). As k increases, the expected probability of a coalition mem-
ber reconstructing the secret increases, thus making it more difficult to con-
vince such a node to request shares from every other peer. Note that while
Figure 5.1 implies that the minimum required benefit goes up as probability of
failure goes up, this is an artifact of how we define m; in reality, the minimum
required benefit goes up as the probability of failure goes down, as expected.
As Figure 5.1 shows, even with coalitions of at most two nodes and be-
liefs that non-coalition nodes fail with probability 0.01, a 2-resilient equilibrium
exists only if a node values a two-hour movie, which incurs γ(n − 1) > $1.37
in communication costs, at over $268.95!
5.1.3 Do nodes want to punish one another?
Cooperative services often incentivize nodes not to deviate by relying on the
threat of punishment. In this section, we show that punishments that hurt
both the enforcing and receiving nodes are never used within a coalition, and
other forms of punishment will be difficult, if not impossible, to achieve in real-
world scenarios. We illustrate this through a simplified version of the mediated
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pairwise-exchange game.4
Definition 5.9. The simple pairwise-exchange game is an infinitely-
repeated game where, in each round r ≥ 0, every node x ∈ N :
1. Simultaneously decides on some set of nodes Γrx ⊆ N \ {x} that it
will contribute to; any node not in Γrx is snubbed.
2. Observes which peer y 6= x contributed to it; let Crx denote the set
of all such y, i.e., y ∈ Crx iff x ∈ Γry.
x’s round payoff is vrx = |Crx|b− |Γrx|γ, where b > γ. x’s total payoff is the




Theorem 5.10. Let σ∗ be a k-resilient equilibrium in the simple pairwise-
exchange game in which some contribution occurs. In other words, σ∗
specifies that, at some point in the game, a node y contributes to some
node x, who “rewards” y if y contributes and “punishes” y if y snubs
x. Then either (1) x must prefer punishing to rewarding y, and/or (2)
x punishing y is not a k-resilient best response (i.e., x may threaten to
punish y, but, given the opportunity, x and y can profitably deviate by
not following through).
Proof. Fix some k-resilient equilibrium σ∗ in which contribution occurs and,
unlike condition (1) above, x is no worse off rewarding y. We prove that con-
dition (2) follows: x punishing y is not a k-resilient best response. Let r be
the round in which this contribution occurs, Ux(σ
∗|(Γrx, Crx ∪ {y})) denote x’s
continuation payoff from rewarding y, and Ux(σ
∗|(Γrx, Crx \ {y})) denote x’s
4While we could use the mediated pairwise-exchange game to illustrate this point, we
instead use a game with an infinite horizon (which enables the existence of Nash equilib-
ria where contribution occurs) and no mediator as the mediator already makes k-resilient
equilibria impossible to achieve.
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continuation payoff for punishing y. We have:
Ux(σ
∗|(Γrx, Crx ∪ {y})) ≥ Ux(σ∗|(Γrx, Crx \ {y})) (5.1)
Denote y’s continuation payoff from contributing to and snubbing x as
Uy(σ
∗|(Γry ∪{x}, Cry)) and Uy(σ∗|(Γry \ {x}, Cry)), respectively. As y contributes
to x as a part of a k-resilient equilibrium, y must be no worse off doing so:
|Cry |b−|Γry∪{x}|γ+Uy(σ∗|(Γry∪{x}, Cry)) ≥ |Cry |b−|Γry\{x}|γ+Uy(σ∗|(Γry\{x}, Cry))
Unsurprisingly, it follows that y, in continuation, is worse off being
punished than being rewarded:
Uy(σ
∗|(Γry∪{x}, Cry)) ≥ γ+Uy(σ∗|(Γry\{x}, Cry)) > Uy(σ∗|(Γry\{x}, Cry)) (5.2)
Suppose K = {x, y}, and let σ′K specify the same actions as in σ∗,
except x and y play σ∗ as if y contributed even if y snubbed x. We can see





−K)|(Γrx, Crx \ {y})) = Ux(σ∗|(Γrx, Crx ∪ {y})) ≥ Ux(σ∗|(Γrx, Crx \ {y}))





−K)|(Γry \ {x}, Cry)) = Uy(σ∗|(Γry ∪ {x}, Cry)) > Uy(σ∗|(Γry \ {x}, Cry))
Thus, x punishing y is not a k-resilient best response.
To get a sense of Theorem 5.10’s impact, consider, for simplicity, a k-
resilient equilibrium σ∗ that uses punishment to encourage nodes to continually
contribute to one another. If all nodes continually contribute to one another,
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without fail, each node earns a payoff of
1
1− δ (n− 1)(b− γ) (5.3)
We now consider how Theorem 5.10 applies to many forms of punish-
ment, including:
Grim trigger (global). Node x contributes to another node y iff every
node has always contributed in the past. A global grim trigger can incentivize
cooperation only if:
1
1− δ (n− 1)(b− γ) ≥ (n− 1)b (5.4)
where the right-hand side represents the payoff x receives from immediately
snubbing everyone.
Consider the scenario in which x has observed y snubbing it in some
round r. If x administers a global grim trigger, it earns at most (n− 2)b (if y
only snubbed x) in round r + 1 and nothing after. If x and y, as a coalition,
simply pretended nothing happened and continuing contributing, then x would
earn the payoff specified in expression (5.3) if x believes that y only snubbed
x.5 By inequality (5.4), this payoff is larger than the (n − 2)b that x would
have earned administering the global grim trigger.
Grim trigger (local). Node x contributes to another node y iff neither
node has snubbed in the past. This is not k-resilient since x will earn
1
1− δ (n− 2)(b− γ) <
1
1− δ (n− 1)(b− γ)
5A node x in the simple pairwise-exchange game can only observe how a peer y behaves
towards x, so x does not know who else y may have snubbed. However, since observing
snub from y is a zero-probability event, we can assign any beliefs we want (see, e.g., [87]).
Moreover, if x and y are colluding, it is possible they could communicate (e.g., via cheap
talk).
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Forgiving trigger. Node x contributes to another node y iff neither node
has not deviated (i.e., contributed when it was supposed to snub and vice
versa) in the past s > 0 rounds. This is not k-resilient since x will earn
1
1− δ (n− 2)(b− γ) +
δs
1− δ (b− γ) <
1
1− δ (n− 1)(b− γ)
Tit-for-tat. Node x contributes to another node y iff this node con-
tributed in the previous round. For δ > γ/b, this is not k-resilient since x will
earn
1
1− δ2 ((n−1)b− (n−2)γ) +
δ
1− δ2 ((n−2)b− (n−1)γ) <
1
1− δ (n−1)(b−γ)
where the first half of the expression on the left is the payoff x gets in rounds
where y contributes to x and x snubs y, and the second half is the payoff gets
in rounds where x contributes to y and y snubs x. As typically b  γ, this
means that tit-for-tat is often not k-resilient.
A k-resilient equilibrium can still use these punishments as a non-
credible threat and hope that such bluffs are not called in practice.6 Alter-
natively, any punishment in which nodes strictly prefer to punish than reward
peers can be part of a k-resilient equilibrium. Here is one such punishment
scheme.
Contrite tit-for-tat [37]. Every node maintains a simple one-bit reputa-
tion with respect to every peer and vice versa. Every node starts off in “good
standing” with all of its peers. If a node x snubs a peer y that is in good stand-
ing, x falls into “bad standing” with respect to y. A node’s reputation does
not change if it snubs a peer who was in bad standing. If a node x contributes
to its peer y, x returns into good standing with y.
Given this reputation, a node x snubs its peer y iff x is in good standing
and y is not.
6Such punishments can never be part of a subgame-perfect or perfect Bayes equilibrium.
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The reason this scheme is k-resilient is because a node prefers to punish
its peers rather than reward them. To see why, suppose that after the first
round, y is in good standing and x is not. Using notation from the proof of
Theorem 5.10, y, playing contrite tit-for-tat, earns
Ux(σ
∗|(Γrx, Crx \ {y})) =
1
1− δ (n− 1)(b− γ) + γ
>
1





−K)|(Γrx, Crx \ {y}))
However, network loss in real-world environments may cause compli-
cations to using non-credible threats and punishment strategies where the
punishing node prefers to punish. Network loss may result in a node falsely
believing that it was snubbed by its peer, even if contributing is the only ac-
tion that should have been played. Such false deviations are not differentiable
from true deviations and result in histories where punishment is supposed to
be played. If a node (rationally) reneges on its non-credible threat, then, in
the absence of punishment, other nodes are unlikely to be incentivized to con-
tribute, causing the collapse of any k-resilient equilibrium that relies on these
punishments to encourage contribution.
Moreover, network loss may enable nodes to frivolously punish other
nodes under the false pretense of being snubbed. This is because, given network
loss, a node that contributed does not know whether its peer observed the
contribution, and a node that observes snubbing does not know whether its
peer contributed. Because it is impossible to distinguish true deviations from
false ones and legitimate and illegitimate claims of deviation, a node that
prefers to punish may profit from falsely claiming to be snubbed.
While we could try to circumvent both of these problems by ensuring
that a node is indifferent between punishing and rewarding its peer, this is
still not a k-resilient best response, since the guilty node’s strict preference to
being rewarded (inequality (5.2)) implies that both nodes can still profitably
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deviate by avoiding punishment (e.g., via σ′K).
5.1.4 What other issues are there?
Finally, we briefly describe two commonly-used techniques that are often not
k-resilient.
Digital signatures. Digital signatures, which guarantee non-repudiation
(the signer of a message cannot later deny sending it), are useful in adver-
sarial environments, but their cost (in bandwidth and computation) is hard
to justify within a coalition where members trust each other. More generally,
digitally signing messages is part of a k-resilient protocol only if not doing so
may affect the outcome of the protocol.
One straightforward example in which this may occur is if this message
is passed around to more than k nodes that check the signature. However,
this is not enough. Observe that the overhead of expending extra bandwidth
to forward a signed message is unnecessary until the message is actually for-
warded outside the coalition. Since coalition members trust each other, the
coalition can simply exchange the keys needed to sign any message that leaves
the coalition. By doing this, we can construct a strategy profile that is both
indistinguishable to nodes outside of the coalition and saves the coalition in
bandwidth costs.
Although exchanging the signing keys may have some positive cost
which offsets the savings of not exchanging signed messages, note that the
size of a digital signature is often comparable to the size of the signing key.7
In addition, if coalition members sign for one another, one node may end up
incurring more cost because it may have to generate signatures for larger mes-
sages. However, if the additional cost is sufficiently low, the savings from not
sending the signature may be enough to cover this additional cost. Moreover,
nodes often exchange more than one message; these future exchanges provide
7In the case of DSA and its variants, the savings of not signing one message subsumes
the cost of exchanging keys; in the case of RSA [67], two is enough.
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opportunities for these nodes to level out any computational disparities that
may exist.
Junk. Junk, i.e., semantically meaningless data, has been used (e.g., [24, 79,
109]) as a form of payment to ensure that nodes contribute their fair share to
the cooperative service. For instance, if a node is required to send data but
has nothing useful to send, it may instead send protocol-specified “junk.” By
making junk more expensive to transfer than useful content, junk transfers
discourage free-riding by incentivizing nodes to send real content whenever
possible. However, junk transfers incur bandwidth costs on the sender and
receiver while providing no benefit to the receiver; nodes that trust each other
have no incentive to perform them. It follows that no protocol that relies on
junk transfers is k-resilient.
5.2 Accepting coalitions
The scenarios in §5.1 suggest that it is difficult for a single strategy profile
to specify strategies that a node, colluding with up to (k − 1) peers, prefers
over all possible deviations, as required by k-resilience. Yet, we believe these
scenarios are symptomatic of a more general problem: the ability for colluding
nodes to hold stronger beliefs and assumptions about fellow coalition members
(and potentially about the system as a whole) often results in more efficient
protocols. As a result, we believe there are likely very few scenarios in which
k-resilience will bear fruit.
In this section, we show that the insight to overcome this impasse is
to recognize that denying benefits to nodes that belong to a coalition, while
sufficient for stability, is not necessary. We propose a fundamentally differ-
ent notion of equilibrium: instead of specifying a single best-response strategy
to each node, our equilibria map each node to possibly multiple strategies,
depending on whom it colludes with. By effectively mapping each possible
coalition to a strategy, our equilibria can specify, as a part of the strategy, the
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efficiencies that a coalition can leverage among its members. Despite this flex-
ibility, our equilibria guarantee that the strategies specified for every coalition
is a best response to what other nodes play, despite how they collude.
Specifying coalitional strategies. Because our equilibria specify a strat-
egy per coalition, the strategies that the nodes, within each coalition, follow
may depend on whom they are colluding with. Our equilibria cannot use strat-
egy profiles used by traditional equilibria because they specify only a single
strategy per node. Our equilibria instead use a novel construct, a strategy func-
tion, to specify a node’s strategy based on whom the node is colluding with.
We formally represent how nodes collude by a partition P of N , in which two
nodes x and y are colluding if there exists some element (a coalition) K ∈ P
such that x, y ∈ K. Intuitively, each partition represents one way that nodes
can collude. We use Pk = {P : ∀K ∈ P, |K| ≤ k} to denote the space of all
partitions that contains no coalition larger than size k.
Definition 5.11. A strategy function S is a mapping from a partition
(representing a particular way that nodes have chosen to collude) to a
strategy profile (which specifies the strategies that these nodes will play
as a result) such that if there exists some coalition K that is in P and P ′,
S maps the same strategy to K in P and P ′, i.e., if K ∈ P and K ∈ P ′,
SK(P ) = SK(P ′), where SK(P ) and SK(P ′) denote the strategies deployed
by K given partitions P and P ′.
Note that a node’s strategy does not depend on how nodes outside of its
coalition collude, which a node may not know. We defineM as the membership
function: M(x, P ) = K if, in partition P , K is the coalition that x is a part
of, i.e., K ∈ P and x ∈ K. With respect to a node x in coalition K, all nodes
in K are insiders, and all others are outsiders.
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5.2.1 Coalition-indistinguishable equilibria
Where k-resilience makes coalitions futile, k-indistinguishability makes them
invisible; where k-resilience fundamentally aims to deny coalitions any claim
of exceptionalism and sees a system as a collection of individual nodes, k-
indistinguishability sees a system as a collection of coalitions, some of which
may contain a single node; where k-resilience ensures that every node best re-
sponds to every other node, k-indistinguishability ensures that every coalition
best responds to every other coalition: in both equilibria, nodes that belong
to different coalitions interact with each other as if no coalition existed.
Definition 5.12. Two strategy profiles σ and σ′ are indistinguishable
with respect to some node x, denoted as σ
x
= σ′, if all histories resulting
from σ and σ′, as observed by x, occur with equal probability and Ux(σ) =
Ux(σ
′).
Definition 5.13. S∗ is a k-indistinguishable equilibrium if:
• For any P, P ′ ∈ Pk, any coalition K such that K ∈ P and K ∈ P ′,
and any x ∈ K, S∗(P ) x= S∗(P ′).
• For all P ∈ Pk and all K ∈ P , there does not exist a strategy σ′K
such that for all x ∈ K,
Ux(σ
′
K ,S∗−K(P )) ≥ Ux(S∗(P ))
and, for some y ∈ K, the inequality is strict.
Intuitively, the first condition (indistinguishability) requires that a node
cannot distinguish whether an outsider is itself colluding with others; the sec-
ond condition (best response) requires that in any partition, there exists some
node in every coalition that prefers the equilibrium-specified strategy to any
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coalitional deviation. Note that while we defined best response to be con-
sistent with the definition of k-resilience, weaker or stronger notions could
have been used instead. Also, observe that the best-response condition of k-
indistinguishable equilibria must hold for all possible partitions. Therefore,
like k-resilient equilibria, a k-indistinguishable equilibrium consists of strate-
gies that make up a best response for all possible coalitions of up to size k,
not just one particular coalition or set of coalitions.
Every k-resilient and Nash equilibrium σ∗ has an equivalent k-indistin-
guishable equilibrium S∗ in which S∗(P ) = σ∗ for all P . However, by allowing
nodes to base their strategies on whom they collude with, k-indistinguishable
equilibria circumvent the challenges described in §5.1 while ensuring that no
coalition will deviate from its specified strategy (§5.2.3). Moreover, similar to
k-resilience, any service that uses a protocol which is the non-colluding strat-
egy in a k-indistinguishable equilibrium is guaranteed to be supported and
maintained by nodes, even if they may collude. Although k-indistinguishability
cannot guarantee that the exact protocol will be followed to the letter by a
node when interacting with a fellow insider, k-indistinguishability does guar-
antee that any actions that a node takes when interacting with an outsider
is the same as those specified by the service’s protocol. Thus, from the ser-
vice’s perspective, every node is effectively running the service’s protocol and
supporting the service.
5.2.2 From indistinguishability to stability
Although indistinguishability is an attractive guarantee, it may in practice
prove too stringent for some applications. For example, a content-distribution
service in which colluding nodes freely exchange content with one another
may not be k-indistinguishable because non-colluding nodes may be able to
detect the presence of a coalition simply by observing that colluding nodes
statistically have more content at any given time than everyone else. k-stable
equilibria do away with indistinguishability, focusing only on the conditions
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necessary for stability.
Definition 5.14. S∗ is a k-stable equilibrium if for all P ∈ Pk and all
K ∈ P , there does not exist a strategy σ′K such that for all x ∈ K,
Ux(σ
′
K ,S∗−K(P )) ≥ Ux(S∗(P ))
and, for some y ∈ K, the inequality is strict.
As in k-indistinguishable equilibria, a k-stable equilibrium requires a
best response for all possible coalitions of up to size k, and every k-resilient and
Nash equilibrium has a k-stable equivalent. Moreover, every k-indistinguishable
equilibrium is also k-stable. However, k-stable equilibria do not guarantee that
a colluding node’s strategy is indistinguishable from that of a non-colluding
node. In other words, it is possible that the strategy of a colluding node x
provides outsiders with information about whether x is colluding, with whom
x is colluding, etc. In addition, if x chooses to collude, x’s coalition may affect
the payoffs of peers both inside and outside of x’s coalition. Nevertheless, a
k-stable equilibrium still guarantees that, for any coalition, the specified strat-
egy is a best response to the strategies played by all outsiders, regardless of
how these other nodes may collude.
Other k-stable solution concepts. k-stability is a very general notion
that, we believe, provides a useful basis for developing new solution concepts
that guarantee stability in the presence of collusion. k-indistinguishability
is one such solution concept, the result of adding indistinguishability to k-
stability. Another requirement that one may desire is some notion of self-
enforcement (no profitable deviation by sub-coalitions), e.g., a solution con-
cept could require that, in equilibrium, nodes prefer to be with their respective
coalitions over working alone (k-stability and k-indistinguishability do not have
any such requirement). Alternatively, one could devise a Bayesian version of
k-stability that guarantees an expected best response for each coalition based
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on the likelihood that certain coalitions will form. Yet another interesting di-
rection would be to devise a version of k-stability that bounds the “price of
collusion,” i.e., how much a node’s payoff is affected when outsiders choose to
collude (similar to the notion of a safety-net guarantee used in [109]). We leave
exploring these and other notions of equilibrium to future work.
5.2.3 Examples of equilibria
In this section, we show the applicability of k-stability and k-indistinguishability
by showing that such equilibria exist in the scenarios described in §5.1, where
k-resilient equilibria did not exist before.
k-stability and k-indistinguishability in the mediated pairwise-exchange
game. It is simple to prove that there exists a k-indistinguishable equilib-
rium in the mediated pairwise-exchange game (Definition 5.2). Because k-
indistinguishable and k-stable equilibria allow nodes to base their play on
whom they are colluding with, a node, as a part of a k-indistinguishable equi-
librium, can use the mediator with outsiders (as in Theorem 5.3) and leverage
the trust provided by the coalition with insiders.
Theorem 5.15. Let S∗ be a strategy function such that, for any partition
P ∈ Pk and any x ∈ N , S∗x(P ) specifies that
• For y ∈ M(x, P ) such that y 6= x, x never uses a mediator and
always contributes.
• For y /∈M(x, P ), x contributes to y, using a mediator only in round
R, iff (1) x and y have never snubbed each other in the past and
(2) x and y have not used a mediator in any round other than R.
Otherwise, x snubs y without a mediator.
Then S∗ is a k-indistinguishable equilibrium.
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Proof. Without loss of generality, fix some partition P ,8 and consider the in-
teractions of some node x with some peer y.9 Suppose that y is an insider, i.e.,
y ∈M(x, P ) = K. Let Rs be the set of rounds in which x snubs y and Rm be
the set of rounds in which x uses a mediator with y. In each round in Rs, x
gains γ, but y loses b. In each round in Rm, x loses ; y’s payoff is unaffected.
Any deviation in which Rs 6= ∅ or Rm 6= ∅ is then not in K’s best interest.
Suppose instead that y is an outsider, i.e., y /∈ M(x, P ). We can show
that by following S∗x(P ) with respect to y is x’s best response by backwards
induction.
Base case: round R (the last round). We first show that S∗x(P ) is a best
response for x with respect to y by considering the following two cases:
• x and y have always contributed to one another. If x deviates by snubbing
and/or not using a mediator, x saves at most γ + . However, since y
is using a mediator, x loses benefit b it would have received from y
otherwise. Since b > 2γ +  > γ +  by assumption (Definition 5.2), x is
clearly worse off.
• x and/or y have snubbed one another in the past. If x deviates by con-
tributing to y or using a mediator, x is obviously worse off: x must pay
at least min(γ, ) > 0 but receives no additional benefit.
Inductive step. Assume that for all rounds following some round r0 > 1, S∗x(P )
is a best response for x with respect to y. We now prove the inductive step—
S∗x(P ) is a best response for x with respect to y in round r0—in a similar
fashion by considering the following two cases:
• y has always contributed to x. If x deviates by using a mediator, x is at
least  worse off in round r0. If x deviates by snubbing y, x saves γ in
8As our proof makes no assumptions about P , it follows that our proof holds for all
possible partitions P ∈ Pk.
9We can safely do this because each interaction between any two pairs of nodes in S∗ is
independent.
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round r0. Regardless, y will snub x in every subsequent round, resulting
in x losing at least b − (γ + ) per round. x is then worse off since the
net change in x’s payoff is at least γ − (b− (γ + )) = −b+ 2γ +  < 0.
• y has snubbed x. If x deviates by contributing or using a mediator, x is
worse off, as argued in the base case.
Thus, S∗x(P ) is a best response for x.
The mediated pairwise-exchange game, as defined in Definition 5.2, in-
volves every node x privately observing which peers use a mediator with or
contribute to x; x does not know what other peers have chosen with respect to
one another. If such choices were publicly observable (e.g., if the mediator pub-
lished a list describing which pairs of nodes it would mediate for), S∗ would no
longer be a k-indistinguishable equilibrium, since non-colluding nodes would
be able to observe that coalition members never use a mediator with one an-
other. However, because nodes, regardless of whom they collude with, are still
better off following the strategies specified in S∗, S∗ would remain a k-stable
equilibrium.
k-stability in the simple secret-sharing game. Likewise, it is straight-
forward to show that the simple secret-sharing game (Definition 5.7) has a
k-stable equilibrium. In particular, a node, depending on whom it is colluding
with, can choose the exact set of peers to request secrets from that the node
expects will maximize its payoff.
k-stability and k-indistinguishability in the simple pairwise-exchange
game. We can incorporate the punishments in §5.1.3 into a protocol that is
k-stable or k-indistinguishable in the simple pairwise-exchange game (Defini-
tion 5.9). As an example, we demonstrate how a local grim-trigger punishment
can be used here.
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Theorem 5.16. Let S∗ be the following strategy function: for any parti-
tion P ∈ Pk and for any x ∈ N , S∗x(P ) specifies the following action for
x:
• For y ∈M(x, P ) such that y 6= x, contribute to y.
• For y /∈ M(x, P ), contribute to y iff r = 0 or x and y have always
contributed to one another.
Then S∗ is a subgame-perfect k-indistinguishable equilibrium (i.e., at every






Proof. Without loss of generality, fix P . For any K ∈ P in which |K| > 1,
S∗K(P ) is a best response when interacting with fellow insiders. To see why,
observe that following S∗K(P ) in each round earns a round payoff of (n −
1)(b − γ). Deviating by snubbing an insider improves one node’s payoff by
γ but causes a loss of b > γ to another’s; the coalition as a whole earns
(n − 2)(b − γ) < (n − 1)(b − γ) as a result in that round, so someone in the
coalition must be worse off.
Now consider any two nodes x, y that are not colluding, i.e., y /∈
M(x, P ). If x and y have always contributed to each other and x snubs y,
x gains γ in the current round but loses at least (b − γ) in every subsequent
round. This is profitable only if
δ(b− γ)
1− δ < γ
which is never the case given inequality (5.5). Finally, if y has snubbed x and
x deviates by contributing to (rather than snubbing) y, x incurs an additional
cost of γ; this is clearly not in x’s best interest.
122
Similar to the previous example, S∗ as defined in Theorem 5.16 would
remain a k-stable equilibrium (but would not be indistinguishable at every
point in the game) if a node’s choices of whom to contribute to were publicly
observable.
k-stability and k-indistinguishability with digital signatures and junk.
Mechanisms such as digital signatures or junk transfers fit naturally within a
k-stable or k-indistinguishable equilibrium. The equilibrium may specify that
these mechanisms are used between outsiders and bypassed between insiders
when unneeded.
5.3 Summary
Trying to identify strategies that eliminate all incentives to collude, as tradi-
tional approaches attempt to do, is difficult, possibly futile, and fundamentally
unnecessary. This paper introduces a new approach to handle the challenge
posed by collusion: accept that coalitions will form, allow coalitions to bene-
fit among themselves, and aim for stability by ensuring that the strategies or
protocols specified for every coalition, not just every node, are best responses.
While we are only beginning to explore the space of solution concepts and
equilibria allowed by this new approach, we believe our initial results are en-
couraging: our proposed framework offers rigorous guarantees to both colluding
and non-colluding nodes in cooperative services where traditional approaches




So far, this thesis has described what theoretical guarantees practical cooper-
ative services should strive for in the presence of Byzantine and rational nodes
and described one way acquiescent nodes can be leveraged to encourage ra-
tional cooperation. After all, while simply sprinkling a system with incentives
whose rationale is rooted in intuition and common sense may provide a mod-
icum of protection, these schemes are typically easily defeated once exposed to
more than casual strategic behavior [68, 10, 76, 81, 93, 99]. At the same time,
as we have seen in the previous chapters, overly strong equilibrium notions
may not even be achievable in fault-tolerant distributed systems.
While the previous three chapters have worked on spanning the classic
theory/practice divide by making practical theoretical advances, this chapter
focuses on spanning the divide in the other direction: we demonstrate how to
design a system that provides robust guarantees, using many of the ideas we
described in the previous chapters, with far more realistic assumptions than
previously achieved. In particular, this chapter will describe the design and im-
plementation of Seer, a cooperative content distribution service that provides
provably robust incentives to individual clients for faithfully disseminating
content, even if their peers may fail or try to game the system by colluding.
content distribution
Seer is a hybrid peer-to-peer (P2P) protocol, in the style of popular
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commercial services including Spotify [17], Blizzard [5], PPTV [14, 64], and
Akamai [2] and various prior work (e.g., [89, 92, 100]). Like these hybrid P2P
services, Seer leverages trusted servers to offer its users the best of both worlds:
the scalability and low cost of P2P dissemination combined with the reliability
that a trusted set of servers or CDN can provide. Seer share these systems’
practical concerns for scalability and performance, but fundamentally departs
from other hybrid P2P services in how it ensures its clients’ cooperation. Where
commercial hybrid P2P services rely on largely ad-hoc solutions to dissuade
clients from free-riding off the server (such as changing the settings in the
client’s software preferences, using a firewall to block P2P traffic, or modifying
the client itself), Seer takes a principled approach: it applies game-theoretic
techniques to incentivize clients to want to help disseminate content.
Seer is not the first research system to aim at a rigorous treatment of
incentives [24, 78, 79], but it manages to achieve its dual goals of performance
and provable guarantees under fundamentally more realistic assumptions than
any of these prior systems: more than ever before, Seer is not only rigorous,
but rigorous in practice. In particular, Seer does not rely any of the following
frequently-made assumptions:
• Clients do not collude, or, if they do, they can be modeled as Byzantine.
Seer recognizes that clients that develop trust in one another (because
of real-life connections outside the systems or from interacting in the
system) may well choose to collude to improve their own standing.
• Clients do not know when their interaction with other clients will end:
hence, the promise of future benefits will always be an effective incen-
tive to cooperation. Seer recognizes that in practice clients are likely to
infer when a peer is about to leave and leverages the trusted server to
incentivize cooperation even in end-of-game situations.
• Clients are uniformly and exceedingly risk-averse when it comes to in-
centives. Seer does not assume that clients will simply be frightened
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into compliance, but recognizes that when clients interact their behav-
ior, rather than by ancestral fear, is going to be determined by more
nuanced expectations.
Our contributions. In summary, this chapter makes the following contri-
butions:
• We present Seer, a robust hybrid P2P service that advances the state-
of-the-art in dependable cooperative services. Seer, unlike prior systems,
makes few assumptions about the environment and participants and in-
centivizes cooperation despite the possibility of arbitrary failure or col-
lusion.
• We rigorously prove, under a realistic set of assumptions, that clients dis-
seminate content quickly in Seer. We accomplish this in part by basing
design decisions on what we are able to prove about the system, thereby
ensuring that Seer’s policies and mechanisms are backed by strong the-
oretical guarantees.
• We evaluate Seer and show that rigor can go hand-in-hand with perfor-
mance: Seer neither sacrifices the scalability of P2P services nor the reli-
ability of client/server services. Evaluating our implementation of Seer,
we find that Seer can support significantly more clients than a tradi-
tional client/server service and can outperform BitTorrent, a popular
traditional P2P service, by over 20%.
Naturally, Seer’s guarantees still rely on certain key assumptions to
hold, and Seer is still far from the final word in how cooperative systems
should be built. Nonetheless, we believe that the design and principles behind
Seer represent a significant contribution towards building a more robust bridge
over the theory/practice divide.
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Organization of chapter. We discuss some of the principles underlying
Seer in §6.1. We describe the system model in §6.2, provide a description of
Seer in §6.3, and describe the incentives that underlie Seer in §6.4. We present
an implementation and evaluation of Seer in §6.5 and summarize in §6.6.
6.1 Principles
There are several important principles that underlie the design and imple-
mentation of Seer. While we do not claim to be the first to recognize these
principles, we do believe that the strategic application of the combination of
these principles enables us to build a dependable cooperative service with much
stronger guarantees and fewer assumptions than previous systems.
Leverage impatience. Clients not only want content, they want it now.
Leverage this impatience to induce clients to contribute their resources in order
to accelerate their own acquisition of content.
Align incentives of participants. Downloaders want their content fast;
uploaders want to do as little as possible as slowly as possible. Design the
incentives so that they are working towards a common goal.
Balance the role of the server. In many P2P applications, a trusted
server exists, but a P2P mechanism is deployed to reduce the cost of serving
content. Leverage the server to help the reliability of the service, but limit its
involvement in the common case to preserve scalability.
Keep assumptions about rationality to a minimum. Individual clients’
take on what constitutes maximizing utility is subjective and depends on how
they value their time, bandwidth, and the content, as well as how they view
their peers. To maximize the applicability of the system’s guarantees, strive
to minimize what the system assumes about a node’s motivations.
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6.2 System model
Principals. In Seer, there are two types of principals: servers, which are run
by some content provider in order to serve some content, and nodes, which
are interested in acquiring and consuming the content. While there may be
multiple servers, we model the set of servers as a single trusted entity for
simplicity. The server has a known IP address and public key.
Nodes, on the other hand, may be arbitrarily faulty (Byzantine), correct
(acquiescent), or selfish and deviate if doing so is in its best interest (rational).
We do not restrict the behavior of Byzantine nodes except that we assume that
no node, Byzantine or otherwise, can subvert cryptographic primitives. We
do assume that rational nodes are somewhat pessimistic when dealing with
a known Byzantine peer. We assume no Sybil attacks and ignore malicious
denial-of-service attacks, which any system is susceptible to. We discuss these
assumptions more rigorously in §6.4. Note that we do allow rational nodes to
collude and deviate as a coalition if doing so is weakly better for the coalition.
We call a node that is downloading content a consumer, and a node
that is offering or uploading content to other peers a distributor. A node may,
of course, be a consumer for some content and a distributor for other content.
Incentives. Rational nodes are trying to maximize their own utility; in order
to do this, they try to maximize their benefits while minimizing their costs.
In Seer, rational nodes have some notion of impatience; a node’s benefit is
derived from being able to acquire some content of interest more quickly. A
node’s costs come from participating in the service, whether from downloading
some content or from helping distribute. §6.4 formalizes these notions in more
detail.
Network. We assume that the network may be lossy and asynchronous.
Nodes have certain beliefs regarding how lossy and asynchronous the network
might be. While not strictly necessary, for simplicity of analysis, we assume
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that a node believes that any connection to the server is reliable and syn-
chronous. We assume nodes have full-duplex connections in that serving and
downloading content are independent with respect to network bandwidth. As
we describe later in §6.3.2, a node’s upstream and downstream bandwidth are
split into a number of upstream and downstream capped-bandwidth channels.
Timing assumptions. We assume nodes in the service have synchronized
clocks. Because our incentives depend on the impatience of nodes, which in-
herently is based on time, an unsynchronized clock may affect whether a node
chooses to cooperate or not. Ultimately, the server serves as the authoritative
time source, and when initiating a P2P exchange between two nodes, the server
sends some messages that include a timestamp, which nodes use to roughly
synchronize their clocks.
Content. Similar to other P2P services, content in Seer is broken up into
blocks. For a particular piece of content, every block (with the possible excep-
tion of the last block in the content) is the same size and is further broken
up into fixed-sized fragments. We pad content to be a multiple of the frag-
ment size. The size of the block and fragment, while constant for a particular
piece of content, may differ depending on the content. The block and fragment
sizes present various tradeoffs that we discuss further in §6.5, but, for now, we
generally assume that blocks will be large and fragments small.
6.3 Overview of Seer
Seer is a hybrid P2P service designed for bulk transfer of content. The core
of the protocol and of the incentive structure focus on encouraging clients to
help exchange blocks.
At a high-level, consumers acquire content in Seer by (1) purchas-
ing/requesting the content from the server, which provides the list of block
























Figure 6.1: The messages involved in initiating a block exchange.
to download the block form either (a) the server (which will in turn assign the
task to a server-backed distributor) or (b) a peer distributor; and (3) down-
loading the block via the chosen method, falling back on the server if needed.
Whether they choose to download from the server or a peer, consumers
download the content on a block-by-block basis. A consumer performs the
following steps to download a block (illustrated by Figures 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3):
1. The consumer sends to the server a BlockRequest message to get
distributors for the blocks it wants to download, indicating whether the
distributor should be a peer or a server.
2. The server selects distributors for each block and notifies them via a Dis-
tNotification message. For blocks for which the consumer selected to
download from the server, the server selects a server-backed distributor.
3. Upon confirmation from a distributor, the server sends the consumer a
StartExchange message.
4. The consumer starts the block exchange by sending the distributor the
InitExchange message included in the the StartExchange message
received from the server.
5. The distributor encrypts the block using a block-specific key (the block
key). The distributor sends each block fragment to the consumer inside
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of a Fragment message and waits for the consumer to acknowledge the
fragment.
6. For every fragment, the consumer sends a cumulative acknowledgment
message (Ack) back to the distributor.
7. The consumer and distributor independently report back to the server
using ConsReport and DistReport messages, respectively, when the
exchange completes or the consumer or distributor give up on the trans-
fer. If the consumer chose to download the block from the server, the
server already knows that the exchange has completed, and this step
can be be skipped.
8. The server sends to the consumer a ConsFinish message that includes
the the block key needed to decrypt the block and, if necessary, the means
to download from a server-backed distributor any fragment missing from
the block—a process that simply involves performing steps 4, 5, and 6).
Before serving a particular block, distributors must register for the
blocks they want to serve. Seer ensures that distributors only register for blocks
that they possess. §6.3.4 describes this process in more detail.
Note that in Seer, consumers and distributors ultimately have complete
freedom over what exchanges they want to participate in and how long they
want to participate. In the following subsections, we describe the key challenges
in Seer and how we leverage our principles to solve them.
6.3.1 How does Seer encourage use of P2P?
Because in hybrid P2P services like Seer a trusted server provides clients with
a reliable source for content, a peer does not need other peers to receive the
content it is interested in. Hence, the prospect of receiving content from an-
other peer is insufficient to motivate rational peers to cooperate in the pro-



















Figure 6.2: The messages involved in the main block exchange loop.
contributing their resources to the system, clients can accelerate their own
acquisition of content.
We put in place this in a straightforward manner by using the trusted
server as a bank that issues credits to clients. Clients earn credits by distribut-
ing content and spend credits to get content more quickly. Credits are not tied
to a particular piece of content, so a client can earn credits for serving one
piece of content and use them to download another. Thus, a client’s incentives
are not tied to a particular piece of content.
When requesting the server for blocks, a consumer has a choice of three
different levels of service. At the lowest level, the free tier, clients download
content slowly from the server for free. This enables the client to acquire
content even if it does not have any credit. There are certain limitations to
using this level of service. For example, a consumer can only use this level of
service on a small number of downstream channels and cannot simultaneously
use its other downstream channels for downloading content.
Otherwise, a consumer can use all of its downstream channels in the
paid tier, either in P2P or server mode. In P2P mode, a channel is used to
download content from a distributor; in server mode, a channel is used to
download content from the server. Both modes incur a positive cost; the server
rate (the cost of using the server) costs more credit than the P2P rate (the



















Figure 6.3: The messages involved in finishing a block exchange. The itali-
cized fields are optional.
mode, and a consumer may begin an exchange on a channel using P2P and
complete it from the server.
In Seer, clients are not actually issued any form of actual token or
coin; instead, the server tracks all the credits that clients have. Since all P2P
requests go through the server first, a server will only pair up a distributor
with a consumer if the latter has enough credit to pay for the download. By
using the server, we avoid issues with forging currency and double-spending.
6.3.2 How does Seer incentivize adherence?
While its lower cost encourages clients to use the P2P tier, clients are ulti-
mately free to choose the level of service they want to use. If clients do not
faithfully participate in the P2P protocol, it is likely that the performance of
using P2P will suffer, resulting in clients preferring other levels of service.
Thus, we must ensure that P2P exchanges occur in a timely fashion. The
challenge is that, in P2P exchanges, the two parties involved in the exchange
have incentives that are not naturally aligned: distributors want to do as little
as possible as slowly as possible while still earning credit for the exchange,
while the consumer wants to acquire the content as quickly as possible.
Seer aligns the incentives of consumer and distributor by providing in-
centives for both parties to complete their exchange in a timely fashion. For the
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consumer, the server initially charges it the server rate regardless of whether
the consumer chose to use P2P or (paid) server service. The server later credits
the consumer back after it receives a report with the number of fragments the
consumer successfully received using P2P. Thus, for the consumer, there is no
ambiguity: a consumer wants to finish its exchange as quickly as possible, both
to get the content and its credit back. For the distributor, the server credits
the distributor only after it successfully provides the content; as a result, a
distributor also prefers serving content more quickly.
However, even if both clients want to finish an exchange as quickly as
possible, a client’s view of what it means to be timely may differ from that of its
peer. Pairing a consumer and distributor with different expectations may result
in both parties being disappointed and ultimately choosing to opt out of P2P
services. To ensure common expectations in the service, all block exchanges
in Seer (P2P or client/server) are performed over a capped-bandwidth (data)
channel that handles transmitting content fragments at a rate that does not
exceed some system-defined bandwidth (the channel bandwidth).
Clients are assigned a particular number of downstream and upstream
channels based on periodically-repeated bandwidth tests that the server con-
ducts. As each channel is assigned to a single block exchange at any given time,
channels are also a limited resource that clients prefer using as efficiently as
possible. As we discuss in the following subsection, how and when channels
can be allocated is dictated by the server and depends on the manner in which
the previous exchange completed.
6.3.3 What role does the server play?
The server plays a key role in dictating the incentives in Seer, both as a medi-
ator of P2P exchanges and as a backup distributor. For every P2P exchange,
the server is a matchmaker: every consumer—with sufficient credit and a free
downstream channel—is matched up with a distributor—with a free upstream
channel and able to offer the block in question. An exchange begins when
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the server stamps the current time as the exchange timestamp on the Ini-
tExchange message (the server-provided message used to initiate a block
exchange).
In addition to its role in pairing clients, the server also acts as the
authoritative clock in the service and has the final say as to when, at the end
of an exchange, a consumer and distributor get to reuse their channels and
when they get charged/credited for the exchange. Given the capped bandwidth
of the channel and the timestamp on the InitExchange, the expected time
to transfer a given number of fragments is known to all parties involved (the
consumer, distributor, and server). Using this notion of expected time, the
server enforces a set of policies regarding how much credit a client receives
and when it receives credit or can reuse its channel.
When a consumer ends an exchange and reports to the server, the server
waits until the expected time to transfer the reported number of fragments has
elapsed (if it has not already). It is only after this period elapses that the server
provides the block key for decrypting the block and enables the consumer to
download the fragments (if any) that it is missing from the server-backed
distributor (through a capped-bandwidth channel). Besides helping to enforce
the channel bandwidth, waiting provides some incentives to consumers to stick
to the assigned distributor.
When a consumer successfully downloads all fragments, the server then
allows the consumer to reuse the associated channel and credits the consumer
the difference between the server rate and P2P rate for each fragment the
consumer downloaded via P2P. Note that as a direct consequence, a consumer
has no access to the content block or the channel and credits tied up in this
exchange until after the expected time for transferring all the fragments.
When a distributor reports to the server, as with the consumer, the
server waits until the expected time for the reported number of fragments
has elapsed (if it has not already) before allowing the distributor to reuse
the associated upstream channel. However, when it comes to crediting the
distributor for the fragments it did send. Seer wait until the time elapsed is
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the larger between the current time and the expected time to transfer the
fragments reported as sent by the distributor plus the expected time needed
to transfer any of the fragments the distributor did not successfully send.
Finally, the server also acts as a distributor as well. The server provides
a server-backed distributor either when there are no available distributors or
if a consumer requests for service from the server, either as a part of the free
tier, the paid tier, or to help it finish downloading fragments it is missing from
a previous block exchange with a client distributor. Because clients can always
fallback onto the server, this enables clients to demand a certain level of ser-
vice from client distributors, lest they simply switch to the server distributor,
depriving client distributors of credit.
6.3.4 Seer: a close-up
This section provides additional details on the inner workings of Seer.
Pairing clients (Figure 6.1). For the server to add a peer as distributor,
the peer must register with the server the blocks it wants to serve. Seer re-
quires that clients prove to have the blocks for which they want to be listed as
distributors. This condition could be enforced using cryptographic puzzles, but
our prototype opts for a straightforward solution: we allow clients to only to
become distributors for blocks that they have previously downloaded through
Seer.
A consumer that wants to download a particular piece of content sends
to the server a BlockRequest message that contains the list of blocks
it wants to download and the level of service it wants to use (free, paid
P2P/server). If the consumer chooses to use P2P, then for every requested
block, the server matches up the consumer with a distributor offering the
block. The probability that a particular distributor is selected is equal to the
ratio between that distributor’s free upstream channel and the total number
of free upstream channels available at all distributors offering this block. The
server pairs the consumer up with as many distributors as the consumer has
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downstream channels. If there are no distributors that have free channels for
a particular block, the server provides a server-backed distributor to serve the
block.
After selecting a distributor, the server assigns a unique identifier to
this particular P2P block exchange and sends the distributor a DistNotifi-
cation message that notifies the distributor that it has been selected for an
impending P2P exchange with a particular consumer and block. The distrib-
utor may choose to refuse to serve this request; if so, the server repeats the
random distributor selection without any distributor that previously refused
this request.
After finding a distributor willing to serve the consumer, the server sends
the consumer a StartExchange message that notifies the consumer of the
selected distributor. This message also contains a list of fragment hashes to
enable the consumer to verify the fragments it is receiving (to limit the amount
of damage Byzantine distributors can cause) along with other relevant details
needed to communicate with the distributor. In addition, the server gives the
consumer a InitExchange message that the consumer uses to initiate the
P2P exchange with the distributor.
Exchanging content (Figure 6.2). Upon receiving the server’s response,
the consumer decides whether to download from the assigned distributor. If
the consumer chooses to proceed, it sends InitExchange to the distributor.
Upon verifying InitExchange, the distributor retrieves the encrypted version
of the block (either by retrieving the encrypted version or re-encrypting the
block with the block key, both of which it received at the earlier time when it
was a consumer of this block) and breaks the block up into fragments. For each
fragment, the distributor decides whether it wants to continue the exchange; if
so, it sends a Fragment message to the consumer with the encrypted content
and awaits an acknowledgment before repeating this process.
Upon receiving a Fragment message, the consumer verifies that it
matches the list of hashes provided by the server. If it does, the consumer
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responds with a Ack message that acts as a cumulative acknowledgment.
Finishing up an exchange (Figure 6.3). When either the exchange is
completed or a consumer or distributor unilaterally aborts the exchange, both
the consumer and distributor report on how the exchange went using the Con-
sReport and DistReport messages. The ConsReport message contains
how many fragments the consumer received; similarly, the DistReport mes-
sage reports the last Ack received in the exchange, which indicates how many
fragments the distributor served. Upon receiving the reports, the server pro-
ceeds to credit the participants for the exchange and goes on to pair them with
other peers as described in §6.3.3. If the consumer aborted the exchange early,
the server includes information similar to the StartExchange message that
provides, among other things, a InitExchange message to obtain the content
from a server-provided distributor itself.
Clients are only allowed to send one exchange report for a given ex-
change. When a consumer and distributor send differing reports, the server
reconciles them as follows. If the consumer reports one more fragment than
the distributor, the server assumes that either the consumer neglected to send
an Ack message or the Ack message was dropped; thus, the server charges
the consumer as if the consumer had reported the number of fragments listed
in the distributor report. Note that we do this instead of crediting the distrib-
utor to encourage consumers to send Ack messages (thereby overcoming any
end-game problems within a particular block exchange). Otherwise, one client
has underreported the number of fragments exchanged. While the server could
potentially detect which client lied if the messages contained slightly more in-
formation (e.g., the ConsReport message contained information about the
last Fragment message received), note that underreporting is never in a
client’s best interest. As a result, we chose to have the server ignore this and
simply credits the consumer and distributor based on their own individual
reports.
Content mostly consists of fixed-sized blocks, but when content is not
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evenly divisible by the block size, the last block may be smaller than the rest.
For this block, the amounts of all charges and credits are directly scaled to the
number of fragments this block contains, as is the time before the channel is
eligible for reuse. However, the time at which credits are processed, both for
the consumer and distributor, is as if the block were a full-sized block.
Security. To ensure that clients cannot spoof traffic, we use secure chan-
nels for all control traffic. While we could have used signed messages with
sequence numbers to ensure authenticity and prevent replay, control messages
are generally small, so securing the entire channel is unlikely to cause signif-
icant overhead. The server is used to act as a key distributor or certificate
authority to distribute the necessary keys or certificates.
On the other hand, because the content being sent over the channel is
potentially large, Seer uses a combination of signatures to ensure authenticity
and integrity of the message. To prevent arbitrary clients from connecting to
a client’s channel, the consumer sends a nonce along with the InitExchange
message on the secure control channel that the distributor presents when con-
necting to a consumer’s channel, and the consumer checks to be sure the nonce
came from the correct IP address.
Any deviation that the server can verify (either as a first- or third-party)
serves as a proof of misbehavior and results in a client being banned from the
service and losing any credits it may have accumulated.
6.4 Incentives in Seer
In this section, we describe in more detail how Seer is able to achieve the
needed incentives to guarantee that clients help disseminate content quickly.
Rational clients aim to maximize their utility, which may depend on
payoffs that the client receives now and in the future. Since clients are impa-
tient, they always prefer receiving payoff earlier. We formally model a client’s
patience using a discount factor (δ). We use the standard formulation of dis-
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counting utility exponentially, i.e., δrv represents utility of v received at time
r by some client with a discount factor of δ.
Because of the key role that timeliness plays in a client’s experience,
a client that is maximizing its utility is likely to maintain some notion of its
peer’s timeliness. We refer to a client’s view of how timely its peer is expected
to be as a peer’s expected timeliness. Every client may have a different view of
a peer’s expected timeliness. We say a client’s expected timeliness is better if
the client is expected to be no less likely to be timely in the future.
We say an exchange is (or is expected to be) timely if, at the current
time (or some future time), a client has received (or is expected to receive)
credit for at least the expected number of fragments, given bandwidth w. We
say that the exchange at some future time is expected to be at least as timely
if, from now until that future time, a client expects to receive credit for at
least the expected number of fragments. Finally, we refer to a client as being
timely if it is at least as timely at all future times and refer to a node being
“more” timely, “better” off, etc. in a non-strict sense, i.e., a node is no less
timely, no worse off, etc.
We discuss bandwidth in terms of fragments per second, as this is the
minimal unit of data that either a consumer or distributor can earn credit for.
6.4.1 Abstracting away uncertainty
A client’s beliefs represent its view on the unknown. A client must come up
with some expectation over these unknowns before it can decide its (expected)
best course of action. However, this becomes extremely hairy in any real-
world distributed system, where clients cannot observe all the interactions
that occur in the service and must maintain beliefs about what its peers may
have observed, what its peers may believe about what the client has observed,
etc.1
In this paper, we abstract away these details by simply representing
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Figure 6.4: An illustration of how various symbols relate to a particular
exchange.
three key parameters that we believe captures the relevant details that a client
considers when deciding whether to continue exchanging fragments with a peer.
Note that clients may have a different value of these parameters for different
peers and that a client may have a different value depending on whether it is
serving as a consumer or distributor.
What is the client’s expected marginal net payoff to get additional frag-
ments from the peer? This factor represents how much a client values getting
credit for additional fragments (for a distributor, through a cumulative ac-
knowledgment; for a consumer, through the fragments themselves), how much
a client values its network bandwidth (the cost of getting these additional
fragments), and how the client views the reliability of the network or its peer
(e.g., network loss could increase the cost per fragment). We use pi to repre-
sent the marginal net payoff for a node. For simplicity, we assume that, at
any moment in time within a particular block exchange, pi is constant, so the
expected marginal net payoff is linear with respect to the number of additional
fragments.
We describe how introducing Byzantine clients affects pi in §6.4.4. Fi-
nally, we assume clients cannot collude in the first few subsections; we describe
how collusion affects our results in §6.4.5.
How much longer does the client expect additional fragments will take
with this peer? This factor incorporates a client’s expectation of how slow this
peer or the network is or how likely a failure has occurred, potentially based
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on previous history with this peer. We use ri to denote a client’s expectation
regarding how long it will take to receive credit for i fragments, relative to
the beginning of the exchange. r0 then represents the current time, i.e., the
amount of time that has currently elapsed in the current exchange, and we let
i0 be the number of fragments a client has already received credit for. Figure
6.4 illustrates these notions of time. Because a client cannot receive credit for
(i+i0) fragments until the client receives those additional fragments (expected
to occur at time ri) or until the expected time for transferring those fragments
elapses ((i+i0)/w), whichever is later, a client often considers this time instead;
we denote this time as r¯i = max(ri, (i+ i0)/w).
How much does the client expect to earn using this channel after this
exchange? This utility, known as a continuation utility, incorporates a client’s
expectation a client’s beliefs about other peers and the environment as a whole,
including the two previous factors. We denote the expected continuation util-
ity of using the system as V and assume that it is non-negative. A negative
continuation utility implies that a client believes it will be worse off partici-
pating in Seer than not doing anything at all, which would make it difficult to
sustain cooperation in Seer, or any system for that matter.
6.4.2 What do clients do if they use P2P?
The main result that we prove is that clients want to be timely when using
P2P in Seer.
Theorem 6.1. If a client chooses to participate in a block exchange with
a peer it is not colluding with, a client is better off being timely.
One single block exchange
We first discuss conditions under which, ignoring the effects on a node’s ex-
pected timeliness, a client chooses to terminate an exchange before it is com-
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pleted. The conditions are effectively thresholds that bound how long a client
is willing to wait to receive credit for i more fragments. In this section, we
ignore how a client’s actions affect its perceived timeliness; we consider these
effects in §6.4.2.
Consumers. Consumers may always choose to download from the server,
but the server is expected to cost more than using P2P. Thus, consumers only
choose to use the server if the cost of acquiring the content through the peer
is expected to be slower and/or more costly than going through the server.
To get an idea of why Seer’s design provides the incentives it does, we
first consider an intermediate lemma, which describes conditions under which
a consumer prefers to continue a block exchange rather than terminating it.
As a reminder, recall that pi is the expected marginal net payoff per fragment,
V is the expected continuation payoff for the consumer, i0 is the number of
fragments a consumer currently has, r0 is the current time relative to the
exchange timestamp, w is the channel bandwidth in fragments per unit time,
ri is the expected time in which a client (in this case, a consumer) expects to
get i additional fragments, and r¯i = max(ri, (i+ i0)/w).
Lemma 6.2. Ignoring the effects on expected timeliness, a consumer con-
tinues to download from a distributor in some block exchange iff there
exists some i > 0 such that at the time ri the consumer expects to get i
additional fragments,
1. The exchange is timely,
2. The exchange is at least as timely, and/or



















Proof. A consumer continues downloading from a distributor iff there exists
some i > 0 such that
vC(i0 + i, ri) ≥ vC(i0, r0)
where vC(x, r) is the payoff that a consumer expects to earn in an exchange
if it chooses to download a block by downloading j chunks from a distributor
and downloading, starting at time r, (m − j) fragments of a block from the
server; recall that time is measured relative to the beginning of a particular
block’s transfer.
How do we define vC? A consumer that downloads j fragments using
P2P expects to earn a payoff of (pij + V ). A consumer expects that it can
redeem this benefit at the later of (r + (m − j)/w) (the amount of time it
will take to download the remainder of the (m− j) fragments at time r from
the server at bandwidth w) and τ = m/w (the beginning of the redemption
period). Given the current time is r0, we have,
vC(j, r) = δ(m−j)/w+max(r,j/w)−r0(pij + V ) (6.2)
By plugging this into the condition at the beginning of this proof and moving
terms around, the condition becomes
r¯i ≤ r¯0 + i
w
+ Ci (6.3)
where Ci is defined as above.
We prove that condition (6.3) holds iff at least one of the three cases in
Lemma 6.2 holds. We first prove the “if” direction.
Case (1): the consumer expects the exchange to be timely when it
receives i more fragments, i.e., ri ≤ (i0 + i)/w. Then r¯i = (i0 + i)/w; since
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r¯0 ≥ i0/w, we have
r¯i ≤ r¯0 + i/w





It is straightforward to show that this condition is true given that V ≥ 0 (by
assumption).
Case (2): the consumer expects the exchange to be at least as timely,
i.e., ri ≤ r0 + i/w. Assume also that ri > (i0 + i)/w; otherwise, condition (6.3)
is satisfied using the argument made in case (1). This implies that r¯0 = r0 (the
exchange is currently untimely); since r¯i = ri ≤ r0 + i/w, r¯i ≤ r¯0 + i/w. The
proof of case (2) then proceeds using the same argument as the one used in
case (1).
Case (3): condition (6.1) holds. The only difference between condition
(6.1) and (6.3) is a ri in the former and a r¯i in the latter. If ri ≤ max((i0 +
i)/w, r0 + i/w), then either case (1) or (2) proves that condition (6.3) holds.
However, if, on the other hand, ri > max((i0 + i)/w, r0 + i/w), r¯i = ri as
needed.
We prove the “only if” direction by using the contrapositive. If none of
the cases are true, it must be the case that ri > max((i0 + i)/w, r0 + i/w), ri =
r¯i, and condition (6.1) is false. This directly contradicts condition (6.3).
Observations from Lemma 6.2: There are several interesting properties
that can be gleaned from Lemma 6.2. First, a consumer always prefers to
continue an exchange if it is timely or is expected to be more timely in the
future.2 Recall that a consumer is immediately charged server rate even if it
requests a peer. Thus, a consumer that gives up on an exchange early and
submits a ConsReport not only receives the missing fragments at the same
2While true, note that a node never expects this to be the case given the capped-
bandwidth channel.
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channel bandwidth that its peer distributor would have served at, but also
receives less credit because it received fewer fragments via P2P.
Second, assuming the exchange is currently untimely (i.e., max(r0, i0/w) =
r0), Ci represents how much longer a client is willing to wait beyond the ex-
pected i/w duration it should take to transfer the i fragments. If pi > 0, then
Ci > 0; the larger V then is, the less a consumer is willing to tolerate untimeli-
ness. If instead pi < 0, then Ci < 0, and the consumer is unwilling to continue
the exchange.
Third, the max(·) term is a side-effect of Seer’s policy of not releasing a
channel until the expected time for a given number of fragments (in this case,
i0) elapses. If Seer had instead allowed immediate channel reuse, a distributor
that sends at channel bandwidth on average but sends faster earlier on and
slower later on could actually make the consumer more likely to abort an
exchange early to cash in on being ahead.
Distributors. Like the consumer, a distributor is only willing to serve a
particular consumer if it believes it will always be behind schedule and the
amount the distributor can earn from switching is worth it.
Lemma 6.3. Ignoring effects on expected timeliness, a distributor contin-
ues serving a consumer in some block exchange iff




Di = − logδ
(
δ(m−i0)/wpi(i+ i0) + δi/wV
δ(m−i0)/wpii0 + V
)
Proof. A distributor serves a consumer iff there exists some i > 0 such that
v(i0 + i, ri) ≥ v(i0, r0)
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where v(j, r) is the payoff that a distributor expects to earn in a particular
channel if it has a cumulative acknowledgment for j fragments at time r and
chooses to terminate the exchange early.
To define v, consider that a distributor that terminates an exchange
at time r with an acknowledgment that covers j fragments will (a) receive
a payment of pij after the expected transfer time of those j fragments has
elapsed if it has not already (max(r, j/w)− r0) plus an additional delay equal
to the expected time to transfer the missing fragments ((m − j)/w) and (b)
an expected utility of V when this channel is reused and allocated to other
exchanges at time max(r, j/w) − r0 from now. This gives us the following
definition of v:




It can be seen that given this definition, the condition at the beginning of the
proof is satisfied given condition (6.4).
Corollary 6.4 describes sufficient conditions similar to those of Lemma
6.2 under which a distributor continues to serve a consumer.
Corollary 6.4. Ignoring effects on expected timeliness, a distributor
continues serving a consumer in some block exchange if the expected payoff
of serving this consumer is at least as good as serving any consumer on
average, i.e.,
δm/w
1− δm/wmpi ≥ V
and there exists some i > 0 such that at the time ri the distributor expects
an acknowledgment for i > 0 additional fragments,
1. The exchange is timely, or
2. the exchange is at least as timely.
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Proof. We prove that condition (6.4) holds given one of the two aforementioned
conditions.
Case (1): the distributor expects the exchange to be timely when it
receives an acknowledgment for i more fragments, i.e., ri ≤ (i0 + i)/w. This
implies that r¯i = (i0 + i)/w; since r¯0 ≥ i0/w, we have
r¯i ≤ r¯0 + i/w
To ensure condition (6.4) holds, it is sufficient to ensure that Di ≥ 0, i.e.,
δ(m−i0)/wpi(i0 + i) + δi/wV ≥ δ(m−i0)/wpii0 + V














Case (2): the distributor expects the exchange to be at least as timely,
i.e., ri ≤ r0 + i/w. Assume also that ri > (i0 + i)/w; otherwise, condition (6.4)
is satisfied using the argument made in case (1). This implies that r¯0 = r0 (the
exchange is currently untimely); since r¯i = ri ≤ r0 + i/w, r¯i ≤ r¯0 + i/w. The
proof of case (2) can then be shown using the same argument as the one used
in case (1).
From one single block exchange to all block exchanges in a channel
The previous section relies on a node’s expectation of how long it would take
to receive credit for i additional fragments (ri). This expectation depends on a
peer’s perceived timeliness, which likely depend on that peer’s previous actions
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with respect to that node, both in previous exchanges and even the current
exchange. Moreover, in additional to timeliness, a node’s best response depends
on other factors as well. For instance, a node may be judged on the basis of
when it chooses to terminate an exchange or the expected cost of receiving
credit for a fragment (pi) from this node. We collectively call these factors a
node’s reputation.
A node’s reputation can greatly affect a node’s willingness to interact
with a peer. In an extreme example, a peer may blacklist any node that termi-
nates an exchange early; this may cause a node to not terminate an untimely
exchange even if the conditions in §6.4.2 would say otherwise. The effect of pi is
also explicit in Lemmas 6.6 and 6.7; §6.4.4 will further discuss how Byzantine
nodes affect pi.
In this paper, we largely take the approach of keeping our results simple
and general and leave it to nodes themselves how to calculate ri or pi or how to
update a peer’s reputation based on observed behavior. Note that as the de-
signer of the protocol, we can “correlate” how all non-Byzantine nodes choose
to (initially) update their reputations. As long as this update rule is in a node’s
best interest given how other nodes operate, then nodes will continue to use
it. For instance, we can choose to have nodes maintain reputations which only
keep track of how timely a node is and does not penalize a node for terminat-
ing an exchange early. We will make such decisions in the implementation of
Seer (§6.5).
However, the one important restriction we make is that a node expects
that being timely will never worsen its expected timeliness. Without this as-
sumption, a client may be encouraged to be untimely if peers believed that
timeliness now was sign of untimeliness in the future.
Assumption 6.5. A client being timely in the current exchange with any
non-Byzantine peer will not negatively affect the peer’s view of the client’s
expected timeliness in the future.
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By using Assumption 6.5, we can prove that, even considering the effects
on a node’s expected timeliness, a node is no worse off being timely in the
current exchange.
Lemma 6.6. In a particular exchange, a consumer expects to be no worse
off being timely for the remainder of an exchange than not.
Proof. First, assume that a distributor never cuts off the exchange early. Con-
sider the consumer’s best response at any instant r0 when it has i0 blocks.
Given Lemma 6.2, a consumer cuts off an exchange as specified by Lemma
6.2, resulting in an expected payoff of
v¯C = max
i≥0
vC(i0 + i, ri)
Observe that dvC/dt ≤ 0, i.e., for a given amount of payoff that a consumer gets
after cutting off an exchange after a given number of additional fragments, a
consumer’s expected payoff is non-decreasing with respect to the time it takes
to get those fragments (more specifically, it is decreasing if the exchange is
untimely and constant if the exchange is already timely). As a result, dv¯C/dt ≤
0, which implies a consumer expects to be no worse off being timely.
Consider now if a distributor may cut off an exchange early if the ex-
change is expected to be sufficiently untimely. The effect this has on a con-
sumer’s payoff is that the values of i that v¯C maximizes over is restricted to
values in which the distributor is still willing to serve the consumer. By As-
sumption 6.5, a consumer that is more timely for the remainder of the exchange
expects its expected timeliness will be no worse, implying that the consumer
expects that its distributor’s perception of ri will be no worse. By Lemma 6.3,
this implies that a distributor is no less likely to continue serving a consumer
that is timely, i.e., the values of i over which v¯C is maximized does not shrink as
a result of the consumer being timely. It follows then that dv¯C/dt ≤ 0 remains
true.
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Lemma 6.7. In the context of the current exchange, a distributor expects
to be better off being timely for the remainder of an exchange than not.
Proof. As in the proof of Lemma 6.6, we first assume that a consumer never
cuts off an exchange early. Then a distributor, at any instant r0 with an ac-
knowledgment for i0 blocks, expects to cut off an exchange as specified in
Lemma 6.3, resulting in an expected payoff of
v¯D = max
i≥0
vD(i0 + i, ri)
As before, since dvD/dt ≤ 0, it follows that dv¯D/dt ≤ 0, i.e., a distributor
expects to be no worse off being timely.
Consider now if a consumer may cut off an exchange early if the ex-
change is expected to be sufficiently untimely. As before, this constrains the
values of i over which v¯D maximizes. By Assumption 6.5 and Lemma 6.2, a
distributor does not expect that being more timely should worsen its perceived
timeliness (and thus increase ri). As a result, the values of i over which v¯D is
maximizing remains the same, so dv¯D/dt ≤ 0 still remains true.
From one channel to all channels
Through Assumption 6.5, we can argue that a client prefers to be as timely as
possible in all its exchanges that it chooses to participate in within a particular
channel. In reality, however, a client is likely to be participating in simultaneous
exchanges in multiple channels, and how a client allocates its bandwidth among
these channels has an obvious impact on its payoff.
For instance, suppose that a node is involved in two exchanges, one of
which is timely and one of which is not. Even if it is in a client’s best interest
to be timely in its exchanges, a client may actually be better off allocating
bandwidth from its timely exchange to its untimely exchange to improve its
overall utility.
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Fortunately, for situations where a client is involved in an exchange with
a peer that it is not colluding with, the capped-bandwidth channel saves the
day:
Lemma 6.8. With any peer that a client is not colluding with, the client
never expects that the bandwidth experienced in the remainder of a par-
ticular exchange will ever exceed the channel bandwidth.
This lemma simply follows from the properties of the capped-bandwidth
channel. Simply put, a node does not believe that sending or receiving at a
higher speed will result in higher payoff, and so a node (weakly) prefers sending
at the channel bandwidth. If a client does not expect to receive above channel
bandwidth for any exchange, the best a client can do is transfer at the channel
bandwidth on all channels. This encourages clients to continue to be on-time
in all exchanges that they choose to participate in.
Note that, unlike our previous lemmas, Lemma 6.8 only holds for non-
colluding peers that are involved in an exchange (in fact, it is because of
Lemma 6.8 that Theorem 6.1 only holds for non-colluding peers). If peers are
colluding, then we cannot guarantee that they will necessarily abide to the
channel bandwidth. §6.4.5 describes this issue in more detail.
We now prove Theorem 6.1 using all our previous results.
Proof (of Theorem 6.1). A node’s payoff is effectively determined by the ex-
changes that it takes part in. Being timely does not make a node’s reputation
worse (Assumption 6.5); consequently, Lemmas 6.6 and 6.7 show that a node is
no worse off being timely in the context of every individual exchange. Finally,
by Lemma 6.8, the timeliness of one exchange cannot affect the timeliness of
other simultaneous exchanges, making being timely a node’s expected best
response.
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Content Song TV show Movie Game
Benefit ($) 1 3 15 60
Size (MB) 8 1024 6144 8192
Block size (MB) 0.5 8 32 64






















Discount factor (per hr.) 
 Music  TV show  Movie  Video game 
Figure 6.5: The minimum average effective channel bandwidth, expressed as
a fraction of the channel bandwidth, that a client must experience to prefer
using P2P over the free server tier. For values of the discount factor (x-axis)
that do not have corresponding points, the client never prefers using P2P.
6.4.3 When do clients choose to use P2P?
While §6.4.2 showed that clients that chose to use P2P would prefer to be
timely, recall that clients still have a choice regarding which service level they
choose to use. Under what conditions do clients prefer using P2P over simply
downloading from the server itself?
The answer to this question is complicated, depending on many factors,
including how patient a client is, how much benefit a client gets from the
content, how much the client must pay in order to get said content via the























Discount factor (per hr.) 
 Music  TV show  Movie  Video game 
Figure 6.6: The minimum average effective channel bandwidth, expressed as
a fraction of the channel bandwidth, that a client must experience to prefer
using P2P over the paid server tier. For values of the discount factor (x-axis)
that do not have corresponding points, the client never prefers using P2P.
methods, and what a client will do in the future. Moreover, this may also
depend on how much credit a client has and how it values its credit.
To get an idea of what a client will choose, we consider the following
scenario. Suppose we consider a client that is solely deciding which tier of
service it will use exclusively for some piece of content (listed in Table 6.1),
ignoring what it will do in the future. We conservatively assume that the client
pays all the costs of acquiring the credits needed for the associated level of
service right at the beginning of the exchange. We set the channel bandwidth
to 1024 Kbps, 10 downstream channels, $0.05/GB to upload content, and we
set the cost of using paid download via the server to be 5 times more than via
P2P.
Figures 6.5 and 6.6 shows, for various values of δ, how much effective
downstream bandwidth a client must experience in order to prefer using P2P
over either the free or paid server tier of service using various pieces of content.
As expected, very patient clients—those with values of δ approaching 1—will
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simply prefer getting its content via the cheapest method possible; for instance,
for δ = 0.9999, a client is always better off downloading via the free tier given
the example parameters above. Clients who are extremely impatient (δ < 0.1)
also prefer the cheapest option possible for large pieces of content: by the time
these clients receive the content via any paid means, the content has been
devalued beyond the amount the client had to pay to use the paid service in
the first place.
6.4.4 The effects of Byzantine failure
A client’s beliefs regarding how Byzantine failures occur and their prevalence
have an impact a client’s incentives. However, because we abstract away these
beliefs in the three parameters mentioned in §6.4.1, many of our results and
their affiliated conditions in §6.4.2 and 6.4.3 continue to hold, albeit under
more limited circumstances (e.g., a Byzantine peer may make it more costly
to get an additional fragment or increase the expected amount of time needed
to get fragments).
However, we do have to make one additional restriction on a rational
client’s beliefs regarding Byzantine failures to ensure that Theorem 6.1 still
holds:
Assumption 6.9. Rational clients expect to be strictly worse off interact-
ing (downloading as a consumer, serving as a distributor) with a known
Byzantine peer than not.
The reason this assumption is needed is because if rational clients in-
teracted freely with Byzantine peers (or possibly even preferred interacting
with them), rational participants may be willing to be labeled as Byzantine if
a deviation is expected to be sufficiently profitable. If rational and Byzantine
clients alike deviate, then any stigma (and Byzantine labeling) behind and any
disincentive for deviating is removed, making cooperation difficult to achieve.
In particular, without this assumption, it is possible that a consumer
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would be able to profit in expectation by being receptive to receiving at rates
higher than channel bandwidth and having a random Byzantine distributor
send at a higher rate. Given Assumption 6.9, Lemma 6.8 still holds since a
client believes no client will ever send at a rate higher than channel bandwidth
except possibly Byzantine peers, which the client does not want to associate
with anyway. As a result, even in the presence of Byzantine participants, The-
orem 6.1 holds.
6.4.5 The effects of collusion
In previous sections, we considered incentives with respect to individual con-
sumers and distributors. In this section, we explore how incentives are affected
if consumers or distributors can form coalitions.
Much like §6.4.4, the existence of coalitions have an impact on the
parameters from §6.4.1. Although we cannot ensure that coalitions cannot
profitably deviate from Seer (in particular, Lemma 6.8 no longer holds), despite
these profitable deviations, Theorem 6.1 continues to hold between clients that
are not colluding, thus guaranteeing that clients that are not colluding still
benefit from the cooperation of non-colluding clients in Seer.
To see why, we briefly consider a few ways colluders can potentially
game Seer. We refer to a peer whom the client is colluding with as an insider
(with respect to the client); all other peers are outsiders.
A coalition could work together and use the free channels to get content.
A coalition could simply work together and use the limited free channels that
each individual has at the free tier to download content. While possible, this
greatly restricts the aggregate downstream bandwidth that the coalition pos-
sesses, which could prove to be useful if multiple participants are interested in
downloading content from Seer. Note that this does not affect the actions of
non-colluding clients.
A coalition could exchange content among its members at a rate faster
than the channel bandwidth. A coalition may request a peer to download blocks,
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but then choose to exchange content between coalition members at a rate
exceeding the channel bandwidth. Such a deviation could benefit the coalition
in that members get content more quickly, especially since they may also share
the block key.
Ultimately, there is nothing in Seer that can disincentivize a coalition
from performing this deviation. Note that even if coalition members finish
data transfers early with one another, the server does not issue credit until
the expected time ends, so finishing transfers early provides no benefit with
respect to credit. If a coalition prefers to deviate even at the risk of being late
for exchanges with outsiders, then coalition members may appear to outsiders
as clients that transfer more slowly on average, which may adversely affect
how outsiders view the timeliness of these members.
A coalition could exchange content among its members outside of Seer.
A coalition may choose to exchange content among themselves using their own
optimized protocol. As before, there is little we can do.
A coalition could register to serve blocks they do not have. A colluder
could register for a block that it has previously downloaded but no longer has.
Consumers, however, check to ensure that content is sent from the expected
source address. Thus, a colluder here must acquire the content from a fellow
insider before sending it to the consumer, which is effectively the same as
transferring content outside of Seer.
A coalition could send reports for exchanges that are not actually com-
pleted. Two colluders that are paired together could feign the exchange and
report to the server even though such an exchange never occurred. The result
of such a deviation is one coalition member transfers credit to a fellow insider,
which in itself does not enable the coalition to gain credit as a whole. More-
over, such a deviation uses up one of the distributor’s channels that could have
been used to earn credit.
A coalition could start spurious exchanges with outsiders. A member
of a coalition could start spurious exchanges with outsiders in order to waste
their resources. While this could slow down outsiders from obtaining content or
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serving content (thereby allowing other coalition members to serve content in
the meantime), recall that clients ultimately have free will as to whether they
believe continuing this exchange is in their best interest. Thus, the outsider
can always abort the exchange and receive pro-rated credit from the server
(via the coalition), and distributors can always reject this coalition member
in the future. Moreover, performing these spurious exchanges as a consumer
wastes credit, since the consumer has to pay (potentially the server rate) for
the block; performing this deviation as a distributor wastes a channel that
could have been used to serve other consumers.
6.4.6 Discussion
In this section, we discuss some other considerations and issues.
Macroeconomic issues By providing a credit system and a bank, Seer ef-
fectively induces an economy among its participants. As with any economy,
there are macroeconomic issues that need to be addressed. For instance, what
if a particular client hoards all the credits it has? Alternatively, what if clients
who earn credit spend it to download from the server, thus draining the econ-
omy of credit?
Many of the policies and decisions to shape the economy are outside
the the scope of this paper. That said, various policies and decisions could
be adopted by content providers to provide different guarantees. For instance,
one way to introduce additional credit in the service is by rewarding credit
to clients that have contributed more in the past. While coalition members
may then have some incentive to generate spurious exchanges, one way to
combat this is by, once again, leveraging the impatience of clients: charge a
tax on distributors (making the exchanges negative sum) and then refund
some multiple of the tax later on to the distributor. As a result of discounting,
the coalition is actually worse off: while the tax refund is higher than the tax
charged, the refund is heavily discounted by being in the future.
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Alternatively, there could simply be periodic credit grants to all clients
or those that have little credit and have not downloaded much recently. We
must ensure that clients do not sit around for a “free lunch”; this can be
achieved by simply making the amount low and the frequency rare to ensure
that a client is unlikely to significantly benefit from this grant.
Bootstrapping the service. Until this point, we have ignored how clients
gets credits in the first place when joining the service. Ultimately, this is a
policy decision that depends on the content provider and its willingness to
serve clients directly with the server. For instance, clients could be issued a
certain number of credits to start, and if the participant purchases any content,
additional credits could be issued. A client that wants to earn extra credit could
potentially ask the server to assign it blocks to serve. In such cases, the server
encrypts the block with a special symmetric key that prevents the client from
peeking into the block’s contents. When a service first starts, the tracker itself
could serve to help bootstrap the service by acting as a consumer downloading
content from clients. While this would waste the tracker’s resources, this would
also ensure that clients do their fair share to earn credit. Finally, a content
provider could provide a method for clients to purchase credit with cash.
Relaxing the reliance on the capped-bandwidth channel. Lemma 6.8
relies on a combination of the capped-bandwidth channel and clients weakly
preferring to continue using exchanging at channel bandwidth.
However, even if the channel did not have the bandwidth cap, note that
an exchange’s bandwidth cannot be unilaterally decided by one node. The
bandwidth is determined by both nodes, and to send at a higher bandwidth, a
node must attempt sending at a faster rate, and its peer must also be willing to
transfer at this rate. How much bandwidth a peer is willing or able to allocate
to an exchange is unknown to a node, since it depends on a peer’s bandwidth
and the other transfers that the peer is simultaneously undertaking, including
how timely these other exchanges are, this peer’s perceived timeliness to its
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own peers, how likely this peer’s own peers will themselves transfer at a faster
rate, and so on.
Ultimately, to best respond, a node needs to form expectations over
how all other nodes in the system are behaving in the system: whether they
are acting as consumers and distributors, for which blocks they are processing,
with whom they are exchanging, when the exchange began/is expected to end,
etc. Such knowledge is unlikely to be known with any meaningful accuracy by
any single node in the system. Thus, it may be realistic to simply assume that
clients do not possess sufficient knowledge to assess whether it can expect to
send more quickly with a particular non-Byzantine peer.
Another way to relax the capped-bandwidth channel is by having nodes
believe that Byzantine peers transfer above channel bandwidth with positive
probability. Because non-Byzantine nodes (at least) initially run the specified
protocol and transfer at channel bandwidth, then any node observed to be
deviating by transferring above channel bandwidth will be labeled as Byzantine
by its peer in the exchange. If interacting with Byzantine peers is expected to
have an adverse impact on a rational node’s payoff, a rational node will neither
interact with any Byzantine peer nor transfer above channel bandwidth, as
this may result in that node being labeled Byzantine and cutoff from a non-
Byzantine peer.
Another, related method is to leverage acquiescent nodes, which are
willing to follow whatever strategy they are given. For instance, suppose that,
following the protocol, a node that observes its peer exceeding channel band-
width in an exchange terminates the exchange—which makes the exchange no
less timely or costly for a rational node than finishing at channel bandwidth—
and blacklists the peer—which is no better than simply being labeled as un-
timely for this exchange. A rational node will then never deviate in this manner
with a peer if a rational node believes there are a sufficiently large risk of en-
countering a peer who will enforce this punishment.
Both of these prior approaches assume that a node never appears to
be transferring at a faster bandwidth than it actually is. We believe this is a
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reasonable assumption, given strong identities of nodes and the reality that
network loss makes nodes appear to be slower, not faster.
Finally, note that this lemma is regarding a node’s expectation, and
reality does not necessarily have to match this expectation.
6.5 Implementation and evaluation
Seer is implemented using around 11,800 lines of heavily-multithreaded Java
code and 430 lines of Apache Thrift [3] for implementing the control channels
(RPC and serialization).
Data communication is done through an implementation of the capped-
bandwidth channel, which is implemented by writing a wrapper around the
Java’s socket library and rate-limiting the bandwidth by checking the through-
put every second and idling the channel if the channel is sending or receiving
too quickly. The channel attempts to maintain an average transfer bandwidth
equal to the channel bandwidth within a particular fragment, i.e., it will try to
catch up if it falls behind while transferring the fragment. Between fragments,
the channel will delay if it is running ahead of schedule. This implies that if
the channel falls behind on a particular fragment, it will not attempt to make
up for this tardiness by transferring future fragments at a bandwidth higher
than channel bandwidth (as specified in §6.3.2).
Our implementation separates a membership server, where clients sign
in and log into the service, from the tracker server, which effectively handles
tracking the state of all clients in the system. To allow users to access the
tracker after logging in through the membership server, the membership server
provides a server-signed access token that is effectively a lease on when they can
access the service. This access token is presented with every message sent to the
tracker. We separate out the server-backed distributor, but in our experiments,
we co-locate the two together.
We use SSL channels to secure all control communication (i.e., any com-
munication outside of the data transfers themselves). In our implementation,
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when the consumer initiates a block exchange with a particular distributor
(via a secure control channel), the consumer provides a nonce. The distrib-
utor, when initiating a data connection to the consumer, must present this
nonce as the first piece of data. The consumer only accepts an incoming con-
nection if the nonce received is the one expected from this IP address. We do
not secure the data channel otherwise.
The Seer client, upon receiving the block ids that make up a piece of
content, download the block ids in completely random order. For simplicity,
we do not implement the bandwidth test that the server performs. The imple-
mentation assumes a single fixed block and fragment size. Our implementation
of the client also currently does not perform any batching; thus, for a given
workload, our experiments will put more load on the server.
We implemented the client policy based on the conditions described
in §6.4.2. We set the client to expect the best-case scenario for continuation
utility: full credit (and, for the consumer, the block) in a timely fashion. As a
result, a client believes it can do really well in future exchanges, making it less
patient with the current exchange it is part of. We fix the expected marginal
net payoff per fragment to 1, and we calculate the expected time to get more
fragments based on the observed bandwidth in the current exchange starting
1 second into the exchange. Clients re-evaluate their policies every time they
have an opportunity to send a Fragment or Ack message or after 1 second
after the last message, whichever is sooner.
Experimental setup. We run all server-related code (membership, tracker,
and server-backed distributor) on a single server with a two 8-core, 3 GHz
AMD Opteron 4284 processors and 64 GB of RAM. The peers are running
on about 180 department cluster machines with varying configurations, with
one machine with a dual-core, single-threaded, 2.33 GHz Intel Core 2 Duo
processor and 4 GB of RAM to a large number of machines (about half) with
quad-core, dual-threaded 3.5 GHz Intel Xeon-powered machines with 16 GB of
RAM. Overall, we have a total of about 670 cores with 1260 hardware threads
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Table 6.2: Average throughput per client vs. block size.
with approximately 14.6 GB of RAM on average per machine. We distribute
peers on machines in a weighted fashion; the number of clients we put on each
machine is linear to the number of cores the machine has.
All of our machines run Ubuntu Linux 12.04. While our machines are
connected through a department network via 1 Gbps links, we set the chan-
nel bandwidth to 1 Mbps and restrict the network bandwidth of peers to 10
capped-bandwidth downstream channels and 10 capped-bandwidth upstream
channels (10 Mbps full-duplex). We do not restrict the number of channels for
the server.
6.5.1 Selecting block size
We first explored the tradeoffs involved in selecting different block sizes. Intu-
itively, bigger block sizes incur lower overhead on the tracker because clients
check in less frequently, but larger blocks result both in less entropy (due
to fewer available blocks) and more involvement of the server if nodes fail.
Moreover, because each block is served by a single peer and each channel has
a capped bandwidth, larger blocks reduce the number of blocks that can be
downloaded in parallel.
In this experiment, we deploy a 100-peer flash crowd which start down-
loading a 500 MB file simultaneously. To simulate more realistic network con-
ditions, we introduce an artificial network latency of 100 ms at the application
level on all network communication (control and data).




























Figure 6.7: Proportion of data served by the server to a flash crowd with
varying block sizes.
varying block sizes. As expected, a small block size can cause lower throughput
due to the increased overhead imposed to the server. On the other hand, a large
block size may hurt the throughput due to the reduced content entropy in the
P2P network. In our experiment, a block size of 1-4 MB achieves about the
same performance: about 11.4% higher than a block size of 512 KB. We believe
that it is possible that with an implementation of Seer that uses finer-grained
locks, smaller block sizes may perform better.
Figure 6.7 shows the proportion of fragments that Seer is serving using
the server when block sizes are varied. We counted the number of fragments
that clients downloaded from the server as a result of not using the assigned
distributor at all (“Entire Block”) and aborting its exchange early (“Partial”).
We calculated the proportion over the total number of fragments that all clients
downloaded from the server. As block sizes increase, the decrease in entropy
and increase in proportion of possibly aborting an exchange early results in
more fragments being served from the server.
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6.5.2 Scalability
To investigate the scalability of Seer, we ran experiments with 20 to 500 peers.
For comparison, we ran the same experiments with BitTorrent and with a
conventional client/server system. For BitTorrent, we use cTorrent 3.3.2 [6] to
provide the clients and initial seeder; we use opentracker [13] to provide the
tracker. We put no network bandwidth constraint on the seeder but limit all
other clients to 10 Mbps upstream/downstream bandwidth. We leave all other
parameters set to their defaults (e.g., 4 slots for serving peers, one of which is
an unchoke slot).
For client/server, we use our own simple implementation of a server and
client that uses multithreading to serve requests from clients directly. We use
our capped-bandwidth data channels in this implementation to limit channel
bandwidth to 10 Mbps/10 Mbps upstream/downstream bandwidth but use no
other mechanisms from Seer. In all experiments, clients download 500MB of
content and log out 10 seconds after completing their download. The block size
used for Seer is 4MB with 64KB fragment. The size of a piece—BitTorrent’s
version of the block—is 512KB (the recommended size for 500 MB of content).
Flash crowd. We first tested Seer with all clients joining the system at the
same time. Figure 6.8 shows how Seer compares to BitTorrent and a traditional
client/server system. As expected, in Seer, the average download throughput
of client decreases as the number of clients increase due to increased load
on the server having to coordinate block exchanges and make up for aborted
exchanges. With 20 clients, Seer achieves 9.7 Mbps; at 200 clients, 9.1 Mbps;
and by 500 clients, 8.2 Mbps. Not surprisingly, while client/server system works
better for small numbers of clients, its throughput significantly drops with the
larger number of clients as the bandwidth of the server becomes the bottleneck
of system performance.
Surprisingly, Seer outperforms BitTorrent for the number of clients we
evaluated. We believe this benefit comes from the server in Seer ensuring that


























Figure 6.8: Comparison of throughput, normalized to the theoretical maxi-
mum of 10 Mbps, between Seer, BitTorrent, and client/server with a varying
number of clients in a flash crowd.
have bandwidth, and are willing to send said block to the requesting consumer,
whereas in BitTorrent, clients are given a random subset of peers to download
from and upload to, some of which may not have bandwidth or may not
be willing to serve the client. Note that another benefit that Seer’s capped-
bandwidth channels would provide in more heterogeneous environments than
the one in our evaluation is that nodes are effectively bandwidth-matched and
have a clear understanding of what they are expected to do. On the other hand,
BitTorrent clients may end up uploading content to peers in an vain attempt to
try to curry their favor by unchoking them, which may occur when nodes have
vastly different connections [71]. However, we expect that the performance
of Seer would drop below BitTorrent with larger number of clients since the
server is the performance bottleneck.
To get an idea of how many fragments the Seer server is serving, we
measured what proportion of fragments Seer is serving using the server with



























Figure 6.9: Proportion of received data served by the server with a varying
number of clients in a flash crowd.
Unsurprisingly, for a small number of clients, the clients receive more data
from the server. As we increase the number of clients, less than 10% of data is
served directly by the server. On the other hand, the portion of partial block
transfer served by the server increases as the number of clients increase: in
our tests, Seer server serves only approximately 10% of data when there are
at least 100 clients.
Randomly-distributed downloads. We then tested how well Seer per-
formed versus other systems when clients logged in and downloaded the con-
tent at random times. We spawned clients at random delays, where the random
delay was an exponentially-distributed random variable with λ = 1 (per sec-
ond, i.e., one client per second on average).
Given this, Figure 6.10 shows how Seer compares to BitTorrent and
client/server systems. Both Seer and BitTorrent perform better, roughly pro-
viding stable throughput throughout the number of clients we tested, even with


























Figure 6.10: Comparison of throughput, normalized to the theoretical max-
imum of 10 Mbps, between Seer, BitTorrent, and client/server with a varying
number of clients that download at random times.
remains more stable is because there are more opportunities for clients to serve
as distributors to help other clients. This is particularly true for BitTorrent;
since clients are given a random set of peers to work with, having clients join
at random times ensures that the random set of peers is more likely to have the
content than in the flash crowd scenario. For Seer, staggering when clients join
the system ensures that fewer peers have to go through the server to get the
content, reducing the load on the server itself. Unsurprisingly, client/server still
performs poorly even in this case, as bandwidth continues to be a bottleneck
in the system for most clients downloading the content.
6.6 Summary
In this paper, we designed and implemented a new hybrid P2P service—Seer—
that we believe represents a significant advancement in the design and imple-



























Figure 6.11: Proportion of received data served by the server with a varying
number of clients that download at random times.
just the first of many. We are interested in seeing if our approach to dealing
with collusion can be used to deal with Sybil identities—which complicates the
granting of credit to participants—as well as trying to enable more flexibility
in various parts of the protocol without weakening the robust guarantees pro-
vided by the service. For example, being able to provide consumers the ability
to blacklist distributors may be useful in dealing with faulty (or even colluding)
entities, but it is unclear how this may affect our incentives. We also believe
that a Seer-like approach can be adapted to streaming media since the incen-
tives in Seer are based on timing and node impatience. With the principles
we learned in designing and building Seer, we believe that Seer provides us a




There is extensive related work in the areas that this thesis covers. We describe
some of the more relevant work that we are aware of here.
7.1 Incentives in the presence of failure
There has been much work in providing incentives when nodes may fail. The
two primary examples that this thesis focuses on are the BAR model [24]
and (k, t)-robustness [19, 21]. This thesis formalizes and extends the work of
the BAR model and shows that, while appealing, the guarantees that (k, t)-
robustness provides with respect to failure and coalition are hard to achieve in
practice. As this thesis has covered these two models in detail, we omit further
details here.
The t-maximin-like approach (Definition 3.14) has been used by Mosci-
broda et al. [86] to consider worst-case Byzantine behavior in the context of
computer virus propagation. Furthermore, several systems have been built us-
ing the BAR model [78, 79].
Eliaz [49] has described a solution concept which is effectively (1, t)-
robustness. Gradwohl [56] explored regret-free equilibria with t arbitrary or
colluding nodes in leader election and random sampling games. As shown in
§3.2, these notions do not admit equilibria in many real-world cooperative
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services.
Our results are similar in spirit to previous work in mechanism design
[47, 55, 66, 88, 97] which have explored the feasibility of using mechanisms to
incentivize nodes to reveal their true types. Much of this work has found that
mechanisms that incentivize nodes to reveal their true preferences or types for
every possible realization of types are found to be often impossible or heavily
restricted. Others [47, 88] achieved positive results by using Bayesian solution
concepts instead of dominant ones. Mookherjee et al. [84] define conditions in
which Bayesian incentive-compatible mechanisms can be replaced by equiva-
lent dominant-strategy mechanisms.
Maximin strategies have been previously explored in conjunction with
adversarial or possibly irrational agents. Alon et al. [25] quantify how, in a
two-player zero-sum game, the payoff of playing a mixed maximin strategy is
affected by an adversary who can choose its actions based on some information
about its peer’s realized strategy. Tennenholtz [101], extending the work of
Aumann et al. [30, 32], explores how maximin strategies can approximate the
payoff of a Nash equilibrium when a rational node may not want to rely on
the rationality of its peers.
7.2 Leveraging acquiescent participants
The existence of acquiescent or altruistic participants extend far beyond co-
operative services into the real world (e.g., [27]). Consequently, there has been
extensive work in game theory that has covered imperfect knowledge, private
signaling, and the use of “irrationally” correct nodes. The use of acquiescence
to achieve cooperation in the finitely-repeated prisoner’s dilemma game was
first proposed by Kreps et al. [73]. It was shown that reputations could be
maintained even when there was imperfect observation of actions [53]. Cripps
et al. later showed that, under certain conditions, reputations cannot be main-
tained forever unless the action played by the irrational node was part of a
rational node’s equilibrium strategy [45, 46].
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The scenario considered in this thesis differs from much of this work con-
sidering Byzantine participants and network loss. None of the previous work
explicitly consider the possibility of Byzantine and acquiescent players. Much
of the previous work has also assumed that actions or their corresponding sig-
nals can either be observed at least publicly [45, 53], if not perfectly [73], or
that any signal can occur as a result of any action with positive probability
[46]. More importantly, previous work has focused on the existence (or nonex-
istence) of equilibrium under general conditions, whereas we are interested in
applying this theory to a specific problem and a realistic model that we believe
to be applicable to many distributed protocols.
Martin [83] introduced a notion of equilibrium in which rational nodes
do not deviate regardless of Byzantine or acquiescent nodes’ actions. Our work
differs from this work by showing the need for acquiescence to address a key
problem in cooperative services and considering real-world issues such as net-
work costs and lossy links.
Vassilakis et al. [103] study how acquiescence affects content sharing in
P2P services at the application level. Their approach, which does not address
Byzantine participants, complements our own; we focus on network-level in-
centives and issues (such as lossy links) that motivate participants to actually
send the content they share at the application level.
Note that the pester mechanism that we implement using acquiescent
nodes in §4 can be applied to many systems, e.g., BAR Gossip [79], FOX [77],
and PropShare [76] can use acquiescence to incentivize key exchange. Our
technique may provide insight into the larger fair exchange problem [72, 90].
Finally, rational secret sharing [60] faces a similar problem to the last-exchange
problem we considered in §4. However, without a pestering mechanism, our
work is not directly applicable.
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7.3 Incentives in the presence of collusion
Coalitions have been studied in depth in the game theory literature. We have
seen how hard it is to achieve useful equilibria in cooperative services using
strong Nash equilibrium [31], which is effectively n-resilience and thus requires
a strategy profile be Pareto optimal, and k-resilience [19, 21], which has weaker
but similar requirements. Green et al. [57] has similarly demonstrated the
difficulty of dealing with coalitions in mechanism design by showing that, in
the presence of coalitions, revealing one’s private information truthfully is not
a dominant strategy.
Bernheim et al. [33] describe coalition-proof Nash equilibria, which
weaken strong Nash equilibria by requiring that the equilibrium be prefer-
able only to self-enforcing deviations, i.e., a deviation by a coalition in which
no sub-coalition of this coalition can further deviate and profit. Consider-
ing only self-enforcing deviations provides little benefit when coalitions have
exogenous means to ensure that coalition members deviate together, which
we argue is often the case in cooperative services. For instance, friends may
avoid hurting each other because of social repercussions (which can be formally
modeled using notions of binding commitments or multimarket contact [34]).
Finally, there has been work in defining correlated versions of strong Nash and
coalition-proof equilibria (e.g., [35, 48, 85]); like their non-correlated counter-
parts, these equilibria require a best response despite how nodes collude and
thus have similar shortcomings.
As previously mentioned in §5.1, the theory of the core and coopera-
tive game theory studies how nodes can cooperate in order to maximize their
own payoffs, but the focus on cooperative game theory—how nodes choose to
collude—differs from the focus of our (and traditional, non-cooperative game
theory) work—the interactions between non-cooperative nodes and coalitions.
In the context of mechanism design and auctions, Chen et al. [40] de-
scribe rationally-robust implementation, an interesting non-equilibrium-based
solution concept that primarily aims to ensure that even if every individual
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or coalition is given no initial hint of what to play, the underlying mechanism
induces individuals or coalitions to choose strategies that ultimately preserve
some desired system property. As a result, players may play multiple strategies,
as in our equilibria; unlike equilibrium-based approaches, rationally-robust im-
plementation does not predict the exact strategies that will be used, which
ultimately may be any undominated strategy. It is unclear whether rationally-
robust implementation’s notion of dominance can remove enough strategies in
games based on cooperative services to enable the existence of useful properties
that hold for all surviving strategies.
Another way to deal with collusion is by aiming for an approximate
best response or -equilibrium (e.g., [77, 78]), which guarantees that deviations
only provide minimum benefit. This approach could be used to disincentivize
coalitions if colluding provides limited benefit (which, as seen in Section 5.1,
may not be the case) and is largely complementary to our approach. Similarly,
DCast [109] is an overlay multicast protocol that guarantees each node that
follows the protocol some baseline payoff, even if others may collude. However,
DCast does not aim to be an equilibrium and thus provides no guarantees that
nodes will actually follow the protocol.
In some cases (e.g., in a multicast cost-sharing game [29]), mechanisms
can be designed that are robust to coalitional deviations. However, since it is
difficult to devise such mechanisms, many systems focus instead on detecting
or reducing the effects of collusion. Several content distribution systems (e.g.,
[92, 94]) use incentives that attempt to reduce the benefits of collusion. Lian
et al. [80] use a variety of techniques to detect collusion in a popular P2P
service. Reiter et al. [95] design a reputation mechanism that require nodes
to solve puzzles to prove they have the content in question. Tran et al. [102]
develop a credit-based system in which a node’s reputation is based on the
number of distinct credit issuers it has received credit from and filters out
those issuers that have issued excessive credits. EigenTrust [69] uses trusted
peers to provide reputations that are robust against limited misbehavior (due
to coalitions or failure). Similarly, Feldman et al. [52] and Marti et al. [82]
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describe reputation systems that place more trust and weight in certain peers’
opinions. Finally, Zhang et al. [110] describe a heuristic for preventing colluding
administrators from using links to increase the ranks of their pages in Google’s
PageRank algorithm. These systems can only ameliorate, not eliminate, the
effects of collusion and provide no rigorous assurance that rational nodes will
not deviate.
7.4 Other P2P and hybrid P2P systems
There have bee a plethora of hybrid P2P services used in commercial applica-
tions (e.g., Spotify [17], Blizzard [5], PPTV [14, 64], LiveSky [108], and Aka-
mai [2]). As previously mentioned, these services largely assume that clients
will contribute their fair share, an assumption that may not hold in practice
[22, 65, 96].
Hybrid P2P systems have also been proposed in previous research. Dan-
delion [100] is a hybrid P2P service that shares many similarities with Seer.
Where Dandelion and Seer differs is in its incentives: while Dandelion mentions
malicious, altruistic, and colluding nodes, there is little in the way of argument
that shows that following Dandelion is in rational node’s best interest despite
these “irrational” agents, especially since altruistic nodes give away content
for free.
Antfarm [92] is a hybrid P2P content distribution system that uses a
BitTorrent-like protocol for disseminating content. Unlike BitTorrent and like
Seer, a coordinator issues credits to clients, which use them to pay for content.
Unlike Seer, Antfarm’s main purpose for these tokens is for resource allocation:
by forcing clients to cash in credits, the coordinator can track which swarms
are actively downloading, and the coordinator can allocate trusted seeders to
those swarms that would benefit the most from additional seeders. Although
these tokens could play a part in incentivizing cooperation, Antfarm does not
provide rigorous incentives for encouraging nodes to disseminate content or
participate faithfully in bandwidth resource allocation, leaving BitTorrent to
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deal with the former issue (which itself is known to be susceptible to gaming
[68, 76, 81, 93, 99]). Moreover, Antfarm, like BitTorrent, does not handle
malicious or colluding nodes.
Floodgate [89] is a P2P system that uses a credit system based on a
trusted server. Floodgate uses tokens that do not have to be checked against
the server that allow nodes to download some piece of content. Unlike Seer,
Floodgate only uses the server for credits, does not leverage the server for
anything else, and provides few theoretical guarantees that nodes want to
participate in the service.
The benefits of P2P techniques in video-on-demand services have been
studied in much previous work (e.g., [62, 63]). Zebra [41] and Zebroid [42] are
two systems that implement a hybrid P2P-assisted video-on-demand service.
Huang et al. [64] showed the benefits of using P2P techniques in PPLive [14],
which has since become a hybrid architecture known as PPTV similar to the
one proposed for Seer. Only a few of these services consider rational behavior
at all, and none of this work provide guarantees that rational participants will
faithfully participate (even ignoring collusion or Byzantine behavior, which
are also not considered). Contracts [94] attempts to improve PPLive’s incen-
tives for rational cooperation and has some facilities for handling collusion,
but it provides no formal guarantees and does not consider the possibility of
Byzantine participants.
Reliable Client Accounting (RCA) [23] describes a way of performing
reliable accounting of all client interactions in hybrid CDNs. Clients maintain
logs of interactions, report these logs to a centralized infrastructure, which
audits the logs to find anomalous behavior. Such behavior is then quarantined
and restricted to downloading from infrastructure (not P2P) nodes. RCA is
largely complementary to our approach and could potentially be used to catch
misbehaving nodes in the system, thus making the P2P component more at-
tractive to clients.
Aperjis et al. [28] propose PACE, a mechanism that matches up nodes
for multilateral exchanges—which Aperjis et al. argue are more efficient and
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robust than bilateral exchanges such as those used by BitTorrent—and en-
ables nodes to set their own price for serving content—which enable efficient
use of network resources. While Seer also uses a multilateral exchange, Seer
effectively provides only one single global price that is dictated by the tracker.
However, the pricing mechanism provided by PACE is largely orthogonal to
the mechanisms used by Seer, and a PACE-like pricing mechanism could be
adopted by Seer.
Beyond hybrid P2P systems, there have been a variety of P2P systems
used in practice (e.g., [7, 8, 11, 16]) which rely on users faithfully serving
their fair share of content. Such assumptions are unlikely to hold in practice
[22, 65, 96]. Kazaa [9] was formerly a popular P2P service that provided some
incentives in the form of a reputation, which was later gamed by free-riding
clients [10]. BitTorrent [4, 43] is, at the time of writing, a popular P2P service
for distributing content, which leverages a tit-for-tat scheme to give preference
to peers that have uploaded to a node in the past. There has been much
subsequent work that has shown that the incentives provided by the protocol
are susceptible to strategic manipulation [68, 76, 81, 93, 99].
EquiCast [70] and FOX [77] are a few other examples of research systems
that have been developed to deal with rational incentives. Of these systems,
only AntFarm deals with Byzantine behavior; none of them are able to leverage
acquiescent nodes to encourage rational cooperation nor deal with rational
collusion. Finally, as previously mentioned, there has been several systems
that, like Seer, have been built upon the BAR model [24, 79, 78]. Unlike these
systems, Seer leverages the server to tolerate the same types of nodes and
deal with collusion without requiring some of the strong assumptions (e.g.,




This thesis spans both theory and systems by describing contributions to
the design, reasoning, and implementation of incentives in cooperative ser-
vices where nodes may be faulty, selfish, or correct. More generally, this thesis
demonstrates the importance of considering the applicability of theory to real
systems; after all, as we showed, theoretically-rigorous solution concepts that
require a rational node to always prefer the equilibrium strategy, despite how
Byzantine failures may occur or how nodes may collude, are unlikely to yield
useful results in many practical cooperative services. Furthermore, while it
may be desirable to aim for guarantees that hold in the absence of acquies-
cent nodes, such goals may sacrifice the ability to achieve cooperation at the
end of the service. This loss may, in turn, result in the inability to guarantee
cooperation at all in the entire service.
Fortunately, this dissertation is not all bad news. We showed that, by
taking expectation into account, solution concepts can both provide rigorous
guarantees regarding rational behavior in the presence of Byzantine failure and
yield useful equilibria in applications of interest. We demonstrate that acqui-
escence, which often enables selfish free-riding, can be wielded to encourage
rational cooperation. We introduce a novel approach for reasoning about the
incentives when nodes may collude and solution concepts that allow us to pro-
vide strong guarantees about the behavior of rational nodes that may collude.
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Finally, we describe the design and implementation of Seer, a system that pro-
vides robust, reliable, and scalable content dissemination and demonstrates
that our theoretical insights can be applied to real systems.
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